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Introduction
We cannot literally take a number
in our hands and ‘apply’ it to a
physical object.
Patrick Suppes
If all you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail.
Popular adage
The problem I am going to deal with in this work is often briefly summarized
in the following way: why is mathematics applied and applicable to physics
(and to science in general)? However, this is a very misleading way to set the
problem. It gives the erroneous impression that we are handling two different
areas of knowledge, mathematics and physics; that these two areas are mutually
separated and independent; and that we are asking why the former can be
profitably applied to the latter.
There is no doubt that mathematics is actually a field of knowledge indepen-
dent from physics; but it is surely wrong to say the reciprocal for the physics.
There is nothing like a ‘nonmathematical physics’ to which we ‘apply’ mathe-
matics. Surely, we can provide the example of the Aristotelian physics, which
was to all intents and purposes a “physics” (at least if by that we mean a com-
plex of propositions aimed to describe and understand the emprical phenomena)
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and didn’t make use of any mathematics at all. But nowadays physics is surely
not aristotelian physics + mathematics. Indeed, the Scientific Revolution in
XVII century had a deep impact on the conception and practice of physics —
an impact that cannot be summarized by simply saying that physicists started
to use mathematics.
The point that I want to emphisize is that, from the Scientific Revolution
up to now, the physical concepts themselves are strictly interwoven with math-
ematical ones. So, in a certain sense, there is no “application” at all. Rather,
we must account for the very fact that physical concepts are mathematically
shaped. The mathematics operates within the physics; it is not something that
is just sticked to it from the outside. As Dyson (1964) points out,
For a physicist mathematics is not just a tool by means of which phenom-
ena can be calculated, it is the main source of concepts and principles by
means of which new theories can be created. (p. 129)
As a consequence of this strict twine between physics and mathematics,
it often happens that a clear distinction between physical and mathematical
concepts is impossible to draw in a precise manner.
[T]here is no theoretical way of drawing a sharp distinction between a piece
of pure mathematics and a piece of theoretical science. The set-theoretical
definitions of the theory of mechanics, the theory of thermodynamics, the
theory of learning, to give three rather disparate examples, are on all
fours with the definitions of the purely mathematical theories of groups,
rings, fields, etc. From the philosophical standpoint there is no sharp
distinction between pure and applied mathematics, in spite of much talk
to the contrary. (Suppes 1967a, pp. 29–30)
It follows that, if we want to take these quotations seriously, the problem
cannot be seen as a problem only for the philosophy of mathematics. The topic
has a boder-line feature. Its solution cannot depend only on a survey concerning
the nature of mathematics. What we are trying to understand is the role of
mathematics in the scientific enterprise; so, we are interested in those features
of scientific enterprise that ask and justify the employment of mathematics.
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In a very general way, we can distinguish between two contributions to our
discussion. On the one side, we must point out (A) which features internal to
mathematics are of some interest to the physicist. On the other side, we must
show (B) how these features can be integrated in the representational production
of physics, and hence how these features can help to reach this representing aim.
In contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the role of mathematics in sci-
ence is often mentioned as a premise for drawing conclusion of various kinds.
The importance and centrality of this role is so well emphasized — but it is
notwithstanding still not well understood. And not only it is still not well
understood, but it seems that the efforts to clarify this role aren’t even propor-
tional to the number of mentions. Just to give an example, there is a lot of works
concerning the so called indispensability argument, whose fundamental premise
says that mathematics has an indispensable role in our (best) scientific theories.
But none of these works takes the trouble to go deeper into the question and to
clarify why mathematics is really indispensable.
Thus, contemporary philosophers rarely dealt with the real philosophical
problems that applicability of mathematics raises.1 Such a circumstance is quite
odd, since until Frege these problem were well present in the philosopher’s dis-
cussions. The dismissal of such a problem is thus quite recent and one might
legitimately ask why the problem has been dismissed.
In the next chapters I will deal with all these problems and I will try to
offer some relevant contributions to their analysis. The present work is divided
into three parts. The first two parts aim to understand the nature and the
philosophical significance of the problem of mathematical applicability. Actu-
ally, one might raise the question: Is really there a problem here — a problem
concerning the applicability of mathematics? And if there really is a problem,
is it a philosophical problem? That Frege and many logicists thought, until the
1This is true apart from some exceptions, of course.
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beginning of the 20th century, that their philosophy of mathematics could offer
a significant and satisfying answer to the question about why mathematics is so
useful to science, and the fact that the problem has been dismissed after them,
makes the previous questions even more urgent.
Thus, in the first part (Historical Considerations), I will deal with
the historical problem of understanding why the applicability problem has been
dismissed after Frege’s and logicists’ analysis (Chapter 1: A Neglected Problem).
I will show that their answer is no longer satisfying and that such a dismissal
was not due to a real overcoming of the problem.
The second part (Philosophical Problems) will be devoted to the analy-
sis of the specific philosophical problems lying behind the applicability of math-
ematics. First I will discuss Wigner’s (1960) famous analysis (Chapter 2: Do
Miracles Occur? ), and then I will deal with Steiner’s (1998) fundamental work
on the topic (Chapter 3: Applicabilities of Mathematics). As we will see, there
are many philosophical problems concerning the applicability of mathematics.
A further chapter (Chapter 4: Applicability and Ontological Issues) will be
devoted to an analysis of the relations between ontological questions in math-
ematics and its applicability and effectiveness in science, in order to remove
any misunderstanding about the possibility that the problems of mathematical
applicability are nothing but a consequence of a certain ontological choice.
Finally, in the third part (An Account for Mathematical Represen-
tativeness) I will offer an original account for one of the main roles played by
mathematics in science: the representative role, which is at the very base of so
many scientific discoveries and improvements in contemporary physics. First,
(Chapter 5: Structures and Applicability) I will present my account in a purely
theoretical way, and then I will offer some concrete examples in support of such







The philosophical reflection has always paid a fair amount of attention to the role
of mathematics in the physical knowledge. From Plato to Frege, moving through
Galileo, Berkeley, Kant, and many others, philosophy has always been interested
in the relations between mathematics and the knowledge of the external world.
However, if we give a look to the philosophical reflection from the middle of the
20th century up to now, we can notice that this problem has been progressively
dismissed — that contemporary philosophy (both of science and mathematics)
has forgotten the problem, and that it is only in the very last years that it has
known a timid revival. During all this time, there has been no lack of physicians
and mathematicians who expressed a vague wonder for the amazing effectiveness
of mathematics in physics1 — but no philosophical reflection followed up this
wonder.2
Mark Steiner, in his (1998) underlines this neglect by pointing out that
(Benacerraf & Putnam 1983) — which can be legitimately considered the most
important 20th century anthology about philosophy of mathematics — com-
1See chapter 2.
2A relevant exception to this claim, which deserves to be mentioned, is Körner (2009
[1960]).
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prises no article concerning mathematical application or applicability. Steiner
reports that, when he reproached Benacerraf for it, Benacerraf answered that
lack of material was the reason for this gap.3 The aim of this chapter con-
sists just in trying to find a historical reason for this philosophical neglect, and
contextually in showing that this neglect cannot be overlooked any further.
This neglect seems to have a quite precise cronological collocation. It is a
matter of fact that early in the 20th century the applicability problem was still,
at least superficially, addressed. This is well testified by the quotations from
Russell, Frege and Hahn that we shall read further on in this chapter. So, we can
agree with Mark Steiner when he says that «the disregard by the philosophical
community of issues of mathematical application is quite recent».4 It is even
more surprising if we think that it was just in the second half of the 20th century
that mathematics gave its most important contribute to the physical inquiry.5
So, what did it happen in the middle of the 20th century?
1.1 Carnap and the Logical Empiricism
Wilholt (2006) tries to give an answer to this question. He notices a suspicious
coincidence between the disappearance of the applicability problem and the
ascent and heyday of Logical Empiricism, and finds a cause for this neglect in
the history of this philosophical current. By examining the idea of the early
logicians who held that the analyticity of mathematics could account for its
applicability, he points out that this idea has been transformed through Carnap’s
efforts to establish a consistent philosophy of mathematics within the framework
of Logical Empiricism. This transformation concerned the notion of analyticity
3See (Steiner 1998, p. 14n). As Steiner remarks, this book was actully his «final att-
tempt to persuade my advisor and mentor, Professor Paul Benacerraf, that there really is a
philosophical problem about the applicability of mathematics in natural science» (p. vii).
4(Steiner 2005, p. 625).
5I’m thinking here particularly to the introduction of algebraic methods in physics (theory
of groups) and to the widespread practice of mathematical modelizing.
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and the result of it was that the new notion was no more able to account for
the applicability of mathematics — as the original was supposed to do.
Let’s retrace with Wilholt this interesting philosophical development. The
general tendency of the first logical positivists was to belittle the value of the
applicability problem by levering on the tautological character of mathematical
statements. In a paper published in 1933, Hans Hahn draws the following
conclusion from it:
[. . .] now one should realize how vastly far apart our view is from the old
— maybe one may say platonizing — view that the world is constructed
according to the laws of logic and mathematics [. . .] and that with our
thinking [. . .] we have been given a means to grasp these eternal laws of
the world. No! It is no reality that our thinking can grasp, no fact of the
world that thinking can bring us lore about; it only refers to the way we
talk about the world; it can only transform tautologically what has been
said. (Hahn 1988 [1933], p. 160)6
Much can be said about this strategy of solution (or, it would be better to say,
of ‘obliteration’) of the problem. But it is quite uncontroversial that this was
the strategy widely adopted by the first logical positivists. Ayer (1956 [1936])
seems to be on the same line of thought when he says that «the truths of logic
and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies» (p. 41):
The power of logic and mathematics to surprise us depends, like their
usefulness, on the limitations of our reason. A being whose intellect was
infinitely powerful would take no interest in logic and mathematics. For
he would be able to see at a glance everything that his definitions implied,
and, accordingly, could never learn anything from logical inference which
he was not fully conscious of already. But our intellects are not of this
order. It is only a minute proportion of the consequences of our definitions
that we are able to detect at a glance. Even so simple a tautology as
‘91× 79 = 7189’ is beyond the scope of our immediate apprehension. To
assure ourselves that ‘7189’ is synonymous with ‘91×79’ we have to resort
to calculation, which is simply a process of tautological transformation —
that is, a process by which we change the form of expressions without
altering their significance. (p. 48)
This tautological character of mathematical statements echoes the doctrine
of logicism, which had a great influence on the works of the first logical posi-
6Wilholt’s translation from the original.
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tivists. Frege and Russell were well aware of the fact that no account of mathe-
matics can be considered satisfactory if it makes the applicability of mathematics
a deep mystery.
[W]e want our numbers — Russell says — to be such as can be used
for counting common objects, and this requires that our numbers should
have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain for-
mal properties. This definite meaning is defined by the logical theory of
arithmetic. (Russell 1993, p. 10)
Frege, particularly, was persuaded that the need to account for applicability of
mathematics pushes us to say that mathematical statements have a cognitive
content. The only difference between mathematical statements and, let’s say, a
formation of chess-pieces consists in the fact that the former are useful and can
be profitably applied to other branches of science, while the latter don’t. But
why is it so? Because mathematical statements (e.g., arithmetical equations)
express thoughts. Mathematics is not a mere formal game (as formalists want)
because it is useful — and it is useful because it has cognitive content.
This “cognitive content” was supplied by Frege by means of a definition of
mathematical concepts in terms of logical concepts. E.g., positive whole num-
bers are applicable to concepts,7 such that, for every concept F , the number
of F ’s is identical with the extension of the concept “equinumerous with F ” —
where “equinumerous” is in turn definable in terms of a one-to-one correspon-
dence between extensions of concepts, which is surely a logical concept if the
theory of concept extension is a part of logic. Arithmetical truths would be
therefore analytical truths.
Russell and Whitehead provided a different version, couched in terms of
classes and types rather than extensions of concepts, but the outcome was ex-
actly the same: arithmetic is equally defined by means of logical terms, so that
arithmetical truths are therefore logical (analytical) truths. Thus, in the logicist
7This is an important point in Frege’s account of applicability of arithmetic. Arithmetical
concepts apply to concepts, not to objects. As we shall see in chapter 3, this is the way in
which Frege solves what Steiner calls the “semantic problem of applicability” for arithmetic.
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account, the applicability of arithmetic (and, by extension, of mathematics ) is
justified by the purely logical character of the arithmetical concepts, so that
their application is no more surprising than the application of a logical con-
cept. The relevant point consists in the fact that the arithmetical statements
are truths concerning concepts, not objects.
Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development of logic, and every propo-
sition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit a derivative one. To apply arith-
metic in the physical sciences is to bring logic to bear on observed facts;
calculation becomes deduction. [. . .]. The laws of number, therefore, are
not really applicable to external things; they are not laws of nature. They
are, however, applicable to judgements holding good of things in the ex-
ternal world: they are laws of the laws of nature. (Frege 1980 [1884],
p. 99)
It follows, as it is clear, that arithmetic will be applicable in every context where
concepts (having a finite extension) appear. Thus, in Frege’s original version
of logicism the question “Why is arithmetic applicable?” gets the following
response:
(A-F) Arithmetic is applicable because it is a body of useful truths about
concepts of finite extension; and we apply concepts whenever we make
judgments about the external world; and a great many of them have
finite extensions. (Wilholt 2006, p. 75)
In this account — it must be noted — there are two distinct elements that
contribute to the success of the explanation: (A) the analyticity of the arith-
metical truths and (B) the reduction of arithmetic to logical terms, namely, to
(logical) laws of concepts. (A) guarantees that the application of arithmetic is
conservative, i.e. that it does not lead to true premises to false conclusions; and
(B) enables us to apply arithmetic everywhere the proper concepts appear. If
these concepts rigthly apply to the objects of the external world that we are
investigating (and if these concepts have a finite extension), then the laws of
arithmetic rightly apply (can be applied) to these concepts.8
8Wilholt seems to link very closely (B) to the logicist reduction of arithmetic. «This
reduction — he says — was the core of the original logicist explanation of the applicability of
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So, when Hahn and Ayer invoke the analyticity of mathematical statements
in order to explain their applicability, they are invoking exactly this kind of
analyticity, I mean analyticity as the outcome of a (Fregean) logicist reduction.
However, as is well known, this logistic reduction of mathematics to log-
ical terms encountered soon several difficulties: Frege’s theory of extensions
of concepts turned out to be inconsistent, and all the following attempts to
avoid inconsistencies (theory of types, axiomatic set theories) had the problem
of introducing premises or axioms (like the axiom of reducibility, the axiom of
infinity and the axiom of choice) that seemed to be not purely logical truths.
These difficulties ultimately determined the end of the logicist program.
The problem, at this point of the story, is paraphrased by Wilholt in the
following way:
[since] this reduction was the core of the original logicist explanation of
applicability of mathematics [. . .] how could the view that the applica-
bility problem was no longer a problem survive the demise of reductive
logicism? (Wilholt 2006, p. 73)
In order to shed light on this, Wilholt suggests «to look at the account of
that empirist who paid the most scrupulous attention to the intricacies of such
question, i.e., [. . .], Carnap» (p. 73).
In his (2001 [1934]), Carnap formulates his famous Principle of Tolerance:
«It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions» (p. 51).
In other words, this principle says that there is no authoritative logic, but many
possible logics; everyone is free to embrace his own logic, justifying it by means
of its pragmatical utility. Among the possible languages that we can choose,
there are also languages that contain the above mentioned axioms of infinity
mathematics» (Wilholt 2006, p. 73). However, we must distinguish two different components
of (B): (B.1) the logicist reduction, namely the fact that arithmetic is reduced to logic; and
(B.2) the fact that this reduction is made such in a way that the arithmetical concepts result
to be concepts of concepts (and hence applicable only to concepts and not to objects). It
is only the second point (B.2) that has an explanatory value regarding the applicability of
mathematics. (B.2) can effectively be revived even in the absence of the point (B.1). That’s
what acutally Steiner proposes in (1998). Concerning this see chapter 3.
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and of choice. Carnap formulates the rules and principles for such a language
— that he calls “language II”.9 The idea of reducing mathematics to pure logic is
thus abandoned, for there is no clear distinction between the former and the lat-
ter: both are equally constitutive of a form of language. It follows that Carnap
cannot any longer defend a Fregean conception of analyticity. Mathematical
truths are not analytic in the sense that they are reducible to logical truths;
they are analytic simply in virtue of our adoption of a form of language.
In this way, Carnap manages to save the analyticity of the mathematical
truths, and can answer the question “What makes arithmetical sentences true?”
in the same way as Frege did: “The fact that they are analytic truths”. But
the abandonment of the idea of logical reduction makes for him impossible to
answer the question “Why is arithmetic applicable?”. The best that he can offer
for answering to such a question would be:
(A-C) Arithmetic is applicable because language II is a serviceable lan-
guage to adopt. (Wilholt 2006, p. 75)
But this answer does not seem very satisfying, for one could ask why this lan-
guage is a serviceable one. As Wilholt remarks,
[. . .] it might be objected that to ask Carnap “Why is language II a
serviceable language to adopt?” would be the same as to ask Frege “Why
do we always use concepts when we relate to the external world?”.
But the difference between the two question is remarkable [. . .]. The
universal applicability of concepts is a matter that one may plausibly
accept as a brute fact, as part of the validity of pure logic. In contrast,
the usefulness of language II, a system that explicitly incorporates a good
deal of sophisticated mathematical content (like the axiom of choice), is
no more acceptable as a brute fact than the applicability of arithmetic
itself. (p. 75)
In order to better articulate Carnap’s view on this point, Wilholt suggests
to supplement (A-C) by means of (Carnap 1950). In the light of the distinc-
9To be more precise, the axiom of infinity does not need to be formulated in language II,
since it is implicit in the syntax of number expression adopted by Carnap. The axiom of
choice is expressed as the primitive sentence PSII 21, called “primitive sentence of selection”.
See (Carnap 2001 [1934], p. 92). Carnap explicitly says that «PSII 21 is Zermelo’s Principle
of Selection (corresponding to Russell’s Multiplicative Axiom) in a more generalized form
(applied to types of any kind whatsoever)» (Carnap 2001 [1934], p. 93).
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tion between external and internal questions there sketched, and by drawing a
parallel to the question “Are there numbers?”, Wilholt concludes that Carnap
would probably have scorned the question why language II is a serviceable
language to adopt, insisting as he did that questions about the acceptance
of a linguistic framework are practical rather than theoretical. (p. 75)
The question why the number language should be adopted falls within the prac-
tical sphere and cannot call for any theoretical account in terms of truth.
This means that from the mature Carnapian perspective, the applicabil-
ity problem was dropped from the philosophical canon, not because it
was considered to have received an answer, but because all matters of
applicability of frameworks were considered practical questions. A theo-
retical account of the applicability of mathematics was thereby ruled out
as inappropriate. (p. 76)
Wilholt’s paper continues with a final section in which he argues that the
demise of reductive logicism determined the abandon of some aspects of the
applicability problem and some of the Fregean ideas relating to its solution that
shouldn’t have been abandoned. I will talk later about these ideas and their
importance for the applicability problem.10 For the moment I want only to
linger on the specific argument offered by Wilholt. To sum up, his idea is that
Carnap chose to preserve the logicist tenets of reductive logicism, sacrificing
its reductive characters; in this way he could answer the question about the
general character of mathematical truth but relegated the question about the
applicability of mathematics to the realm of pragmatical questions. This is the
reason why Carnap dropped off the applicability problem and it is implicitly
supposed that his influence on the following thinkers could and should explain
why the problem was disregarded for such a long time.
I think that Wilholt’s reconstruction is basically correct and that it surely
explains why Carnap abandoned the problem. However, can it explain, on its
own, the continuing disregard by a whole generation of philosophers? Surely, its
10See chapter 3.
1.2. ANALYTICITY AND INDISPENSABILITY PROBLEM 15
explanatory power is correlated to Carnap’s influence on the following philoso-
phers — more precisely, to the fortunes of his notion of “analytic”. Yet, it is well
known that this notion, and the logical empiricism in general, began very soon
to fall on hard times. So, there is a question that one could rise and that Wil-
holt leaves unsolved: Why wasn’t this abandon reversed when these difficulties
became more pressing, and why did it take such a long time to rediscover the
problem of applicability? Wilholt sees the point but he gets rid of it by simply
saying that «[it] is a different question» (p. 81).
These considerations suggest, on the one side, that Wilholt’s account should
be considered just as a part of the story, but not the whole story at all; and,
on the other side, that we should take a look at the next development of the
notion of analyticity. That’s what I am going to do in the next section.
1.2 Analyticity and indispensability problem
As is well known, Quine put a hard strain on the notion of analyticity in his
(1951). In this famous article, Quine indentifies two strong beliefs — two “dog-
mas”, as he calls them — laying at the base of empiricism. The first is the
belief that there must exist a precise demarcation between analytic and syntetic
propositions, and that this demarcation can be made explicit. The second con-
sists in the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical
construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. These two dogmas
are strictly interrelated and their refutation leads Quine to introduce his holistic
theory.
The first dogma is refuted by Quine by means of an analysis of the notion
of “analyticity”. There are two distinct classes of analytic statements: those in
the first can be called “logically true” and are exemplified by “No unmarried
man is married”. A statement of this kind «is true and remains true under all
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reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles» (pp. 22-23).
In other words, what makes it logically true is just his logical particles (like “no”,
“is”, “un-”) and in no way the meaning of its terms. The second class of analytic
statements, on the other hand, is exemplified by “No bachelor is married”. State-
ments of this class «can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for
synonyms» (p. 23). The problem, now, consists in specifying what a synonym
is. Well, it seems that there is no way to define it in a non-circular manner.
Quine tries to do it by means of the notions of “definition”, “interchangeability
salva veritate” and “semantical rules”, but any of these attempts cannot break
the circularity. In running through these attempts, Quine is unequivocally crit-
icizing Carnap. The conclusion of this whole discussion is, in Quine’s words,
that
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralin-
guistic fact. [. . .]. Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the
truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component
and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reason-
able that in some statements the factual component should be null; and
these are the analytic statements. But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a
boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been
drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical
dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. (pp. 36-37)
The second dogma concerns the two theories known as verificationism and
reductionism. Verificationism is the theory according to which «the meaning
of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it» (p. 37).
As a consequence of it, two statements will be synonymous when they have
similar methods of confirmation or infirmation. By extending this notion of
synonymy to linguistic forms in general, we could define analyticity in terms of
synonimy, simply by saying that a statement is analytic when it is synonymous
with a logically true statement. So, it would seem that verification theory could
save analyticity. However, there is still a problem to be removed: what do we
mean when we say that two statements share the same method of empirical
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confirmation (or infirmation)? This question brings us directly to reductionism.
For the most naïve view of the relation among a statement and the experience
that confirms (or infirms) it is radical reductionism, the theory according to
which «Every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement
(true or false) about immediate experience» (p. 38). Carnap tried to realize this
project in (2003 [1928]) — unsuccessfully. But despite this failure, the dogma
continues, according to Quine, to be influent, and it is particularly influent in
the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can
admit of confirmation or infirmation at all.
The two dogmas are strictly interrelated, to the extent that Quine says they
«are, indeed, at root identical» (p. 41). Against these dogmas, Quine sets his
own holistic view, according to which
our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense expe-
rience not individually but only as a corporate body.
[. . .] it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a lin-
guistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual
statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon
language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable
into the statements of science taken one by one. (pp. 41-42)
And also
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the
periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by plead-
ing hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called
logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to
revision. Revision even of the logical law of excluded middle has been pro-
posed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference
is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler
superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (p. 43)
Mathematical statements are potentially revisable too, just in the same way
as logical ones are. As Putnam (1983) notices, the resulting notion of analyticity
seems to be less close to the Kant’s notion of “the predicate contained into the
concept” than to the traditional notion of a priori.11 So, not only mathematical
11Putnam (1983) writes: «[. . .] Quine also considers a very different notion: the notion
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statements are not analytic, but they also are not a priori and can be revised
in a possible future.
What does all this mean about the fate of the applicability problem? It is
evident that Quine’s criticisms to the notion of analyticity demolish Carnap’s
attempt to justify the truth of mathematical statements: if there is no room
for analyticity (in any sense we mean it), we cannot say that mathematical
statements are true because they are analytic, and it seems also that we cannot
say any longer that the applicability problem is a pragmatical one, since this
strategy rested, in Carnap, on his particular interpretation of the notion of
analyticity. So, one could think of reverting to Frege’s solution and trying to
make it clearer and more coherent in its details. However, Quine’s criticism, by
completely abolishing the possibility of an appeal to any notion of analyticity,
makes it impossible. Ideally, we are cast back to a ‘pre-Fregean era’, when the
applicability problem was still problematic. It should have motivated a new
reflection on the problem of applicability — but that didn’t happen. So, the
question is: why?
In order to answer this question, we must take into consideration another
quinean theory, the so called “Naturalism”. Naturalism is the theory according
to which «it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that
reality is to be identified and described» (Quine 1981b, p. 21). Naturalism is
strictly connected to the above seen theory according to which every statement
is in principle revisable. For if any statement is in principle revisable, on which
of them should we rely? Quine’s idea is that it is science that fixes the higher or
lower degree of revisability of a belief (or better, of the corresponding statement).
But what does he mean by “science”? His answer is very interesting:
of an analytic truth as one that is confirmed no matter what. I shall contend that this
is the traditional notion of apriority, or rather, one of the traditional notions of apriority.
[. . .]. And Quine’s argument against this notion was not at all concerned with circularity of
definitions» (p. 87).
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In science itself I certainly want to include the farthest flights of physics
and cosmology, as well as experimental psychology, history, and the social
sciences. Also mathematics, insofar at least as it is applied, for it is
indispensable to natural science. (Quine 1995, p. 252; emphasis mine)
It seems that Quine does not include mathematics in the number of the sciences
— at least, not directly. Mathematics can be considered a science only to the
extent that it is indispensable to other sciences. It follows from this, together
with the theory of the general revisability of the statements, that mathematical
statements will be (probably) true only to the extent that they are indispensable
to science.
We are so naturally lead to the famous quinean “indispensability argument”.
Since Quine cannot justify the truth of mathematical statements on the ba-
sis of their analyticity, he completely turns upside down the order of explana-
tion and, instead of explaining the applicability of mathematics in terms of the
truthfulness of mathematical statements (as Frege did), he argues that mathe-
matical statements are true because they are actually indispensable in science.
However, Quine gives this argument also a strong ontological connotation: he
not only argues that mathematical indispensability justifies the truthfulness of
mathematical statements, but also that it justifies our belief in the existence of
mathematical entities.12
This strong ontological connotation given by Quine to his indispensability
argument catalysed the focus of the following discussions — and indeed, until
the ‘revival’ of the applicability problem, the indispensability argument was
the only way in which applied mathematics was taken into consideration by
philosophy. This, together with the above mentioned Wilholt’s argument, can
12This argument is also known as the “Quine-Putnam argument”, since it was independently
suggested by both. However, the argument proposed by Quine and the argument proposed
by Putnam significantly differs in terms of their premises and conclusions. In particular, and
withouth entering into the details, Putnam’s conclusion does not aim to having an ontological
character, being limited to argue that mathematical statements are true. Nonetheless, it is
clear that Quine’s argument implies also Putnam’s conclusion. For if mathematical entities
exist, mathematical statements can be considered true (if they properly describe these enti-
ties). For more on the indispensability arguments in mathematics and on the relation between
applicability and ontology of mathematics, see chapter 4.
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help in explaining why the applicability problem knew so long an oblivion.
Yet, one could wonder about why Quine did not ask why mathematics is
indispensable to sciences (provided that it is). I must confess I have no precise
answer to this question. Actually, it seems that Quine takes the indispensability
of mathematics as a matter of fact, something evident in scientific practice. I
think the previous considerations could add something to the Wilholt’s argu-
ment about why the problem of applicability was abandoned in the middle of
20th century, but it is probably too much pretentious to hope that this is a
problem that can have a clear and precise answer. However, for our aims, it is
interesting to note that the ensuing debate about the indispensability argument
was less concerned about why rather than if really mathematics is indispensable
to science. Field’s (1980) attempt to refute the indispensability argument by
showing that mathematics is actually dispensable to scientific practice is well
known. But also on the opposite front the situation seems not to be very dif-
ferent, since the debate is mainly focused on what means for an entity to be
“indispensable” (see Burgess 1983, Colyvan 2001a).13
1.3 Anything else?
As I have already noted, Wilholt’s analysis shows a possible reason why during
the 20th century the applicability problem was suddenly forgotten, but it is hard
to believe that that is the only reason. In the previous section I tried to develop
Wilholt’s argument by considering the works of Quine, but this has not solved
all the questions on the table. A precise and definite answer cannot probably be
given and the best we can do is to put forward some incomplete ideas, tentative
suggestions and fragmentary considerations. It is in this spirit that I want
to conclude this chapter by suggesting some very general considerations about
13I will talk more extensively about these problems later, in chapter 4.
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three facts that can have played a role in this neglect and can perhaps contribute
to better — although not completely — account for it.
The first point is a typical character of the 20th century mathematics — of
the practised one as well as its image in philosophical thinking: the particular
idea according to which the “real” mathematics is pure and abstract mathemat-
ics. On the philosophical side, it must be noted that actually, during the time
under consideration, not only the problem of applicability, but also the whole
field of applied mathematics roused in general a scanty interest by the philo-
sophical reflection. In this sense, the neglect of the applicability problem can be
considered as a particular instance of a more general tendency in overestimat-
ing the importance of pure mathematics.14 On the mathematical side, not very
diffrently, this overestimate takes in some cases the shape of a Platonic concep-
tion of applied mathematics as a discipline less noble than pure mathematics —
something with which the “pure” mathematician should not get his hands dirty.
A typical example of this kind of attitude, particularly important for his
influence on contemporary mathematics, can be find in Bourbaki. Bourbaki is
the pseudonym used by a group of (mostly) French mathematicians who wrote,
from the 1935 until 80s, a series of books in advanced mathematics, the Elements
of Mathematics (Éléments de mathématique) series, in nine volumes. The two
foundamental ideas laying behind their works are so summed up by Atiyah
(2007):
One was that mathematics needed new and broad foundations, embodied
in a series of books that would replace the old-fashioned textbooks. The
other was that the key idea of the new foundations lay in the notion of
“structure”, illustrated by the now common word “isomorphism”. (p. 1151)
This attempt has been variously celebrated, but it must be noted that
14We have just seen an interesting “counterexample” to this tendency: in Quine’s naturalism,
we attend to an inversion of the roles, for only applied mathematical entities permit us to say
that mathematical entities (in general) exist. In this sense, applied mathematics seems to be
much more (ontologically) relevant than pure mathematics. However, it must be noted that
Quine talks about applied mathematics in a very general sense: he is just interested in the
fact that there is an applied mathematics, not in the “how” that mathematics can be applied.
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[One] severe limitation of Bourbaki, no doubt conscious, was the restric-
tion to pure mathematics. Applied mathematics is too messy and dis-
parate to be included, and theoretical physics hovers on an uncertain
borderline. One distinguishing feature of Bourbaki was the emphasis on
clear and unambiguous definitions and on rigorous proofs. This was,
as in algebraic geometry, a reaction against some sloppy treatments of
the past, and it served a purpose in creating a firm platform for the fu-
ture.Unfortunately, when taken to extremes, the requirement for total
rigour excludes large areas of mathematics which are in their early cre-
ative stages. Had Euler worried too much about rigour, mathematics
would have suffered. (Atiyah 2007, p. 1151)
This kind of attitude chances creating a gap between mathematics and other
scientific disciplines which need mathematics in their development — as de-
nounced, for example, by P. Germain already in 1953:
it would be very interesting for us to know where [Bourbaki] puts the
boundary which limits the field of properly called mathematics. But we
can say that if Bourbaki insists on using the more abstract, and sometimes
abstruse, method in every chapter of mathematics he would not show
much interest in the development of applied mathematics.
[. . .] many ideas in Bourbaki’s books could be very useful, even for ap-
plied mathematicians. But the abstract, axiomatic and general form in
which the courses are written may discourage people who are attracted
to practical problems and who always like to see the physical significance
and the relation to reality of mathematical ideas [. . .]. As a result there
is the danger that a kind of barrier will be erected between mathematics
and other sciences. (Germain 1953, p. 53)
The second point pertains the considerable focus deserved by contempo-
rary philosophy of mathematics on foundational issues. Beginning around 1950,
philosophers of mathematics focused almost entirely on foundational questions
related to logic and set theory. One reason that fostered such researches was
surely the realization that some questions in set theory (like the continuum
hypothesis, just to make an example) are indipendent of the standard axioms
for set theory and could not be answered by these axioms. All these questions
does not relate to mathematics as it is actually used in science, and they are
hence not tightly connected to the problem of applicability. However, it must
be noted that the foundational role widely credited to set theory could have
implicitly suggested an ‘obvious’ way to account for applicability: it is easy to
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apply set theory once we admit that sets can have non-mathematical objects as
members, and if the whole mathematics can be founded on set theory we can
hope to ultimately reduce all cases of mathematical application to application
of sets. This idea, although quite naïve and not explicitly formulated, could
have played a role in pushing philosophers of mathematics to think that, once
we got clear on what sets are and how we know about them, then there would
be no additional problem of applicability. Thus, we have here another possible
motivation for which the applicability problem was delayed and progressively
dismissed: we will be able to answer the question “Why and how is mathemat-
ics applicable and so effective in science?” only after we will have answered the
question “What is mathematics?”.
Finally, the third point consists in a typical character of the analytic philos-
ophy: specialization — namely, the tendency to specialize in a limited number
of particular problems concerning a certain discipline or a certain argument.
Analytic philosophers approach these problems in a way that generally favours
a small-scale analysis. The point that I want to emphisize is that this special-
ization, although usually positive, tends sometime to obstruct the interdisci-
plinarity. In the particular case at issue, the problem of applicability is clearly
neither a philosophy of mathematics problem, nor a philosophy of science (or,
of physics) problem, since it essentially bridges both. There is a sense in which
the problem has not a precise home in analytic philosophy.
It is well known that philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics
have been and are characterized each by a quite definite list of problems. Those
assigned to philosophy of mathematics has been, more or less, the following ones:
foundation of mathematics, epistemological status of mathematcal statements
(a priori/a posteriori, analytic/syntetic, true/not true, . . . ), ontological status
of mathematical entities (realism/anti-realism), indispensability argument. On
the other side, those assigned to philosophy of science has been, more or less,
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the following ones: logic of the scientific method, role of the inductive reason-
ing, distinction between observable and theorical entities, role of probability,
etc. . . The applicability problem not only does not appear in any of the two
lists (as I showed before, the indispensability argument does not deal directly
with the reasons why mathematics is indispensable or applicable), but also there
seems not to be a precise and appropriate collocation for it. It is a boundary
problem. This is probably a consequence of the previous point, i.e. of the fact
that the relations among physics and mathematics are considered as ‘extrinsic’
compared to what is considered the ‘real’ mathematics.
One might object by saying that the applicability problem is a ‘higher level’
problem: it presupposes that we already have a satisfying answer to more ba-
sic questions, like “What is mathematics?” and “What is physics?”.15 This is a
popular point of view but I think that these questions cannot get a satisfying re-
sponse without taking into consideration the concrete practice of physicists and
mathematicians — and very often in these practices there is no clear distinction
between physics and mathematics, applied and pure.16
15The second consideration I offered (p. 22) is just an example of such a strategy.
16In recent times, some philosophers have begun to consider philosophy of mathematics as
too much disconnected from the mathematics actually studied in mathematical courses and
practiced by working mathematicians. Thus, a new ‘strand’ in philosophy of mathematics has
arisen whose aim consists in reconciling the philosophy of mathematics with the mathematics
as it is really practiced. For a sort of manifest for this new philosophy of ‘mathematical







In the previous chapter I dealt with the neglect of the problem of the applicabil-
ity of mathematics during the second half of the 20th century by the philosoph-
ical reflection. However, even if such a problem was dismissed by the philosoph-
ical reflection, that does not mean that it was completely abandoned. Actually,
a certain number of mathematicians and physicists never stopped to marvel at
such a prodigious effectiveness of mathematics in science. Their wonder filtered
out here and there in their more or less divulgative works. The very famous
physicist Richard Feynman, for example, wrote in his (1967): «I find it quite
amazing that it is possible to predict what will happen by mathematics, which
is simply following rules which really have nothing to do with the original thing»
(p. 171). Before him, but on the same line, Bourbaki already noted that
mathematics appears [. . .] as a storehouse of abstract forms — the math-
ematical structures; and it so happens — without out knowing why —
that certain aspects of empirical reality fit themselves into these forms, as
if through a kind or preadaption. (Bourbaki 1950, p. 231)
In more recent times, the Nobel awarded physicist Steven Weinberg said that
«It is positively spooky how the physicist finds the mathematician has been
there before him or her» (Weinberg 1986, p. 725). And later he wondered again
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about the fact that
mathematicians are led by their sense of mathematical beauty to develop
formal structures that physicists only later find useful, even where the
mathematician had no such goal in mind. [. . .]. Physicists generally find
the ability of mathematicians to anticipate the mathematics needed in the
theories of physics quite uncanny. It is as if Neil Armstrong in 1969 when
he first set foot on the surface of the moon had found in the lunar dust
the footsteps of Jules Verne. (Weinberg 1993, p. 125)
And also the mathematician Reuben Hersh in his (1990) wrote: «There is no
way to deny the obvious fact that arithmetic was invented without any special
regard for science, including physics; and that it turned out (unexpectedly) to
be needed by every physicist» (p. 67).
Yet, all these expressions of marvel remained without a follow-up. None
of these phisicists or mathematicians was pushed by these considerations to
attempt an account of why mathematics is so effective in science. No blame for
this, of course. After all, their main professional concern is not in explaining
such an effectiveness, but in capitalizing at best on this effectiveness.
Notwithstanding, there is an interesting case in which this general tendency
is contradicted. In 1960, the Nobel awarded physicist Eugen P. Wigner pub-
lished an article in which he focused just on this effectiveness and sought to
offer some philosophical reflections about it (Wigner 1960). The article comes
to amazing and — as we will see in a little while — not completely satisfying
conclusions, but it deserves to be mentioned and examined for three reasons.
First of all, Wigner was one of the most important physicists of the last century,
who gave very important contributions to particle physics by a wide applica-
tion of group theory. He knows, in concrete terms, what it does mean to apply
mathematics to physics, and he also knows how much amazing such an appli-
cation can be. Thence, its voice deserve to be listened. Secondly, although
his article is somewhat unsatisfying (even frustrating, in some passages) for a
philosopher, it must be admitted that, if the applicability problem has known a
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timid revival in the past years, most of the credit must be ascribed to Wigner
and his article: his unsatisfactory and provoking conclusions caused, in many
cases, a philosophical reaction that fueled the debate. Hence, its contribution
had a historical importance that cannot be disregarded. Third, the examination
of his article, with all its gaps and difficulties, will give us some important cues
from which we will be able to start our theorical coverage.
In the next sections of the present chapter I will first sum up in deatil
Wigner’s article, and then I will make some considerations about it. In the end,
I will underline three points on which Wigner’s account is not satisfying and on
which we will have to focus our attention.
2.1 An unreasonable miracle
There are two points emphasized by Wigner:
The first point is that mathematical concepts turn up in entirely unex-
pected connections. Moreover, they often permit an unexpectedly and
accurate description of the phenomena in these connections. Secondly,
just because of this circumstance, and because we do not understand the
reasons of their usefulness, we cannot know whether a theory formulated
in terms of mathematical concepts is uniquely appropriate. (p. 2)
But what does he mean by “mathematical concepts”? His answer is very
simple: «mathematics is the science of skillful operations with concepts and
rules invented just for this purpose. The principal emphasis is on the invention
of concepts» (p. 2). Mathematical concepts, according to him, are invented. His
claim is better clarified by his next words:
Most more advanced mathematical concepts, such as complex numbers,
algebras, linear operators, Borel sets (and this list could be continued
almost indefinitely) were so devised that they are apt subject on which
the mathematician can demonstrate his ingenuity and sense of formal
beauty. [. . .]. The principal point [. . .] is that the mathematician could
formulate only a handful of interesting theorems without defining concepts
beyond those contained in the axioms and that the concepts outside those
contained in the axioms are defined with a view of permitting ingenious
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logical operations which appeal to our aesthetic sense both as operations
and also in their results of great generality and simplicity. (p. 3)
According to Wigner, the main characteristic of mathematics consists in its
“being of some interest”. Part of the concepts are comprised among (defined by)
the axioms and part are instead invented by the mathematician only in order
to satisfy her “sense of formal beauty”. So aesthetics comes out to be the main,
metatheorical leading criterion that mathematicians follow.
Of course, to use the word “aesthetics” in this context does not helps very
much. Actually, we would like to know which these aesthetical criteria are and
what is their role in invention. Anyway, Wigner does not give any satisfactory
answer to these questions.
Having this conception of mathematics in mind, he passes to analyze the
role of mathematics in physical theories. He points out two different roles:
1. evaluating the consequences of already established and already mathemat-
ically formulated theories; and
2. contributing to the (mathematical) formulation of physical theories.1
The first role is the role generally assumed by applied mathematics, where math-
ematics merely serves as a tool — probably no more than a calculus. That’s
what happens when, for example, we want to know the exact position of a star
in the sky at a certain time t: by means of the appropriate astronomical theory,
we make the relative computations and we find the wanted result. In this case,
we already have a mathematically formulated theory and we use mathematics
just in order to evaluate the consequences of this theory.
The second role is the most intriguing. It consists in the fact that physicists
choose certain mathematical concepts for the formulation of the laws of nature.
This is something that comes out with strong evidence even at a first glance to
1See Wigner (1960, p. 6).
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the physicist’s practice. But the very question is: Why does the physicist use
these mathematical concepts to formulate the laws of nature?
A possible explanation — Wigner answers — [. . .] is that he is a some-
what irresponsible person. As a result, when he finds a connection between
two quantities which resembles a connection well-known from mathemat-
ics, he will jump at the conclusion that the connection is that discussed
in mathematics simply because he does not know of any other similar
connection. [. . .]. However, it is important to point out that the mathe-
matical formulation of the physicist’s often crude experience leads in an
uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large
class of phenomena. This shows that the mathematical langauge has more
to commend it than being the only language which we can speak; it shows
that it is, in a very reak sense, the correct language.(p. 8)
The three examples he gives for substantiating his words are: (A) the use
of second derivatives in Newton’s law of gravitation, (B) the use of matrices in
elementary quantum mechanics, and (C) the quantum theory of the Lamb shift.
These examples show with great incisiveness the «appropriateness and accuracy
of the mathematical formulation of the laws of nature in terms of concept chosen
for their manipulability, the “laws of nature” being of almost fantastic accuracy
but of strictly limited scope» (p. 10). At this point, he proposes to refer to
this fact as to the “empirical law of epistemology”: it’s an empirical law that
we can use mathematics in science and that such an employment is so effective.
This law, together with the laws of invariance of physical theories, is an indis-
pensable foundation of these theories. Thus, according to Wigner’s account,
the astonishing ability of mathematical concepts in describing reality, and the
amazing high degree to which it does that, is something that we should accept
as an empirical fact — and that’s all! His conclusions are finally expressed in
the following famous, somewhat ‘mystical’ words:
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for
the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither
understand nor deserve. We should be grateful for it and hope that it
will remain valid in future research and that it will extend, for better of
for worse, to our pleasure, even though perhaps also to our bafflement, to
wide branches of learning. (p. 14)
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Wigner’s conclusion is ultimately aporetic: the effectiveness of mathematics
in science is something misterious, a miracle that we cannot understand (we do
not even deserve it!) and that we can just accept as an empirical law. We are
just lucky that God, destiny, natural selection or whoever else gave us such a
gift. We can just receive it and try to make it profitable, but ultimately we have
neither a clear comprehension of it nor a direct control on it — to the extent
that we can only «hope that it will remain valid in future research».
It is not completely clear what, in Wigner’s argument, is really “misterious”
and “unreasonable”, and part of the critics is centered just on this point. Also
the argument that should led to such a conclusion is not explicitly stated, so
that we can only attempt to deduce it from his words. It seems that the main
problem is the gap emerging between physics and mathematics concerning their
respective aims and development criteria, particularly considering the impor-
tance of aesthetical criteria in mathematics. For ease of discussion, I will sum
up Wigner’s argument as follows:
(A) Mathematicians invent their mathematical theories and concepts in order
to satisfy, among others, their own aesthetical criteria (let such criteria be
A,B,C, . . ., where some of them are aesthetical criteria).
(B) Phisicists elaborate their physical theories in order to satisfy their own
criteria a, b, c, . . ., employing for their aims also mathematical concepts.
(C) Criteria A,B,C, . . . are different from criteria a, b, c, . . ..
(D) It is unreasonable that something elaborated on the basis of A,B,C, . . .
can satisfy in such an effective and precise manner the critieria a, b, c, . . ..
(E) Conclusion: the employment of mathematical concepts in phisics is un-
reasonable.2
2Steiner (1998) sums up Wigner’s argument in a slightly different way. Actually he distin-
guishes between two different arguments that can be possibly traced out in the article. The
first is summarized in the following way (see Steiner 1998, p. 45):
(1) Concepts C1, C2, . . . , Cn are unreasonably effective.
(2) Concepts C1, C2, . . . , Cn are mathematical.
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So, we can focus now on the single premises (A)-(D), and try to understand
whether they should be accepted or not and whether the conclusion actually
follows from the premises or not. Wigner does not give us many convincing ar-
guments to accpet his premises, and his analysis is surely unsatisfactory. How-
ever, to throw it away without considering his words worthy of a deeper analysis
would be undoubtedly hasty.
2.2 Beauty and mathematical concepts
The first point of Wigner’s account concerns, as we saw, the fact that mathe-
matical concepts are invented by mathematicians according, among others, to
aesthetical criteria. The claim is indeed double: he is saying firstly that math-
ematical concepts are invented, and secondly that what guides mathematicians
in this invention is beauty. These two claims are actually strictly interwoven,
and both these claims deserve our attention.
First of all, in which sense does Wigner say that mathematical concepts
are ‘invented’? His use of the notion is obviously shaped on the opposition
invention/discovery: we do not discover mathematical concepts as we do, for
example, with a new particle in physics; we do not chance upon them, we do not
find them ready-made in nature. A mathematical concepts is rather something
that we have to establish. The anthitesis ‘invention/discovery’ is sometimes
(3) Hence, mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective.
This argument is fallacious, since it only says that some mathematical concepts are unrea-
sonable and no proof is given that their unreasonableness is due to the fact that they are
mathematical concepts. A different argument treacable in Wigner’s article is summed up by
Steiner as follows (see Steiner 1998, p. 46):
(1) Mathematical concepts arise from the aesthetic impulse in humans.
(2) It is unreasonable to expect that what arises from the aesthetic impulse in humans
should be significantly effective in physics.
(3) Nevertheless, a significant number of these concepts are significantly effective in physics.
(4) Hence, mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective in physics.
There is no substantial difference between this argument and the version I have just presented.
Nevertheless, I prefer to mantain my version, since it permits (better than Steiner’s one)
to distinguish two possible reasons for which applicability could be unreasonable: 1) that
mathematical concepts arise from aesthetical impulse in humans, and 2) that mathematical
concepts are invented.
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used to remark the distinction between realist and anti-realist philosophies of
mathematics: whereas an anti-realist (a formalist, or an intuitionist, for exam-
ple) would say that mathematical concepts are invented, a realist (typically a
platonist à la Gödel) would rather say that they are discovered. This is not
altogether right (I will later say some words about this), but this could led one
to think that Wigner’s use of the word “invention” is a clue of his adherence to
an anti-realistic view of mathematics. Since mathematical concepts are just an
invention of human intellect, there are no objects falling under such concepts,
and mathematical terms do not refer to anything in the world.
Actually, if we interpret Wigner’s claim in this stronger, ontological sense,
one might consider such a point as playing a role in drawing the conclusion
(E). Namely, what is unreasonable in premise (D) is not only the fact that
some of the criteria x1, . . . , xn are aesthetical, but also the fact that they do
not bind us to nothing existing in reality. This consideration makes room for
a possible objection: one might reply to Wigner by saying that the problem
of applicability is a problem for anti-realists only. A realist philosopher would
not have such a problem, since, according to her, mathematical concepts are
not invented but have a precise (although abstract) reference in reality: she is
talking of something that exists (or, expressing a different form of realism, that
expresses truth) and presumably has a role in shaping physical reality.
Wigner does not take an explicit stand on the realism/anti-realism debate,
hence it is not possible to say for certain whether he is an anti-realist or not.3
His terminology in this paper sounds anti-realist, and this seems to lay himself
open to the previous criticism — given that the criticism is right, of course.4
However, it is also possible that Wigner, in using this terminology, had no onto-
3I am not acquainted with other works in which he takes an explicit stand.
4Actually, in chapter 4 I will try to show that it is not: the problem of applicability of
mathematics is not ancillary to the ontological problem in philosophy of mathematics; there
is a philosophical problem concerning applicability that cannot be dispensed by an ontological
choice and that therefore pertains both realist and anti-realist philosophers.
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logical concern in his mind. Probably he is just underlining an epistemological
difference between mathematics and physics, nothing that could label him as a
realist or an anti-realist. When he says that «whereas it is unquestionably true
that the concepts of elementary mathematics and particularly elementary ge-
ometry were formulated to describe entities which are directly suggested by the
actual world, the same does not seem to be true of the more advanced concepts,
in particular the concepts which play such an important role in physics» (p. 2),
he is just saying that advanced mathematical concepts are not suggested by the
actual world. If the meaning of “invention” is nothing more than this, then there
is nothing here that could label him as an-antirealist, for many platonists too
would agree with him on this point: mathematical truths are not suggested by
the actual world, rather by the ideal world. Wigner’s words are not sufficiently
clear to determine whether this hypothesis is right or not, but if it were right
then the previous criticism would have no grip.
Anyway, the fact remains that all he says about this invention of mathemat-
ical concepts is just that such an invention is made on the basis of aesthetical
criteria — and here we come to the second claim. As well as about the previous
one, no much is said by Wigner about this claim, so all we can do is to guess
some hypotheses.
There is a widely shared opinion among mathematicians about the tight
connection between mathematics and beauty.5 Hence, Wigner’s claim comes
with no surprise. According to him, as we saw, mathematical concepts arise
from the aesthetic impulse in humans. In order to better understand this claim,
we would like to know what he means by “aesthetical criteria”, but he is quite
reticent about that. The only clarification he gives is when he esplicitly denies
that simplicity is one of these aesthetical criteria. One could note that only a
small number of mathematical concepts are used by physicists in formulating
5See, for example, (Rota 1977, Hardy [1940] 1992).
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their laws of nature and that sometimes physicists do not choose these math-
ematical concepts, but they develop them independently and then recongnize
them as having been conceived before by mathematicians.
It is not true, however, as is so often stated, that this had to happen
because mathematics uses the simplest possible concepts and these were
bound to occur in any formalism. As we saw before, the concepts of math-
ematics are not chosen for their conceptual simplicity (even sequences
of pairs of numbers are far from being the simplest concepts) but for
their amenability to clever manipulations and to striking, brilliant argu-
ments. (Wigner 1960, p. 7).
So, the only information we can gain about these aesthetical criteria is that
simplicity is not among them, but «amenability to clever manipulations and to
striking, brilliant arguments» is.
However, this argument misses the target: even if simplicity is not among the
aesthetical criteria adopted by mathematicians, it could be that the resulting
mathematical theories are indeed the simplest tool for pursuing a certain aim.
For example, it could be that a mathematical structure is the simplest way to
represent a certain physical system — even if that structure was not developed
by mathematicians for its simplicity but for its aesthetical properties. The
crucial point is that the fact that a theory has been selected on the basis of
aesthetical criteria does not exclude that that theory could have some other
interesting properties, and that those properties could make the theory desirable
by the physicists for their own purposes. We could also admit that matrix
theory were developed for aesthetical purposes (whatever they might be), but
the resulting theory is not only pretty: it has also other interesting properties
that prompted physicists to use that for representing and manipulating — as
an instance — the rotation of a body in the space.
Moreover, at a first glimpse it seems quite hard to say that all the mathemat-
ics we know has been developed on aesthetical criteria. For there are branches of
mathematics that were historically developed under the push of physical ques-
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tions. That’s the case of the analysis, developed by Newton and Leibniz during
XVII century mainly to give an answer to concrete applied problems. We can
also think that even in this case mathematicians selected the prettier theory
among a number of possible theories, but the fact remains that all the possible
theories, among which they selected the prettier one, had to be apt, as a neces-
sary requisite, to solve the physical problems for which they were devised. So,
if we conceive aesthetical criteria as only acting a selection within mathemat-
ics (what Wigner seems actually to do), there is no reason to think that there
could not be another more foundamental criterion acting on the formulation of
mathematical concepts such that it can explain why mathematics is so effective
in physics.
However it is also possible to push Wigner’s considerations a bit further
and to claim that these aesthetical criteria has not (only) a selective, but also
a constitutive role in forging mathematical concepts. Namely, a concept can
be said “mathematical” only to the extent it satisfies these aesthetical criteria.
That’s what Steiner (1998) seems to uphold.6 By providing several quotations
from renowed mathematicians as von Neumann and Hardy, he arrives even to
conclude that «That the aesthetic factor in mathematics is constitutive has ac-
tually become a truism in the mathematical community» (p. 65).7 As Steiner
describes it, it seems that a necessary condition on being a properly mathe-
matical concept is that it satisfies our sense of beauty. «Where mathematicians
used to look to utility in science (after all, many of them were also physicists),
mathematicians today have adopted internal criteria to decide whether to study
a structure as mathematical» (p. 7) — and beauty is among them.
As a consequence of this, Steiner can give reason for why a theory of chess
is not a mathematical theory: «The standard philosophies of mathematics —
logicism, formalism, or intuitionism — have no answer, since the distinction
6See chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of this important work.
7Italics mine.
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between mathematics and chess is a predilection of mathematicians, rather than
a logical distinction» (p. 63).
Thus, according to Steiner, «the mathematical sense reduces to the aes-
thetic» (p. 66); and to say that
is to deprive the aesthetic sense of the only argument for its objectivity —
namely, that the aesthetic sense is based on the objectivity of mathemati-
cal form, as the Pythagoreans in fact argued. If the Pythagorean position
on aesthetics today begs the question — if, as I hold, the term "math-
ematical form" (given the multitude of "mathematical forms" today) is
empty without introducing the human aesthetic sense — then there is
no escape from the conclusion that the human aesthetic sense is nothing
but species-specific preference. Classifications like beautiful/ugly are then
anthropocentric; so, finally, are the mathematical classifications.
On this basis, Steiner can offer a stronger version of Wigner’s puzzle:
(1) Mathematical concepts arise from aesthetic impulse in humans.
(2) It is unreasonable to expect that what arises from the aesthetic im-
puls in humans should be significantly effective in physics.
(3) Nevertheless, a significant number of these concepts are significantly
effective in physics.8
(4) Hence, mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective in physics. (p. 46)
This version is not very different from the version offered here at page 33 and
actually Steiner considers it as the real Wigner’s argument. However, as we
have just seen, Steiner seems to attach to these aesthetical criteria not only a
selective role, but also a constitutive role. Steiner’s premise (2) is then stronger
than Wigner’s analogue premise (D). For if mathematical concepts are anthro-
pocentric, it seems very hard to explain how they can be so significantly effective
in a non-anthropocentric discipline like physics. That’s why I consider Steiner’s
version as a stronger version of Wigner’s argument.
8A general objection that has been often made against Wigner is that he unduly stresses the
positive cases of mathematical application. His argument seems to insist that mathematical
concepts (in general) are unreasonably effective in science. However, this is not true: there are
a lot mathematical concepts that have no application in science at all. So, his conclusion (all
mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective in science) cannot be drawn from a short list
of interesting cases. Steiner, in his version of Wigner’s argument, tryes to rectify this point,
by specifying in premise (2) that «a significant number of these concepts are significantly
effective in physics». Not all mathematical concepts, but only a significant number of them,
are effectively used in science, so that only these concepts would be unreasonably effective.
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Since the anthropocentric character of mathematics is due, according to
Steiner, to the constitutive role of these aesthetical criteria, we should under-
stand whether they actually have such a constitutive role or not. The question is
quite complex. Pincock (2012, p. 182) properly points out that it is surely true
that, if a concept is studied by mathematicians, this is a good (and probably
sufficient) reason to believe that such a concept is mathematical; nevertheless,
it is quite weird to say that the only reason for which that concept is mathemat-
ical is because it is studied by mathematicians. We should distinguish between
two different questions: on the one side there is the question (I) “What makes
this concept mathematical or nonmathematical?”; on the other side there is the
question (II) “What makes this concept a good or a bad mathematical con-
cept?”. Now, according to Pincock, there is no doubt that aesthetical criteria
play an important role in answering the latter, but the arguments in favour
of it cannot be used at the same time to argue that aesthetical criteria has a
role in answering the former too. Steiner supports his argument by means of
quotations from mathematicians — as we have seen — but these quotations
seem rather to answer the latter question than the former. For example, Steiner
quotes von Neumann’s (1956) words: «I think that it is correct to say that his
[of the mathematician] criteria of selection, and also those of success are mainly
aesthetical» (p. 2062). Is von Neumann answering question (I) or question (II)?
Question (II), I would say — so that Steiner’s arguments in answering question
(I) seem to answer at the most question (II).
A mathematician discussing complex analysis and the Riemann hypoth-
esis — Pincock says — once insisted to his class that compared to the
Riemann hypothesis, the conjecture known as Fermat’s last theorem was
pointless and not worth pursuing. By this he did not mean to relegate
number theory and Fermat’s last theorem outside of mathematics, but
was instead expressing his conviction that complex analysis is a better or
more important area of mathematics than number theory. These judg-
ments about the relative importance of this or that area of mathematics
are central to mathematical practice as they provide the mathematician
with the motive to pursue his or her specialized area of research. [. . .].
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Similarly, if a mathematician dismisses chess as “not mathematics” be-
cause it is “not beautiful”, then what she is really saying is that it is not
good or important from a mathematical perspective. (p. 182)
Mathematicians sometimes confuse question (I) with question (II), but the
philosopher should nonetheless keep the two well distinguished. Also Hardy
([1940] 1992) says that there is no permanent place in the world for ugly math-
ematics» (p. 85), but then he says also that
A chess problem is genuine mathematics, but it is in some way ‘trivial’
mathematics. However ingenious and intricate, however original and sur-
prising the moves, there is something essential lacking. Chess problems
are unimportant. The best mathematics is serious as well as beautiful.
(p. 88)
Here it seems that Hardy is saying that, yes, a chess problem is ‘mathematics’
since it partakes of the same kind of beauty as mathematics, but such theorems
deserve not to be pursued because they are not mathematically important, they
are not ‘serious’ — so that the real discrimen is not beauty, but importance. It
is true that then Hardy adds: «the beauty of a mathematical theorem depends
a great deal on its seriousness» (p. 90); but this lead into a vicious circle that
seems rather to prove a certain extent of confusion by him. Steiner is honest
in reporting this vicious circle, but he prefers to conclude that «This almost
circular reasoning brings him right back to my position» (p. 65, n. 41). Of
course, Hardy’s reasoning must be revised in some point — but how do we
decide where exactly he is wrong? Steiner did not offer us compelling reasons
to embrace his thesis, even if this is not enough to prove he is wrong. However,
this is enough to show that a different, viable alternative is possible.
Coming back to Wigner, we can conclude that there seems not to be any-
thing particularly misterious in premise (A) and (C): mathematical concepts
can also be invented and these invented concept can also be selected on the ba-
sis of aesthetical considerations, but this does not mean that their application
is miracolous, for they can still have a relevant characteristic that makes them
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a usefull and effective tool for physicists. Such an applicability, then, is not
miracolous in any sense — if we understand “miracolous” as “having no possible
explanation”. Rather, it is still in search of an explanation, and this explana-
tion can also be difficult to be find. And even if we modify Wigner’s argument
as Steiner does, we are absolutely not forced to admit that the applicability
of mathematics to science is something miracolous, a gift «which we neither
understand nor deserve».
2.3 Mathematical and physical concepts
The fundamental point in Wigner’s argument is that something elaborated for
certain aims cannot be so effectively usefull in satisfying different aims (premise
D). Now, I’ve already objected that this argument does not work; for something
elaborated for certain aims can however have some properties that in the end
justify its employment for satisfying different aims, so that this is not a good
reason to say that such application is misterious or unreasonable. It might also
be unreasonable in the end, for my objection does not prove that it cannot be;
but Wigner’s argument actually does not prove that it is. However, what I want
to stress in this section is that to set the question in terms of a comparation
between criteria, or aims, is not the proper way to set the problem.
Actually, Wigner’s argument is based on the fact that mathematical criteria
A,B,C, . . . are different from physical criteria a, b, c, . . .. But what are these
physical criteria and in which sense are they different from mathematical ones?
This seems to be an important point on which Wigner does not sufficiently hin-
der. A hammer is very different from a nail and they have been made having
different criteria in mind, but it is just this difference that makes the hammer
the proper tool to be ‘applied’ to the nail. This is probably an unsophisti-
cated example, but I think it is not completely stupid. There is a difference
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between the criteria adopted by the physicists and the criteria adopted by the
mathematicians, of course; but this difference is not necessarily a sign that any
application of the latter to the first has to be unreasonable.
This is the first critic to Wigner, and it suffices to neutralize his conclu-
sion about the “unreasonableness” of the applicability of mathematics to sci-
ence. However, it is not the only. In this section I am going to underline three
points on which Wigner does not hinder very much — which makes his analysis
philosophically unsatisfactory — and which we will have to take into carefully
consideration in our next inquiries.
claim
First, in which sense the physicist ‘applies’ mathematical concepts? Wigner
distinguishes a simple use of mathematics as a calculation tool from the use
of mathematical concepts to forge physical concepts and laws; but the point is
more complex than this — and it has a very important influence on what exactly
we find problematic in the applicability of mathematics. At the beginning of his
article, Wigner refers a story about two old classmates that meet after a long
time:
One of them became a statistician and was working on population trends.
He showed a reprint to his former classmate. The reprint started, as
usual, with the Gaussian distribution and the statistician explained to his
former classmate the meaning of the symbols for the actual population,
for the average population, and so on. His classmate was a bit incredulous
and was not quite sure whether the statistician was pulling his leg. "How
can you know that?" was his query. "And what is this symbol here?"
"Oh," said the statistician, "this is pi." "What is that?" "The ratio of the
circumference of the circle to its diameter." "Well, now you are pushing
your joke too far," said the classmate, "surely the population has nothing
to do with the circumference of the circle." (p. 1).
The story is just a joke, and it is used by Wigner only to introduce his wonder
about the “unexpected connections” in which mathematical concepts seem to
turn up. But what exactly is the problem with this “unexpected” or “unreason-
able” connections? In the story just told, it seems that the wonder of the second
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man is just the result of his ingenuity and completely lack of knowledge about
the topics in question. Probably, a good course in statistic would have dispelled
his astonishment. As Shapiro (1983) points out, referring a similar example,
The problem can occur on several levels. It may begin when one wonders
how it is possible for a particular mathematical fact to serve as an ex-
planation of a non-mathematical event. [. . .]. In this case, a reply might
consist of a detailed description of the relevant scientific theory which as-
sociates a certain class of functions with a class of physical phenomena.
A question on a different level could then be raised as to what a class
of mathematical objects (such as functions, infinite sets of ordered pairs)
can have to do with physical phenomena. Here, the inquiry concerns the
relevance of the given mathematical-scientific theory. A possible reply to
the second question would be to point out that similar uses of mathemat-
ics have an important role in scientific methodology. When this — the
entire enterprise — is questioned, one might note the vast success of the
methodology in predictingand controlling the world.
[. . .]. Such a statement, however, should not satisfy the epistemologist/philosopher
of science, whose job is to account for scientific explanation and, in par-
ticular, to show how and why the mathematical methodology succeeds in
predicting and controlling the non mathematical world. (pp. 525-526)
So, there are different senses of applicability and different senses according to
which we can say that there is a problem in accounting for the applicability
of mathematics, and Wigner didn’t get into this point deeply enough. Mark
Steiner dealt with these points in his (1998) and I will discuss his contribute
in chapter 3. Anyway, for the moment it is enough to notice that there is
not a univocal sense of applicability, and that a clear analysis of this point is
required to set the problem in the proper way. For if we do not have clearly
in mind in which sense we apply mathematical concepts and in which sense
such applications are problematic, then how could we ever find a satisfying
explanation of how and why we can apply such concepts?
Second, the general framework offered by Wigner in his article risks to sug-
gest a loose comprehension of the applicability of mathematics. For such a
framework runs the risk of representing the physicist simply as an ultimate con-
sumer of mathematical concepts: it happens that the physicists, in doing their
work, need of a mathematical concept or structure; and they just borrow it from
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the mathematicians, which already — on their own — developed it. But this is
not right: there is a lot of work that the physicsits have to do in order to make
their concepts available to a mathematical formulation and/or treatment.
Second, Wigner’s image of the relations between physicists and mathemati-
cians runs the risks of being trivialized in the following way: mathematicians
devise their mathematical concepts for their own purposes and following their
own methods; then, physicists select some of these concepts and simply “employ”
them in their theories. It seems as if mathematics did all the work. Sometimes,
as Wigner said, physicists elaborate mathematical concepts and then discover
that those concepts were already devised by mathematicians; but also in these
cases, the mathematical concepts were already available. So, it seems that it
is just by chance that the physiscist needs to use just that mathematical con-
cept and that such concept has been previously developed by mathematicians.
However, the question is more complex than this. Let me make a very trivial
example. When Kepler “applied” the conic theory (developed eighteen centuries
before by Apollonius of Perga) to the planets’ movement, he had previously to
idealize the planets themselves, making them nothing more than mathematical
points in a bidimensional space; namely, he had to abstract from their corporeal
nature. This has been possible only because Kepler wanted to study the motions
of the planets and, under the given physical conditions, it was sufficient for his
aims to study only the motions of the center of gravity of any single planets,
without taking the spatial distributions of their masses into account. Moreover,
the extensions of the planets are sufficiently small compared to their distances
to permit not to take them into consideration.
These ‘abstractive moves’ permit the elimination of the non-relevant char-
acters in the description of the physical system and their accomplishment is
preliminary required in order to apply the proper mathematical structure to
the physical system under scrutiny. The physicist is well-aware of this and ac-
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tually her work does not consist only in “employing” or “applying” such concepts,
but also in making their application as easier and much convenient as possible.
This is a very important point, on which we will have to pay the necessary
attention.
Thirdly, this framework seems to presuppose a clear distinction between
mathematical and physical concepts: there are two things clearly distinguished
(or, at least, clearly distinguishable each other) and what we have to explain is
the possibility and effectiveness of their conjunction. But this clear distinction
is not clear at all. Let’s take, as an example, the case of an electron: is it a
physical concept? Yes, it would seem; but when we describe its properties we
use concepts that rather seem to be mathematical, having no clear physical in-
terpretation. For we say that an electron has spin 12 , but what is the physical
interpretation of this mathematical value? We usually represent an electron as a
small ball twisting on itself, and the spin as its internal angular momentum; nev-
ertheless such a representation cannot be true, since if it were literaly accepted,
the rotational speed of the electron would be higher than the speed of light,
and this would contradict the special relativity.9 Rather, it seems that physical
conepts (and laws) are constitutively entangled with mathematical concepts.
The first of this three points, hence, suggests us our next move: first of all
we have to specify the nature of the problem at hand. What do we mean by
“applicability”, and what is — exactly — the problem that such applicability
arises? In particular: is there any specific philosophical problem here to be
faced?





One of the problems we stressed in Wigner’s analysis was his vagueness on what
exactly the problem of applicability consists in. Thus, this is the first issue we
have to tackle. If it is true — as I suggested in chapter 2 — that there are many
senses of applicability and that to each of them a different problem corresponds,
then the first thing we have to do is to clarify these different senses.
To this aim, in this chapter I will discuss a work by Mark Steiner published in
(1998) and titled The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem,
whose importance in the debate around the applicability of mathematics can
be hardly underestimated. Philosophers, according to him, have not forgotten
the problem, but they regrettably limit themselves to citing the truism that
mathematics is applicable and to maintaining polemically «that only his or her
favorite philosophy can account for the applicability of mathematics» (p. 15).1
Moreover, Steiner notices that
philosophers and physicists often talk past one another on mathematical
applicability. Philosophers concentrate upon the applicability of arith-
metic; physicists (or physically-minded mathematicians), upon the “mirac-
ulous” appropriateness of matrix algebra or Hilbert spaces for quantum
1In chapter 3 I will make some considerations about this point, with a particular focus on
ontology.
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mechanics. The physicists see no difficulty in the applicability of arith-
metic to the world, and may accuse philosophers who focus upon arith-
metic of mathematical ignorance. Philosophers return the compliment.
(p. 15)
Actually, this consideration finds a confirmation in the analyses led by us in
chapters 1 and 2. But the point is that, according to Steiner, «Neither charge
is just: philosophers and physicists are speaking of “applications” and “applica-
bility” of mathematics in different ways. There is simply no such thing as “the”
problem of mathematical applicability» (p. 15). So, his declared aims consist in
offering a
comprehensive philosophical analysis of the application of mathematics,
an analysis of:
What it is to apply mathematics;
What it is for mathematics to be applicable;
What philosophical problems the applicability of mathematics raises;
What solutions are possible. (p. 15)
In the first three chapters of his book, Steiner distinguishes four different senses
of “applicability” of mathematics — four different senses in which we can “apply”
mathematics to science (his concern is primarily on the application of mathe-
matics to physics) and in which a “problem” can be raised concerning the ap-
plicability.
I will first introduce these four senses of applicability as Steiner describes
them, and only then I will critically examine them.
3.1 The many senses of applicability
3.1.1 The semantic applicability
The first sense of applicability identified by Steiner is what he calls the “se-
mantic” applicability of mathematics. It is connected to the deductive role of
mathematics, both in everyday life and in scientific contexts, and it pertains the
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possibility of using mathematical theorems as premises in deductions. Steiner
considers the following simple argument:
(1) 7 + 5 = 12.
(2) There are seven apples on the table.
(3) There are five pears on the table.
(4) No apple is a pear.
(5) Apples and pears are the only fruits on the table.
(6) Hence, there are exactly twelve fruits on the table.
This is, according to Steiner, a typical example of semantic applicability. Why
semantic? Because we are employing here the numeral terms “7”, “5”, “12”,
“seven”, “five”, “twelve” in two different semantic usages: in premises (1) they are
used to name a mathematical object, while in premises (2), (3) and (6) they are
used to predicate something about the apples, the pears, or both. Since in these
statements both a mathematical and a non-mathematical vocabulary is used,
these statements are considered by Steiner as an example of what he calls “mixed
context”. The problem is that, if we are not able to find a constant interpretation
that permits us to employ the numeral terms in both the mentioned usages, the
argument (1)-(6) losses its validity. The problem is not due to a “metaphysical
gap” between numbers and material objects. For, if it were so, then it would
not arise in contexts where this “gap” is not present. Yet, as Steiner notices, it
arises also when we count the roots of an equation by adding the number of the
real roots to the number of the imaginary roots.
Fortunately — at least according to Steiner — the problem has been already
addressed and solved by Frege, in a manner that does not depend on his logicist
thesis. According to Frege, numerals are always singular terms (they work as
nouns, and therefore stand for objects: the numbers), and all mixed contexts in
50 CHAPTER 3. APPLICABILITIES OF MATHEMATICS
arithmetic can be reduced to the form:
The number of F s is m,
which, adopting Parsons’s (1964) notation, is formally translated by Steiner as:
(7) NxFx = m.
Observing (7), we can see that the numerical attribution has indeed the charac-
ter of a predication. Yet, this numerical attribution is not to objects, rather to a
concept. The numeral “seven” in (2), for example, is not predicated of the pears,
as it seems at first sight, but of the number of the pears — so that numerical
predication is at least a second order predication. Moreover, (7) shows us that
the numeral m is not the predicate, but just a part of it (the entire predicate is
“is m”, or “equals m”).
Thus, all this considered, we need another premise to be added to (1)-(6) in
order to have a valid argument:
∀F∀G(NxFx = m ∧NxGx = n ∧ ¬∃x(Fx ∧Gx)
→ Nx(Fx ∨Gx) = m+ n).
(8)
Frege considered (8) as a theorem of pure logic (since he considered natural
numbers as logical objects); but, in order to clarify the applicability problem at
hand, we need not to decide whether it is or not . All that concerns us is that
such a theorem demonstrates a link between addition of natural numbers and
disjoint set union — and that’s what it does. If we understand addition in (8) as
defined as the iteration of the succession relation for natural numbers, then (8)
is a highly informative theorem, since it links two different mathematical ideas;
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if instead we define it as simple cardinal addition, then (8) is quite trivial. But
the essential does not change: concepts F and G in (8) can be now instantiated
by our particular concepts “pears on the table” and “apples on the table” and
the conclusion (6) can be deductively drawn.
Thus, according to Steiner, Frege solved the semantic applicability problem
by showing that: (a) numerals refer to objects (the numbers); (b) numerals can
be predicate of concepts and not of objects; (c) there is a logical connection
between addition among natural numbers and disjoint set union.
3.1.2 The metaphysical applicability
Another class of problems concerning the applicability of mathematics is what
Steiner calls the “metaphysical” problems of applicability.
These problems, we are told, stem from a gap between mathematics and
the world, a gap that threatens to make mathematics irrelevant. [. . .].
One [of these problems] is the very existence of mathematical “objects”
and mathematical “truths”, which some philosophers simply cannot ac-
cept. One such theorist is Hartry Field. His view of Frege’s project
amounts to the following: Frege’s — valid — interpretation of arithmetic
demands the existence of objects (numbers, sets) that (in Field’s view)
do not exist. Hence, both the theorems of pure mathematics and the
“mixed” propositions of mathematical physics turn out to be false state-
ments. (p. 19)
The problem is then: how is it possible that sistematically false premises can
systematically lead to true conclusions? Steiner seems to present this problem
as a problem for nominalists. But actually there are many versions of nomi-
nalism and what is problematic here is not so much the rejection of abstract
objects as the claim that mathematical statements are literally false. Hence,
the problem Steiner is raising here for nominalists is rather a problem for those
particular nominalists that are also fictionalists (like Field). Anyway, what does
it happen if we reject the typical nominalist adversion for abstract entities and
we platonistically suppose that mathematical objects exist? Are the metaphys-
ical problems of applicability completely ruled out if we assume this? No, they
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are not — Steiner says. For the metaphysical gap between mathematical (ab-
stract) objects and physical (concrete) objects «blocks any nontrivial relation
between mathematical and physical objects, contradicting physics which presup-
poses such relations» (p. 20). Indeed, physics seems to presuppose some kind
of relation between mathematical and physical ‘world’, a relation that permits
to the first to be in some sense ‘effective’ on the latter. But if the two worlds
are platonistically divided by a clean cut, then what relation is still possible?
Underlying these complaints — Steiner adds — is an argument like this:
(1) On the platonist view, physical laws and theories must express rela-
tions between mathematical and nonmathematical objects.
(2) Every relation in physics is a causal (or spatiotemporal) relation.
(3) Mathematical objects do not participate in causal (or spatiotempo-
ral) relations.
Therefore,
(4) On the platonist view, all physical laws and theories are false. (p. 21)
If the fictionalist concludes that mathematical statements are false, the platonist
seems to be led to conclude, not very differently, that all physical laws are false.
Frege, being a Platonist, is surely exposed to this metaphysical problem;
however, as Dummett (quoted by Steiner) has noticed, he has a quite easy way
out from the difficulty:
[Frege’s] combination of logicism with platonism, had it worked, would
have afforded so brilliant a solution of the problems of the philosophy of
mathematics. [. . .]. Frege’s idea was that [mathematical] objects should
always be defined as extensions of concepts directly related to the applica-
tion of the mathematical theory concerned: concepts to do with cardinal-
ity in the case of the natural numbers. [. . .]. In this way, application could
be understood as being no more problematic than it would be according
to non-platonist logicism: it would not consist in pure instantiations of
formulas of higher-order logic, but would involve deductive operations so
close to that as to dispel all mystery as to how application was possible.
A mathematical theory, on this view, does indeed relate to a system of
abstract objects in the sense in which we speak of pure sets [. . .]: they
are objects characterized in such a way as to have a direct connection
with non-logical concepts related to any one of the particular domains of
reality, the physical universe among them. They could not otherwise have
the applications they do. (Dummett 1991, p. 303)
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As I already noticed in chapter 1,2 Frege’s solution is based on the satisfac-
tion of two distinct conditions: (A) the analyticity of arithmetic, and (B) the
reduction of arithmetical concepts to (logical) laws of concepts. The first guar-
antees that arithmetic is conservative; the second that the laws of arithmetic
talk about concepts and not about objects. Thus, for Frege, applying arith-
metical laws is no more than applying laws on concepts that can be variously
instantiated:
Frege argued that the laws of arithmetic are second-order laws governing
all concepts whatsoever. Not only did he argue this point, he constructed
a deductive system of arithmetic in which this second-order character is
evident. In Frege’s system, numerals appear in second-order predicates
applying to ordinary concepts. In this sense, Frege “predicates” natural
numbers of concepts. The concepts themselves may be true of physical
objects. In short, mathematical entities relate, not directly to the physical
world, but to concepts; and (some) concepts, obviously, apply to physical
objects. The mystery thus vanishes without a trace. (p. 22)
Yet, what for Dummett is just a virtue of Frege’s philosophy, for Steiner is
a gain that all platonists can benefit: his solution can be ‘exported’ because it
is independent of logicism:
For example, suppose we regard set theory, rather than second-order logic,
as the foundation of all mathematics, because all classical mathematics
can be modeled in it. Frege’s insight adapts readily to this new context:
numbers characterize sets, not physical objects; while sets can contain,
of course, physical bodies. Set theory is applicable, in the present sense
(one of many senses, I remind you) simply because physical objects can be
members of sets. This is a thoroughly nonmystical idea, always supposing
we accept the existence of sets in the first place. (p. 22)
Frege’s solution of the metaphysical problem is not conditioned at all by the
inconsistency of his logical system. Steiner refers to Boolos’s (1987) work, where
it is shown that the program of Frege’s Grundlagen, including all theorems there
sketched, goes through in a consistent second-order theory (which Boolos calls
2See p. 11.
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“FA”) having only one “nonlogical” axiom:
∀F∃!x∀G(Gηx↔ FeqG).3
Namely, the only mathematical objects Frege needs for arithmetic are classes
of equinumerous concepts. One might reply that FA is not logic, but this is
absolutely irrelevant for the problems at hand: «FA captures the benefits of
Frege’s approach to arithmetic, logic or no» (Steiner 1998, p. 23). Moreover,
his solution is not limited to the only arithmetic: since mathematics can be
modeled in set theory (ZFC), we need only a way to apply set theory to physics.
But this can be easily achieved by adding special functions from physical to
mathematical objects — and functions themselves can be seen as sets. «As
a result, modern — Fregean — logic shows that the only relation between a
physical and a mathematical object we need recognize is that of set membership.
And I take that this relation poses no problem — over and beyond any problems
connected with the actual existence of sets themselves» (p. 23)
Thus — summing up —
In the Grundlagen, Frege showed how to interpret both pure and mixed
arithmetic statements so that we can use pure mathematics to deduce
“applied” conclusions. This solves the semantic problem. He did not
specify the underlying logic, but all of his proofs can be codified in Boolos’s
FA word for word. (That FA is not “logic” is irrelevant to the semantic
problem of applicability.)
And, in solving the semantic problem, Frege did not need to postulate
any metaphysically suspect relations (such as causal relations) between
mathematical and nonmathematical objects. Mathematical objects are
related only to other mathematical objects and to concepts. That physical
objects may fall under concepts and be members of sets is a problem only
for those who do not believe in the existence of concepts or sets. Perhaps
without even intending to, Frege disposed of the metaphysical “problem”
of applicability, and rendered superfluous most recent discussion of “the”
problem of applicability. (p. 23)
3The sign η espresses the relation holding between a concept G and the extension of a
higher-level concept under which G falls. The sign “eq” express the equinumerosity of the
concepts. In words, this axiom says that, given any concept F , there exists one and only one
class x which is the class of all the concepts equinumerous with F .
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3.1.3 The (particular) descriptive applicability
Frege addressed and solved — according to Steiner — the two previous prob-
lems of applicability: the semantic and the metaphysical. However, they are not
all the problems of applicability that can be raised. Another sense of applica-
bility is what Steiner calls “descriptive” applicability. It raises a corresponding
problem that is different from the previous two. Actually, unlike the previous
two, it does not concern mathematical concepts in general, but has to do with
specific mathematical concepts. Steiner defines it as «the appropriateness of
(specific) mathematical concepts in describing and lawfully predicting physical
phenomena» (p. 24).
A first example of the relevance of this problem for a specific mathematical
concepts is given by Steiner for the case of arithmetic:
[. . .] what makes arithmetic so useful in daily life? Why can we use it
to predict whether I will have carfare after I buy the newspaper? Can
we say — in nonmathematical terms — what the world must be like in
order that valid arithmetic deductions should be effective in predicting
observations? (p. 24)
The general idea behind these remarks can be unfolded as follows: when can
we use a certain mathematical concept (or a certain mathematical structure,
or a certain mathematical theory) to describe a certain ‘piece’ of the world?
What are the conditions that such a ‘piece’ of world must satisfy in order to
be describable by that particular mathematical concept? Steiner seems to be
concerned here with the representative role of mathematics and he’s wondering
when such a representative role can be effectively granted — so that we can
make right predictions from the mathematical concept at issue. The condition,
according to which the account should be in non-mathematical terms, is precised
by Steiner by saying that this project must not be confused with Field’s (1980)
one: he is not interested in translating any physical theory into a nominalistic
language, but explaining, in nominalistic language, the conditions under which a
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mathematical concept will be applicable in description (see Steiner 1998, p. 24,
footnote 2).
These — Steiner continues, explaining the difference between this problem
and Frege’s one — were not Frege’s questions, and could not have been:
he attended to the applicability of mathematics in general, not to nature
specifically. His concern was not with the usefulness of mathematical
reasoning, but its validity — to which the state of the world is immaterial.
Frege treats the semantical applicability of mathematical theorems; I will
attend to the descriptive applicability — the appropriateness of (specific)
mathematical concepts in describing and lawfully predicting physical phe-
nomena. Whereas, for Frege, applying meant “deducing by means of”, for
me it will be “describing by means of”. (p. 25)
The descriptions of which Steiner is talking about are — as he explains in
footnote — lawlike or projectible descriptions in the sense of Goodman (1983):
descriptions which could appear in natural laws and thus be used in predicting
events.
Since this descriptive problem concerns specific mathematical concepts (and
not mathematical concepts in general), it will actually consist in as many single
problems as the mathematical concepts employed in science and everyday life
are. So, obviously, an exhaustive exposition is impossible. Steiner mentions four
examples: addition, multiplication, linearity and fibre boundle theory. Let’s
briefly consider each of them, since their discussion will be later useful.
First of all, addition. «Addition — Steiner says — is useful because of a
physical regularity: gathering preserves the existence, the identity, and (what
we call) the major properties, of assembled bodies» (p. 27). A typical example
of “application of addition” (in the descriptive sense we are here dealing with)
is weighing :4
If one body balances 5 unit weights, and another balances 4, then both
together will usually balance 5+4 = 9 unit weights. The natural numbers
indirectly describe, by laws of nature, not only the sets of unit weights
placed on the scale, but the objects they balance. Addition of numbers
becomes a metaphor for “adding” another object to the scale. Arithmetic
4In nonrelativistic contexts, of course — since according to Einstein’s theory of general
relativity weight is not additive.
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is not empirical, but it predicts experience indirectly by the law: if m
and n are the numbers of unit weights that balance two bodies separately,
then m + n units balance both. Equivalently: if one object weights m
units, and another weights n units, then the (mereological) sum of both
“weighs m + n units.” This more usual expression looks like a tautology,
but is as empirical as the former: the expression ‘m + n’ is embedded
in a nomological description of a phenomenon (weight). This description
induces an isomorphism between the additive structure of the natural
numbers and that of the magnitude, weight. (p. 28)
Similarly can be said for the multiplication:
A familiar and genuine application of multiplication is tiling with unit
squares. Suppose we have a rectangular floor and we inquire how many
tiles cover it. The elementary answer is that if the floor lenght is m
units and the width is n units, the number needed is usually m · n. As
in weighing, we have an isomorphism. The numbers m and n come to
measure, not just the size of a set (of units), but the lenght of lines.
Multiplication comes to portray decomposing the rectangle into squares by
parallel lines; conversely, moving from one-dimensional to two-dimensional
Euclidean “intervals”. (p. 29)
What Steiner is pointing out, is that addition is a useful application of
addition (of the additive structure of reals) because it is possible to set an
isomorphism between this additive structure on reals and a property of phisical
bodies. Formally, we can consider a set B of physical bodies, and define a
structure 〈B,E,⊕〉 on it, such that
1. x E y means that, for any x, y in B, body x weighs the same as, or less
than, body y;
2. u⊕ z = w means that body w is the mereological sum of u and z.
Now, we can set a mapping ω from B to the set of reals, such that any physi-
cal body corresponds just to one real number and the following conditions are
satisfied for any x, y, z in B:
i. xE y iff ω(x) ≤ ω(y);
ii. If z = x⊕ y, then ω(z) = ω(x) + ω(y);
iii. For an arbitrarily chosen body e in B, ω(e) = 1.
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Such a mapping from B to R is precisely what assures us that we can use
real numbers to make descriptive predictions on the behaviour of weighing a
collection of bodies.
The next example given by Steiner is a bit more complex but also a bit more
confused. Steiner considers linearity and wonders «why does it pervade physical
laws?» (p. 30).
Because — he answers — the sum of two solutions of a (homogeneous)
linear equation is again a solution. This property corresponds to the
Principle of Superposition, exploited by Galileo: joint causes operate each
as though the others were not present. (p. 30)
Thus, linearity (and nonlinearity) has a clear physical correlate: superposition
(and its absence). When the effects of two causes in a physical system are
independent of each other, then there is superposition and linearity applies.
But this is not the only role for linearity in physics, since it is often useful also
in contexts where the nonlinearity can be approximated by the linear.
For example, we approximate a curve, over short distances, by its tangent,
an idea which finds full flower in the famous Taylor series expansion for
functions. Approximations like this are valid if the curve is smooth, or at
least has smooth pieces, certainly a physical property. Hence we have an
explanation for the second role of linearity in science: the smoothness of
many natural processes. (pp. 30-31; italics mine)
Eventually, Steiner considers a last and more abstract example: the theory
of fiber boundle. As he explains, «the remarkable applicability of fiber boundle
theory to physics rests on the translatability of the concepts of fiber boundle
theory into the concepts of gauge field theory» (p. 32). At this proposal, he
gives a table in which he lists, on the left side, gauge field theory’s concepts,
and on the right side the corresponding fibre boubdle theory’s concepts. We do
not need to get deeper into this table (and actually even Steiner does not do it).
What is important to notice is that the validity of the explanation is, also in
this case, based on «matching mathematical to physical concepts» (p. 32). In
this sense, the terms listed on the left side of the table (referring to the gauge
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field theory) are interpreted as terms for physical objects or physical properties,
whereas the terms listed on the right side (referring to boundle fiber theory) are
interpreted as terms for mathematical objects or properties.
Yet, despite these positive examples, this strategy seems not to be available
for any mathematical concept: in many cases, we are left without any reason-
able account for their descriptive applicability. Steiner cites, at this proposal, a
number of mathematical concepts «whose descriptive applicability now seems
mysterious» (p. 36). His first example concerns the applicability of complex
analysis in physics; in particular, that of an analytic function, of which he con-
siders three distinct cases of application: to fluid dynamics, to relativistic field
theory, and to thermodynamics. In the first case, the applicability follows from
the theorem according to which a two-dimensional ideal fluid obeys the Cauchy-
Riemann equation. In the second case the applicability follows from theorems
that link functions defined on a light cone to analyticity. In the third case,
instead, the applicability if based on the possibility of treating the critical tem-
perature of a ferromagnet as an analytic function of the number of dimensions
of the magnet.
Now, — Steiner comments — even if we were to regard the first two
applications (hydrodynamics and relativistic field theory) as sufficiently
explained by the theorems quoted, note that there is no one physical
property which explains all three applications, or types of application. So
the situation does not resemble the case of additivity, where one property
explains just about every application of “+” in physics. (p. 39)
Moreover, it seems that the third application (to thermodynamic):
is totally mysterious, from the point of view of explaining the descriptive
applicability of analyticity. The assumption that the critical temperature
of a magnet is an analytic function of its dimension is, in fact, physi-
cally meaningless. Not only will we have to condone, in physics, magnets
of dimension 3.5 (we have gotten used to such things by reading about
fractals), but we will have to swallow magnets of dimension 2 + 3i! Here
the analytic function is used as a calculational tool or formal trick: we
cannot calculate the problem for three dimensions, so we calculate it for
a four-dimensional magnet, then expand the function as a power series in
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the complex plane around the number 4, and plug in the value 3. Nobody
knows (today) why this works. (p. 38)
Another interesting case of mathematical concept whose descriptive appli-
cability seems to be misterious is Hilbert space. Its descriptive applicability
to quantum mechanics seems to follow from what Steiner calls the “maximality
principle”: «If a Hilbert space H represents a quantum system Q, then each
basis, or set of “axes”, of H corresponds to a physical property of Q; and each
physical property of Q corresponds to a basis, or at least a subset of basis, of
H» (p. 39). As he precises, some physicists would accept only the latter clause:
there are some bases corresponding to ‘non-physical’ properties, that must be
weeded out in a second moment by ‘superselection rules’. However, what is
particularly relevant in this “maximality principle” is the fact that
the magnitude of position corresponds to a complete basis. Thus, posi-
tion information about a system at a given time determines information
concerning every other magnitude of the system at that time. This in-
formation is obtained simply by changing the basis of the Hilbert space,
and recalculating the coordinates of the unit vector relative to the new
basis. (p. 39)
Let consider a single particle. It is represented by a single vector. Now, once
we choose the position basis, we have an infinite number of coordinates for
the vector, since the particle could be in an infinite number of places, and by
squaring these coordinates, we have the probability distribution of that particle.
If now we desire information about some other property of the particle (for
example, about its momentum) we have simply to change the basis to get a new
set of coordinates.
This strategy can be applied to extrapolate from the formalism an astound-
ing amount of informations, and all this simply follows from the assumption of a
mathematical formalism (complex Hilbert space) and the maximality principle.
Steiner’s conclusion is that
The role of Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics, then, is more profound
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than the descriptive role of a single concept. An entire formalism – the
Hilbert space formalism — is matched with nature. Information about
nature is being “read off” the details of the formalism. (Imaging reading
off details about elementary particles from the rules of chess — castling, en
passant — à la Lewis Carrol in Through the Looking Glass.) No physicist
today understands why this is possible, though there are those who are
making valiant efforts. Thus, the descriptive applicability of the Hilbert
space formalism, which follows from the maximality principle, remains a
mystery. (p. 44)
In conclusion, summing up Steiner’s idea to account for (particular) descrip-
tive applicability, we can say that it consists in matching the mathematical
concept at issue with a physical corresponding property, whose presence or ab-
sence makes the mathematical concepts properly applicable or inapplicable. It
is important to notice that Steiner imposes a condition for this matching: that
the physical property must be the same for all the contexts in which the math-
ematical concept seems to be relevantly applicable. For, descriptive applicabil-
ity of complex analysis in physics seems miracolous just because it cannot be
connected to one general property always present in all the different cases of
application. Sometimes it is possible to do that, sometimes it is not — and in
these latter cases the descriptive applicability of the mathematical concept at
issue remains a mystery.
3.1.4 The heuristic applicability: naturalism vs. anthro-
pocentrism
Even when descriptive applicability can be accounted in the way we have just
seen, there is another problem raising, connected to the fact that generally
mathematicians, and not physicists, developed the mathematical concepts and
that only later such mathematical concepts revealed themselves as apprpopriate
and effective in physics. «It concerns the applicability of mathematics as such,
not of this or that concepts. It is a [sic] therefore an epistemological question,
about the relation between Mind and Cosmos» (p. 45). It is nothing else but the
62 CHAPTER 3. APPLICABILITIES OF MATHEMATICS
question raised by Eugene Wigner in his (1960), which I have already discussed
in the previous chapter.
Steiner criticizes Wigner beacuse his flawed presentation does not distin-
guish between two different arguments that can be find in his article. The first
(argument A) is summed up by Steiner as follows:
(1) Concepts C1, C2, . . . , Cn are unreasonably effective.
(2) Concepts C1, C2, . . . , Cn are mathematical.
(3) Hence, mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective.
This is not a valid argument, evidently, since from it we can only deduce that
some — not all — mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective and, by the
way, no argument is given to show that the unreasonableness of these concepts
is due to their being mathematical. The second argument (argument B), on
the other hand, is almost the same argument we encountered in the previous
chapter. Here is how Steiner formulates it.5
(1) Mathematical concepts arise from the aesthetic impulse in humans.
(2) It is unreasonable to expect that what arises from the aestheticl impulse
in humans should be significantly effective in physics.
(3) Nevertheless, a significant number of these concepts are significantly ef-
fective in physics.
(4) Hence, mathematical concepts are unreasonably effective.
Also argument B is exposed to a risk, for «what is so significant about the
number of mathematical concepts that have proved effective in physics? What
about all the failed attempts to apply mathematics to nature? Are not, in fact,
most such attempts doomed to failure?» (p. 46). If Wigner replies that even a
single success in applying a mathematical concept is significant, he is thrown
5As I precised in footnote 2 at p. 32, my formulation slightly differ from Steiner’s one, but
they are essentially the same.
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back to the fallacy of argument A, for he unduly extends the ‘significativeness’
(and hence the ‘unreasonableness’) of a single mathematical concept to the
whole mathematics. On the other hand, if he limits his analysis to the only
significantly effective mathematical concepts, one might easily retort that the
notion of “significantly effective” is very vague and it is not sufficiently clear
when effectiveness would be “significant”.
Instead of turning down these challenges by finding a way out, Steiner pro-
ceeds to develop a different version of Wigner’s argument, shaped to talk — like
Wigner’s one — about mathematical concepts in general, but rather centered
on the peculiar role of mathematics in scientific discovery. This claim presup-
poses that Wigner’s problem was not about discovery, and this cannot be proved
(since Wigner is quite confused in his presentation, as we have already seen).
However, Steiner’s argument is surely original, having the merit of laying out
an interesting philosophical argument. Part of this argument has been exposed
in the previous chapter, and here I shall repeat myself to be clear.
Steiner distinguishes two roles for mathematics in discovering new laws: the
first is deductive, the other is nondeductive. The first role consists, generally, in
deducing new laws from old laws, and it can be accounted, according to Steiner,
by Frege’s treatment of the deductive role of mathematics we dealt with in







representing the motion of a simple pendulum can be derived from the Newton’s
laws of gravity by means of logical deductions. More interesting is, instead, the
second, nondeductive role. The source of Steiner’s argument lays in a consider-
ation regarding physics from the end of the nineteenth century:
by the end of the nineteenth century, physicists began to suspect that
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the alien laws of the atom could not be deduced from those governing
macroscopic bodies. Nor, of course, could they be determined by direct
observation. Atomic physics seemed reduced to blind guessing, with an
uncertain future. (p. 48)
So, how did physicists manage to discover successful theories concerning objects
so far from our direct observation? How could this “blind guessing” be guided
towards the right direction? Steiner’s answer is: by analogy. «Having no choice,
physicists attempted to frame theories “similar” to the ones they were supposed
to replace» (p. 53). But the notion of similarity is somewhat vague if the
“ground” of the analogy is not set forth. For any objects are similar in some
respects and dissimilar in others. Moreover, such analogies could not be physical,
since the atoms displayed no analogy with the clasical laws known until then:
«reasoning by physical analogy had already been discredited in atomic theory.
The whole trouble was that the laws (if any) of the atom (if any) were proving
not to be analogous to those of bodies. The answer can only be, that (for lack
of anything better) scientists began relying on nonphysical analogies» (p. 54).
Steiner identifies two distinct kinds of non-physical analogy, that played and still
play — according to him — an important role in discovering new laws of physics
— to the extent that, he says, «without them, contemporary physics would
not exist» (p. 54). He calls them ‘Pythagorean’ and ‘formalist’ analogies (or
taxonomies). Here are the respective definitions, as stated by Steiner (see p. 54):
• Pythagorean analogy— A Pythagorean analogy (or taxonomy) at time
t is a mathematical analogy between physical laws (or other descriptions)
not paraphrasable at t into non-mathematical language.
• Formalist analogy — A formalist analogy (or taxonomy) is an analogy
based on the syntax or even the orthography of the language or notation
of physical theories, rather than what (if anything) it expresses.
Now, Steiner’s argument can be summed up as follows: Pythagorean and
formalist analogies play a crucial role in the fundamental physical discoveries
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of the last century, but they are both anthropocentric and hence deeply anti-
naturalistic. Steiner introduces here two new terms, “anthropocentrism” and
“naturalism” that must be carefully defined and considered. The term “natural-
ism” has known a wide variety of definitions over the history of philosophy, but
in analytic field it refers usually to Quine: naturalism is the thesis according
to which natural sciences are the last tribunal for truth and hence philosophy
should be part of (or continuous with) natural sciences. However, Steiner does
not adopt this definition, and actually does not even offer a positive definition of
the terms. He just says that it must be intended in opposition to anthropocen-
trism, where anthropocentrism is defined as «the teaching that human race is
in some way privileged, central to the scheme of things» (p. 55).6 For example,
a naturalist will say that the universe is indifferent to the goals and values of
humanity and that believing the contrary is just a proof of hubris. Steiner’s
idea is that contemporary scientists (particularly physicists) has progressively
— and, probably, even unconsciously — adopted an anthropocentric point of
view in applying mathematics.
Steiner distinguishes three kinds of anthropocentrism:
• overt anthropocentrism,
• covert anthropocentrism, and
• “play it safe” anthropocentrism.
The first kind takes the form of theories which state, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, that human race plays a privileged role in nature. So, for example,
creationism is an explicit form of overt anthropocentrism, and geocentrism is
an implicit form of overt anthropocentrism (since it implicitly assumes that
human race occupies a privileged place in the universe). Covert anthropocen-
trism, instead, is not predicated of a theory, but rather of a behavior which
6Actually, as Steiner precises, he has «no desire to lay claim to the word naturalism» (p. 55):
«If there were a decent word in English for “anti-anthropocentrism,” I would gladly drop the
term “naturalism”» (p. 55, footnote 19).
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presupposes some anthropocentric doctrine. It means that «behavior by an
agent A is covertly anthropocentric if it is irrational if A has no anthropocen-
tric beliefs» (p. 56). A typical example of covert anthropocentrism consists in
classifying phenomena by reference to human peculiarities. So, as an instance,
Pythagoreanism is covertly anthropocentric for it classifies numbers as “male”
and “female”, and Aristotelian physics is likewise since it classified physical bod-
ies into “heavenly” and “terrestrial”. Finally, the third kind of anthropocentrism
is defined by Steiner as the position «which pretends to avoid statements con-
cerning the status of the human race in the Great Chain of Being. “Play it safe”
anthropocentrism advocates, modestly, that science cannot confirm any hypoth-
esis about the unobservable» (p. 58). So, for example, Van Fraassen’s ideal that
all we should pretend by our scientific hypothesis is that they are empirically
adequate (and not true) is a form of “play it safe” anthropocentrism, since it
implies that human science can only reflect human limitations.7 According to
Steiner, this last version of anthropocentrism is no different than the other two:
A philosopher who objects to projecting anthropocentric hypotheses should
also object to limiting or weakening hypotheses by restricting them to an-
thropocentric categories (such as empirical adequacy). The content of the
prediction may now be weaker; but the prediction itself (the speech act)
makes a covert anthropocentric statement. (pp. 58-59)
Let me make just few considerations about Steiner’s kinds of anthropocen-
trism. Actually, it seems to me that there is only one anthropocentrism, con-
sisting in the idea that a theory is anthropocentric if it claims that human race
plays a privileged role in nature. What is different is the way in which I could
state that claim: I could do it either explicitly or implicitly; or I could imply
such a claim (either explicitly or implicitly) in my behavior. However, I do not
agree with Steiner when he says that “play it safe” version of anthropocentrism
is not different than the others. Actually I think it is different. He argues that,
7On Van Fraassen’s notion of “empirical adequacy” see van Fraassen (1980) and the more
recent van Fraassen (2008).
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for example, «the same theories that tell us that we cannot see X- rays tell us
also that what we do see (light) is a random sample of radiation; i.e. that there
is nothing special about light, and that there is nothing wrong per se with pro-
jecting the properties of light on unobservable radiation. Deliberately to limit
our projections concerning radiation to light, then, is to imply, covertly, theses
about the centrality of the human race» (p. 59). I contest this point: if we un-
derstand the notion of empirical adequacy in terms of consistency with all our
possible human observations (as Van Fraassen does), this last term has surely an
anthropocentric character — and Van Fraassen himself admits it. But this does
not imply any anthropocentric hypothesis, for we are not — as Steiner says —
«limiting or weakening hypotheses by restricting them to anthropocentric cat-
egories» (p. 58); rather, we are anthropocentrically limiting our possibilities to
confirm those hypotheses. To say that our knowledge of the word is limited by
anthropocentric categories does not imply, in any sense, that in our hypotheses
human race plays a central role, but only that these hypotheses can be tested
only by those anthropocentric categories.
Anyway — coming back to Steiner’s analysis — both overt and covert an-
thropocentrism have been strongly opposed in modern science, but nevertheless,
Steiner argues, «recent physics — from about 1850 — has retreated from nat-
uralism. Truly great discoveries in contemporary physics were made possible
only by abandoning — often convertly and even unconsciously — the natural-
istic point of view» (pp. 59-60). This conclusion is actually drawn from the
following two premises:
I. Both the Pythagorean and formalist systems are anthropocentric; never-
theless,
II. Both Pythagorean and formalist analogies played a crucial role in the
fundamental physical discoveries of this century.
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Let us leave aside premise II for a while, and let us focus on premise I. The ques-
tion is: why are these analogies anthropocentric? Let us consider Pythagorean
analogies first. What is anti -naturalistic in them? This question, according to
Steiner, hangs upon another: what is mathematics and what is the criterion for
a concept to be “mathemtatical”? For example, why is chess a game and Hilbert
space mathematics? We already discussed Steiner’s view on this argument (see
section 2.2), but let me briefly repeat it. Steiner argues that there are two cri-
teria which determines whether a concept is mathematical or not: beauty and
convenience. The first establishes that a concept is mathematical if it satisfies
our aesthetical sense of beauty. The latter that a concept is mathematical if
it compensates (or increases) our computational limits. As I underlined in sec-
tion 2.2, following Pincock (2012), Steiner is confusing two different questions,
and that in attempting to answer the first (“What makes this concept mathe-
matical or non-mathematical?”) he can at most answer to the second (“What
makes this concept a good or a bad mathematical concept?”). Anyway, fol-
lowing Steiner’s argument, beauty and convenience are highly anthropocentric
categories, and hence the mathematics that results from the employment of these
two categories cannot be non-anthropocentric: «[. . .] the human aesthetic sense
is nothing but species-specific preference. Classifications like beautiful/ugly are
then anthropocentric; so, finally, are the mathematical classifications» (p. 66).
If the analogies we rely on in discovering new physical laws are Pythagorean —
namely, if they are not paraphrasable into a non-mathematical language at the
time we employ them — then, those analogies are anthropocentric.
Coming to formalist analogies, the anthropocentric character is even more
blatant, since (at least) from John Locke onwards, we accepted the idea that
the syntax (or other formal properties) of a language need not correspond to a
scheme outside language. For example,
the symmetries of our notation need not to reflect the symmetries the
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notation describes; does a sentence have an enhanced claim to be true
because it is a palindrome? To think this is arrant anthropocentrism.
[. . .].
Expecting the form of our notation to mirror those of (even) the atomic
world is like expecting the rules of chess to reflect those of the solar system.
I shall argue, though, that some of the greatest discoveries of our century
were made by studying the symmetries of notation. Expecting this to be
any use is like expecting magic to work. (pp. 71-72)
Justifications for premises II are offered by Steiner in chapters 4, 5 and 6
of his book, where he presents a large amount of concrete cases, taken from
contemporary physics, in which Pythagorean and formalist analogies seem to
play a crucial role. I am not going to discuss all these cases in details, but
some words are needed to better understand in which sense Pythagorean and
formalist analogies are — according to Steiner — so crucial in contemporary
physical development.
A typical Pythagorean strategy is the following: «Equation E has been de-
rived under assumptions A. The equation has solutions for which A are no
longer valid; but just because they are solutions of E, one looks for them in
nature» (p. 76). As an instance, Steiner mentions Maxwell’s discovery of elec-
tromagnetic radiation. Since the (experimentally well confirmed) laws of Fara-
day, Coulomb and Ampère turn out to contradict the conservation of electrical
charge when put in differential form, Maxwell tried to “save” this conservation
law by introducing in Ampère’s law a new hypothetical current, which he called
“displacement current”. Although no empirical evidence pushed to doubt Am-
père’s law and there was very little experimental evidence for the reality of this
hypothetical current, Maxwell followed this line and considered the magnetic
field as given by the sum of the “real” current and the “displacement current”.
Then, by ignoring that for Ampère’s law magnetism is caused by an electric cur-
rent, Maxwell asserted that the previous equivalence was valid also for a zero
“real” current. «This — Steiner comments — made electromagnetic radiation
a mathematical possibility. The belief that it was also physically real required
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a Pythagorean analogy — one that paid off» (p. 77).
Another Pythagorean strategy frequently adopted in contemporary physics
is the following one:
One looks for solutions in nature even where there is reason to doubt their
very possibility. There is no a priori reason to believe that every solution
of an equation has a physical interpretation. There is nothing logically
wrong, therefore, with discarding certain solutions of an equation, and it is
often done (for example, unbounded solutions of Schroedinger’s equation).
Nevertheless, the Pythagorean scientist goes by the working hypothesis
that a mathematical possibility will be realized by nature. (p.82)
As an example of this second strategy, Steiner mentions Dirac’s discovery of
anti-matter: Dirac’s equation gave solutions describing electron very well. But
it also allowed particles of negative energies as solutions. There were no reason
to accept their very possibility, but Dirac went on and accepted these negative
energies as real.
A third kind of strategy is so summed up by Steiner:
Suppose we have succesfully classified a family of “objects” by a mathe-
matical structure S. Then we project that this structure, or some related
mathematical structure T , should classify other families of objects, even if,
given present knowledge, (a) S is not reducible to a physical property, and
(b) the relation between S and T is not reducible to a physical relation.
We have doubly Pythagorean analogies. (p. 84)
One of the examples offered by Steiner is isospin: no physical analogy has been
discovered, up to now, between spin and isospin; but isospin is nevertheless
considered as a conserved quantity mathematically analogous to spin.
Unitll now, Steiner presented only strategies for discovering solutions and
symmetries of the laws of nature. Another Pythagorean strategy, in which
what is discovered is instead the equation itself, is at work when «One formu-
lates equations by analogy to the mathematical form of other equations, even
if little or no physical motivation exists for the analogy» (p. 94). An example
is given by the procedure adopted by Heisenberg in deriving matrix mechanics.
Starting with the classical Hamiltonian equations of mechanics, Heisenberg re-
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placed all the variables in the equations by matrices, and all the operations by
corresponding matrix operations.
This procedure — Steiner comments — is an example of “quantization”
— i.e., of transforming a false classical equation for an atomic system into
(what is hoped to be) a true quantum equation for that system. There
is no rationale for this procedure, [. . .], except a Pythagorean analogy.
To put the matter another way, it is impossible to imagine a physicist
discovering the matrix equation by direct physical reasoning, skipping
entirely the classical step. This is because the matrix equation, though
one can extract measurable “numbers” from it, and therefore confirm the
equation, does not “say” anything about the physical system which can
be expressed — even qualitatively — without the matrices. Matrices as
such have no independent physical meaning. (pp. 96-97)
Eventually, two further Pythagorean strategies, very akin, are at work when
«A refuted law is used to test new laws — the “old” law is stipulated to be a
special or limiting case of any “new” law» (p. 105), and when «A refuted law —
false by definition — is nevertheless used to derive new laws» (p. 106). What
is Pythagorean in these strategies is that both
presuppose that mathematical structures are more robust than the laws
that instantiate them. Even if a law is refuted, its mathematical form
(symmetry) must play a role, one projects, in future developments. Such
a projection is Pythagorean, because we cannot characterize physically
what we mean by “mathematics”. (p. 106)
Regarding formalist analogies, Steiner does not make a list of different strate-
gies, but only offers several examples, all taken from Quantum Mechanics. In
this context, «formalist analogies often take the form of pseudodeductions: in-
stead of preserving truth, formalist reasoning establishes meaning» (p. 116).
The most interesting example offered by Steiner is probably the so called pro-
cess of “quantization”. This strategy consists in assuming that the system obeys
the classical laws (which is false), and then in transforming this classical as-
sumption into a (hopefully) true quantum description of the system, by means
of syntactic transformations. According to Steiner,
the discoveries made this way relied on symbolic manipulations that bor-
der on the magical. I say “magical” because the object of study of physics
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became more and more the formalism of physics itself, as though the
symbols were reality — and the confusion of symbols with reality is what
characterizes much of what we call magic. (p. 136)
All these examples clearly shows, according to Steiner, that both Pythagorean
and formalist analogies play a crucial role in contemporary physics. Thus, fi-
nally, if we admit that Steiner has offered us convincingly reasons to believe
both in premises I and II, we must conclude with him that an anthropocentric
policy was a necessary factor in discovering today’s fundamental physics, and
that «This makes the universe look, intellectually, “user friendly” (in that our
categories of beauty and convenience are found in the “real essences” of things)
to our species, or other species like ours, if any» (p. 8).
Three clarifications are in order to better understand this conclusion. The
first is that Steiner is not saying that this anthropocentric policy is the only
necessary factor in discovering today’s fundamental physics. It is just one of
the many. The second is that the anthropocentrism Steiner is professing has to
do only with the discovery of, not with the content of, present-day theories. The
content of these theories may even be considered non-anthropocentric; what is
anthropocentric is the manner by which we achieve them.8 Finally, we can say
that this conclusion challenges naturalism, but only to the extent that “natural-
ism” rejects any anthropocenric point of view.
3.2 Some remarks on Steiner’s analysis
Is Steiner’s analysis satisfying? In this section I will try to show that it is
not, even if we must admit that many elements of interest are contained in it.
Generally speaking, Steiner’s conclusion is not very far from Wigner’s one: for
Wigner, the applicability of mathematics is in general a mystery that we cannot
8It follows from this that the particular version of anthropocentrism Steiner is talking about
must be the covert one. For overt anthropocentrism (given Steiner’s definition) is something
we can predicate of theories, not of discoveries of theories.
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solve. For Steiner there is no single problem of applicability; we can solve (and
solved, actually) some of them, but some others are still mysterious. Particularly
compelling are the anthropocentric (or anti-naturalistic) assumptions that we
do in order to profitably employ mathematical reasoning in discovering new
physical laws. Thus, in general, we must admit that applicability still remains,
for the most part, mysterious.
3.2.1 Some remarks on the validity of Frege’s solutions
As we have seen, Frege’s philosophy is directly invoked to solve two different
problems, the semantical and the metaphysical. So, the first question one could
ask is: Is really Frege’s philosophy of mathematics the solution of (almost) all
of our problems? In the first case, the problem asks to find a constant inter-
pretation for both “pure” and “mixed” contexts, and Frege’s solution consists
in saying that all occurrences of numerals in mixed contexts can be translated
in a uniform interpretation of the form “The number of the Gs is n”. Now,
this solution is obviously suited for arithmetic, and it is not clear whether the
semantic problem is a problem only for arithmetic or for other contexts as well.
Steiner does not take an explicit stand on this point, but he apparently thinks
the semantic problem is involved also in different areas of mathematics. Thus,
if really the semantic problem can be raised also in non-arithmetical contexts,
we have no clue about how to solve the problem in these contexts.9
A second problem concerning Frege’s solution to the semantic problem is
raised by Pincock (2012). Frege’s solution implies two necessary assumptions:
(1) it seems to presuppose platonism concerning mathematical entities; (2) it
presupposes that the substantival interpretation of all mathematical terms is
actually the correct logical form of all mathematical sentences. Even if we
9I tried to figure out some new, non-trivial example to illustrate, concretely, the occurence
of semantic problems of this kind in non-arithmetic contexts, but I could not find any good
instance. So, the doubt remains: is it just a problem for arithmetic, or has it a wider scope?
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accept (1), it remains pointless if we do not accept (2). But neither Frege
nor Steiner provide reasons to accept (2). Even more puzzling, Steiner claims
that «One could [. . .] also solve the “semantic” problem of the applicability of
mathematics with a theory according to which all numerals are really predi-
cates» (Steiner 1998, p. 17n), and to this end he mentions the work of Hellman
(1989). Now, Hellman’s project consists in offering a modal-structuralist inter-
pretation of mathematics according to which all mathematical claims are about
possible structures. Purely numerical claims like “7+5=12” come out as general
claims about the features of any number structure. Thus, “7+5=12” should be
interpreted as “In any number structure S, addingS the 7S to the 5S necessarily
results in the 12S”; and our mixed statements like “There are seven apples on the
table” should be interpreted (uniformly) as “The apple on the table instantiate
the initial segment ‘7S ’ of the natural number structure S” — in order to have
a valid deduction. Now, as Pincock (2012) points out,
As with the Fregean approach that Steiner defends, it is not clear if a
modal-structuralist is entitled to their modal assumptions or the assump-
tion that natural language sentences have logical forms that match their
interpretation. Hellman, for one, is not committed to this strong assump-
tion as he is not trying to solve the semantic problem as Steiner presents
it. But given Steiner’s apparent admission that this sort of adjectival
strategy could succeed, the burden of the proof is then on Steiner to ex-
plain how his substantival solution is superior. [. . .]. Until he does this, I
insist that the semantic problem remains open. (p. 171)
Coming to Steiner’s fregean solution to the second, metaphysical problem, a
further difficulty arises if we analyze more closely the relationship between the
logicist thesis and Frege’s solution to the metaphysical problem. The validity
of Frege’s solution crucially depends on the interpretation of mathematical con-
cepts as second order concepts (i.e., they are concepts of concepts, and not of
objects). The metaphysical application of a mathematical concept is no more
a problem since we are simply talking of concepts that can be variously in-
stantiated — not least by physical objects. But, in Frege’s view, mathematical
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concepts are second order concepts just because they are logical concepts. In
Dummett’s (1991) words,
Frege tacitly took the application of a theorem of arithmetic to consist in
the instantiation, by specific concepts and relations, of a highly general
truth of logic, involving quantification of second order or yet higher order:
if the specific concepts and relations were mathematical ones, we should
have an application within mathematics; if they were empirical ones, we
should have an external application. (p. 256)
As we saw in chapter 1, Frege’s explanation of the (metaphysical) applicability
of arithmetic relies on two different components: (A) the analyticity of the arith-
metical truths and (B) the reduction of arithmetic to logical terms, namely, to
(logical) laws of concepts. (A) guarantees that the application of arithmetic is
conservative, i.e. that it does not lead to true premises to false conclusions; and
(B) enables us to apply arithmetic everywhere the proper concepts appear. (B)
can be further analyzed as consisting of: (B.1) the logicist reduction, namely the
fact that arithmetic is reduced to logic; and (B.2) the fact that this reduction
is made such in a way that the arithmetical concepts result to be concepts of
concepts (and hence applicable only to concepts and not to objects). Now, only
(B.2) has an explanatory value regarding Frege’s account of the applicability
of mathematics; so, we can try to revive Frege’s solution even in absence of
(B.1). However, if we want to do this, we must come to terms with the fact
that, in Frege’s philosophy, (B.2) is actually a consequence of (B.1): arithmeti-
cal concepts are second order concepts just because they are logical concepts.
The same must be said of (A): mathematics is analytic just because it consists
of nothing but logical truths. It follows, if I am right, that if we want to save
Frege’s account without committing ourselves to logicism, we must offer inde-
pent reasons why arithmetic is conservative and why mathematical concepts are
second order concepts — which Steiner omits doing. Steiner holds that these
solutions are independent of Frege’s logicism, since we can frame all the Grund-
lagen in Boolos’ FA, be it logic or not. That’s true, but this only says that
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the Grundlagen’s system is consistent since we can express it in a second order
logic (substituting Frege’s Basic Law V with the so-called Hume’s Principle),
not that the philosophical justification for accepting it is no more needed.
Moreover, Steiner’s extension of this strategy to the rest of mathematics
is based on the modelization of classical mathematics in ZFC, and this move
underlines how the only relevant relation between sets and their application
turns out to be the setting up of a function of some kind. As Pincock (2012)
points out,
If this set-theoretic solution is deemed adequate, then it shows how low
the bar is set to solve the metaphysical problem. Steiner raises the issue by
alluding to a gap between mathematics and the physical world. A bridge
across this gap need only show that mathematics is related in some way to
the physical world. But as Steiner’s own set-theoretic response indicates,
there is no requirement that the bridge do anything else. It need not
illuminate what [. . .] mathematics contributes to the success of science.
To know that every physical object is a member of a variety of sets,
including ordered pairs that are members of sets identified with functions
of a certain sort, is totally trivial once we have adopted ZFC with these
objects as individuals. (pp. 173-174)
Pincock’s idea is rather that a clear comprehension of the applicability of math-
ematics requires a deep analysis of what and how mathematics contributes to
science. Steiner’s answer fills the gap between mathematical entities and phys-
ical entities, but it leaves open the problem of why and how this “filling the
gap” can (and actually is) fruitful for science. For example, «this solution to
Steiner’s metaphysical problem does not address Field’s worry about extrinsic
explanation» (p. 174). Steiner might answer to this objection by saying that
we should not confuse different problems, but try to keep them well separated.
Thus, the trivialization of the metaphysical problem is just a (positive) conse-
quence of his analysis. In other words, we must keep separated the possibility
of filling the gap (by means of special functions from physical to mathematical
objects — functions that can be themselves considered as ordered pairs, so that
the only relatioship between physical and mathematical objects we need recog-
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nize is set membership) from the actual manner in which we can perform this
filling, and just say that the mere possibility of filling the gap is enough to solve
the metaphysical problem — it does not matter how we perform it. However,
given this trivialization of the problem, there’s no surprise that it can be solved
also in different ways. For example, Pincock suggests Wilholt’s (2004) solution,
according to which some mathematical entities can be considered as proper-
ties or relations, and these properties or relations can be predicated of physical
objects. Another example is given by the sort of relations which structuralist
views appeal to.10 Thus, «As with the semantic problem, these other solutions
at least put the burden on Steiner to explain why his Frege-inspired solution is
the best or most promising» (Pincock 2012, p. 174).11
There is another problem that can be raised concerning Steiner’s solution to
the metaphysical problem and which is strictly related to its “trivialization”. The
setting up of a function (or of a relation of membership) between mathematical
and physical objects, seems to presuppose that we have from the beginning
two kinds of clearly distincted objects (mathematical and physical) and that
we can couple them together without any problem. However, as I’ve already
noticed at the end of chapter 2, many physical concepts and objects seems
rather to be the result of a highly abstract process of matematization, and
sometimes it is even uncertain whether a concept (or an object) should be
considered as a mathematical or physical one. But if physical objects are spelled
out from mathematization, that means we can couple them with mathematical
objects only a posteriori, namely, only after the process of mathematization has
produced its fruits. Steiner is right in saying that we must keep distinguished
the different problems of applicability that surround mathematics, but I think
10My proposal, articulated in chapter 5, is actually based on this sort of relations. Another
similar examples of these structural relations can be found in Shapiro (1983), Bueno & Colyvan
(2011), Pincock (2012) and others.
11In chapter 5 I will actually try to spell out some “metaphysical” reasons why we should
prefer a structuralist account on others competitors.
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that the various solutions should show kind of coherence among them. This
does not necessarily invalidate Steiner’s solution to metaphysical problem, but
seems rather to suggest that a surplus of argumentation is needed in order to
show that this solution is, in some sense, compatible with the solution to the
other problems presented and with the roles of mathematics in science.
Thus, once again, the conclusion seems to be that, in formulating the prob-
lem (problems) of applicability, we should avoid to understand this “application”
in a too much litteral sense: physics and mathematics are not to be intended
as two pieces of a puzzle, of which we must understand the way in which they
can be connected. They are much more intertwined than this picture suggests,
and if we are going to properly understand the applicability of mathematics to
science, we cannot underestimate this point.
3.2.2 Description and representation
As we saw, descriptive applicability problems are only partially solved by Steiner.
Depending on the particular mathematical concept involved, in some cases we
are able to offer a non-mathematical description of what the world must be like
in order that a specific mathematical concept can be used to effectively predict
observations; whereas in some cases we are left without a clue about how this
aim could be achieved.
There are two points that Steiner seems to presuppose in accounting for this
descriptive problem. The first, as I’ve already noted, is that Steiner presup-
poses that, when a mathematical concepts is employed in two different physical
contexts, the physical property underlying the two applications must be the
same. The second is that Steiner seems to consider his descriptive account as
an account for the representative role of mathematics. But if this is right, then
— as is well noticed by Pincock (2012) — Steiner is considering the descriptive
role of mathematics as the only form of representation that mathematics can
3.2. SOME REMARKS ON STEINER’S ANALYSIS 79
offer — and this is surely reductive.
Let’s start from the first point. Why should we limit our account by as-
suming that a unique physical property must explain all the applications of a
mathematical concept? There is no particular reason, I think. We can admit
that, for example, the descriptive efficacy of analytic functions in fluid dynamics
has not to be, necessarily, based on the same properties as it is for the descrip-
tive applicability of analytic functions in thermodynamics. Steiner would reply
by saying that the situation for analytic functions does not resemble the case
of additivity, where on the contrary we have a unique physical property which
is able to explain the occurrence of addition in every context. But this implies
that we are assuming the additive case as the standard measurement unit to
evaluate all the other cases — and this is an unwarranted assumption.
However, even if we admit that different applications of the same math-
ematical concept do not need to be accounted by the same physical property,
there are still mathematical concepts which we are still left without a clue about
how to (descriptively) account for — for example, the application of analytic
functions in fluid dynamics and thermodynamics. I do not have a solution for
these problems, but I just want to notice that the difficulty of finding a physi-
cal property matching a mathematical concept can also be seen as a clue that
the application at issue is actually not descriptive. This is a point that Steiner
seems not to really take into consideration. The descriptive applicability seems
to account for the possibility of using mathematics as a representative tool. But
a representation is a very complex thing, and an element of a representation
can play several, different roles — and description is just one of them. Pincock
(2012), for example, distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic mathematics
employed in representations: the first is the mathematics that figures in the
content of a representation; the latter is the additional mathematics that, even
not figuring in the representation, still contributes to the efficacy of the rep-
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resentation. So, for example, we can mathematically describe the dynamic of
a system by means of some set of equations. These equations (along with the
mathematics required to present these equations) will be the intrinsic mathe-
matics appearing in the representation. But we could employ this representation
to allow the derivation of further representations, and in doing this we could
need some extra mathematics. In this case, this ‘extra’ would be what Pincock
calls the extrinsic mathematics. Beyond this, Pincock specifies four dimensions
along which mathematics can contribute to a scientific representation. These
dimensions run along four basic dichotomies: (1) causal/acausal content, (2)
concrete fixed/abstract varying content, (3) small-large representation (issues
of scale), and (4) constitutive/derivative content. Thus, for a given mathemati-
cal representation, we can ask whether the mathematics involved is intrinsic or
extrinsic, and then we can ask whether and how the mathematics contributes
to (1), (2), (3) or (4) (it is also possible that the contribution combines different
features of two or more of these dimensions). Pincock conclusion is that
mathematics makes an epistemic contribution to the success of our scien-
tific representations. Epistemic contributions include aiding in the con-
firmation of the accuracy of a given representation through prediction
and experimentation. But they extend further into considerations of cal-
ibrating the content of a given representation to the evidence available,
making an otherwise irresolvable problem tractable and offering crucial
insights into the nature of physical systems. So even when mathematics
is not playing the metaphysical role of isolating fundamentally mathemat-
ical structures inherent to the physical world, it can still be making an
essential contribution to the success of science. For part of this success
is the fact that we take our evidence to confirm the accuracy of our best
scientific representations. And it is here that the mathematical character
of these representations makes its decisive mark. (Pincock 2012, p. 8)
It is often very difficult to decide exactly when a mathematical contribution
has to be dubbed as ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’, as well as to decide which dimension
the mathematics is playing a role in. However, we do not need to solve this
problem here. For our aims it is enough to show that mathematics can also
be extrinsic. If we accept this, it is clear that extrinsic mathematics cannot be
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accounted in the descriptive way proposed by Steiner. The point is that not all
mathematics works descriptively: mathematics can play a great variety of roles
in its contribution to representation; so, no surprise if Steiner’s solution cannot
work for all mathematical concepts applied in sciences. What surprises, rather,
is the fact that Steiner didn’t pay much attention to this variety of roles.
3.2.3 Deflating the criticisms to naturalism
The last considerations pertain Steiner’s criticisms on naturalism and his idea
of the anthropocentric character of mathematics. As we saw, it is strictly re-
lated to the heuristic role of mathematics in science: mathematical analogies
and reasonings (both Pythagorean and formalist) permit to make important ad-
vancements in science, just in spite of this anthropocentric character — which
contrasts with naturalism.
Some considerations are in order. First, is mathematics really anthropocen-
tric? Second, do these analogies and reasonings really represent a problem for
naturalism? And finally, is this way of setting out the problem satisfactorily?
Concerning the first question, we can go back to section 2.2, where I have
already taken into consideration the reason why Steiner is led to thought of
mathematics as ‘anthropocentric’. As I said there, his argument is not conclu-
sive. For he holds that the anthropocentric character of mathematics comes
from the constitutive role that aesthetical criteria play in it, but I have shown
there that Steiner’s arguments can at best argue for a selective role of aesthet-
ical criteria in mathematics. This does not permit us to reject Steiner’s thesis,
but his argument is not enough in order to hold it up. Hence, in absence of
a stronger argument, it seems to me reasonable to comply only with the more
modest thesis according to which aesthetical criteria in mathematics cannot
have a role but selective.12
12Bangu (2006) comes to a similar conclusion by considering some historical reactions to
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If we are not reasoned to think that mathematics is species-specific, we
cannot conclude that mathematics is anthropocentric. The fact that the em-
ployment of mathematical reasoning can led to new discoveries in physics is then
not necessarily a problem for naturalism. However, even if mathematics is not
anthropocentric, that a physical discovery has been done only relying on mathe-
matical analogies still constitutes a problem for the naturalist philosopher, since
she seems to be in difficulty when we ask her to justify why scientists are led
to believe something only relying on these mathematical analogies. The prob-
lem is quite complex. First of all, one might raise some doubts about Steiner’s
reconstruction of several cases he presents as examples of anti-naturalistic dis-
coveries. Are we really sure, for example, that Heisenberg’s discovery of isospin
was made only by relying on a mathematical analogy? According to Steiner’s
reconstruction,
In 1932, Heisenberg conjectured boldly that the proton and the neutron
— ignoring their opposite charge — are two states of the same parti-
cle, “spinning” in opposite directions in a fictitious three-dimensional Eu-
clidean “space”. The space had to be fictitious, since (unlike the situation
with the “up-down” electronic states) one cannot turn a neutron into a
proton by standing on one’s head. Heisenberg reasoned that the nucleus of
the atom is invariant under SU(2) transformations, those which describe
the spin properties of the electron; and that there had to be, therefore, a
new conserved quantity, mathematically analogous to spin. (pp. 86-87)
And then, commenting on this, Steiner notices:
[. . .] Heisenberg’s theory was not just that the neutron and the proton
are the same particle. That hypothesis would require only a weaker sym-
metry: that one could “swap” neutrons and protons discontinuously (the
permutation group), in any physical process not involving the charge.
Heisenberg’s theory is that the neutron is obtained from a proton by a
continuous abstract “rotation of 180 degrees,” and also that to return a
neutron or a proton to its initial isospin state, one must “rotate” the parti-
cle a full 720 degrees in the fictitious isospin space. It seems clear that the
mathematics is doing all the work in this analogy, and that Heisenberg’s
analogy was highly Pythagorean. (p. 87)
what Maddy (1997) calls “definabilism” (the view that all mathematical objects must be
definable in an explicit and uniform way). Being definabilism anti-anthropocentric, Steiner’s
thesis turns out to be undermined.
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However, a different reconstruction is possible and is offered by French (2000).13
According to him, in the isospin case
the effectiveness of mathematics surely does not seem quite so unreason-
able, as group theory is brought to bear via a series of approximations
and idealisations, the most important being the ontological move. In ef-
fect physics is manipulated in order to allow it to enter into a relationship
with the appropriate mathematics, where what is appropriate depends
on the underlying analogy. At the most basic level, what motivates this
manipulation and therefore underpins the effectiveness of mathematics in
this case are the empirical results concerning intra-nuclear forces and the
near equivalence of masses. (p. 114)
Following French, we can reject Steiner’s claim according to which «mathemat-
ics is doing all the work here» (p. 87). Nevertheless, even if we accept French’s
reconstruction, we have ruled out isospin case from the ‘black list’ of anthro-
pocentric cases, but all the other cases are still there. These considerations do
not exclude that there actually are Pythagorean discoveries in contemporary
physics.
One might say that the role of Pythagorean and formalist analogies in physics
is only heuristic. By recovering the outdated distinction between the context of
discovery and the context of justification, one might say that even if it is true
that the analogies are, in some sense, “anthropocentric”, they are nonetheless
part of the context of discovery. Their acceptance does not depend, in no sense,
on the way they have been discovered. The discovery could have even been
irrational or based on purely psicological facts, but its acceptance requests a
justification — and if a non-anthropocentric justification can be given, then
the problem does not raise. However, this argument cannot reply to Steiner,
since the problem is exactly that there seems not to be other justifications of
these discoveries different from the mathematical analogies that led to them. As
Steiner correctly notices while discussing of isospin case, «even today, nobody
13French does not mention Steiner. His considerations are aimed to oppose Wigner’s claim
about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. Wigner and Steiner have different ar-
guments, but, as we saw, both agree on the point that it is (at least up to now) unreasonable
how and why mathematics is so effective in science. To the extent that French’s arguments
are aimed to reject Wigner on this point, they are equally good to reject Steiner too.
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knows why electron spin and isospin have the same symmetry — and even if
someone were to explain the coincidence, the explanation was not available to
Heisenberg in 1932» (p. 87). Hence, either we offer a different reconstruction
of why Heisenberg was justified in postulating the existence of isospin (and
we saw that, for this case, French’s reconstruction is a valid alternative), but
then we should do the same for all the other cases presented by Steiner); or
we must admit that the distinction between context of discovery and context of
justification is of no help in replying to Steiner on this point.
A more general critics to Steiner can be moved if we consider more closely
what he means by Pythagorean analogy. Remember that «a Pythagorean
analogy (or taxonomy) at time t is a mathematical analogy between physical
laws (or other descriptions) not paraphrasable at t into nonmathematical lan-
guage» (p. 54). This definition is clearly linked to the notion of descriptive appli-
cability, since for Steiner to account for the descriptive applicability of a math-
ematical concept amounts exactly to finding a physical property associated to
the mathematical concept that permits to paraphrase it into non-mathematical
terms.14 Thus, we can say that a mathematical analogy is Pythagorean exactly
when the mathematical concepts involved cannot be descriptively accounted.15
However, we already considered the limits of Steiner’s analysis of descriptive
applicability. Particularly, we pointed out that mathematics can play non-
descriptive, but nonetheless representative, roles in science. Now, following Pin-
cock (2012), this criticism can be exploited also to say that if a mathematical
concept has no descriptive account of its effectiveness, this does not necessarily
imply that it is used in a Pythagorean way. «[T]his reductive test is unreasonable
— he says — and [. . .] it ignores other kinds of well-understood contributions
from mathematics to the success of a scientific representation» (Pincock 2012,
14See section 3.1.3.
15In the case of the analogy, we should account not only for the single concepts employed,
but also for the possibility of exporting the concept from a context to another.
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p. 185).
This criticism is however limited to Pythagorean analogies and does not
touch, in any sense, the cases in which formalist analogies are involved. Steiner’s
criticism to naturalism can then be motivated only by appealing to this latter
kind of analogies. It is difficult to decide whether effectively mathematics is
playing here a role that can be accounted only by appealing to an alleged an-
thropocentric feature. However, I think that we should keep well distinguished
two claims in Steiner’s analysis: one the one side (I) the claim that mathemat-
ics is anthropocentric; on the other side (II) the claim that some roles played
by mathematics in contemporary physics raise a real problem for naturalism.
It seems to me that the arguments offered by Steiner in support of (I) can be
rejected (as we did in section 2.2). Nevertheless, he gave us good arguments
in support of (II), since effectively we have no account for some relevant (and
not isolated) cases of scientific discovery in which mathematics seems to play
a relevant role. That said, we can at best conclude that this is a challenge to
naturalism, but there is no argument here in support of anthropocentrism.
A completely different criticism is moved by Peter Simons, who objects that
«by concentrating only on successful discoveries Steiner has biased the story»
(Simons 2001). Steiner is well aware of this kind of criticism and he tries to avoid
it by moving from theories to taxonomies (see Steiner 1998, p. 73). Theories are
tools aimed to describe the world and in this attempt they may go frequently
wrong; taxonomies are rather frameworks in which such theories are formulated.
Steiner’s point is that taxonomies, not theories, are anthropocentric; namely,
such theories were developed in a (methodological) framework that is, in the end,
non-naturalistic — despite what scientists say. Simons criticizes this distinction,
since according to him Steiner made it too simplicistic. But even if we admit
that Steiner is right on this point, the problem is that the examples he offers
can be differently interpreted:
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To the extent that physical phenomena admit of description in rela-
tively straightforward mathematical terms — and we should not forget
that non-linear, chaotic and uncomputable physical situations abound
— some of the vast array of pure mathematical concepts and results
piled up without regard to application by thousands of mathematicians
were in the end going to be the right ones. The tortuous developments
Steiner entertainingly describes bear witness to physicists’ often mathe-
matically gauche and ill-fitting hunches and trials, and incidentally show
that Pythagorean or formalist analogies by no means always lead in the
right direction. (Simons 2001, p. 183)
In other words, the success of physicists in making surprising discoveries can
be ascribed not to an alleged “anthropocentric, user-friendly universe”, but
rather to «their desperate attempt to discover what looked like the undiscover-
able» (Steiner 1998, p. 73): «Robbed of convincing intuitive pictures, physicists
grasped at anything they understood which might help in some way to give an
account of new and puzzling phenomena» (Simons 2001, p. 183).16
3.3 Conclusions
Steiner’s work has undoubtedly several merits. First of all, it cut out the long
neglect reserved by philosophy to the problem of the applicability of mathemat-
ics, and he did more than other philosophers to show that there is a problem
for philosophy here to be faced.17 Another of his undisputed merits consists
in having underlined that there is not one single problem, but rather a bunch
of different problems orbiting around the applicability of mathematics. This is
probably his main contribution to the discussion of the problem of applicability.
Even if his solutions to all these problems may be unsatisfying — as I showed in
section 3.2 — he traced a “geography” of the argument that future developments
shall take into consideration, and in which we can now move more wittingly.
16Let alone the fact, underlined by Simons and previously considered by us, that «while
professing to give us the history of discoveries by physicists Steiner gives us a history
largely sanitized of the physical motivations and correctives that drove the physicists them-
selves» (Simons 2001, p. 183).
17Remember that the final attempt of Steiner’s work was — as he himself says — «to per-
suade my advisor and mentor, Professor Paul Benacerraf, that there really is a philosophical
problem about the applicability of mathematics in natural science» (Steiner 1998, p. vii).
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Nevertheless, it must be noted that his “geography” of the land is far from
being complete and definitive. Among the four different applicability problems
he distinguishes (semantical, metaphysical, descriptive and heuristic), the last
two seem to be the most problematic. Particularly, his analysis of representative
roles of mathematics appears to be quite poor, and even misleading. He actually
talks only of a “descriptive” role of mathematics, but we saw that mathematical
representations can play a certain number of non-descriptive roles. Moreover,
he distinguishes two contributions mathematics can give to the discovery of
new laws or new entities in physics: deductive and non-deductive. However,
non-deductive contributions can be linked, in some sense, to the representative
role of mathematics, since it often happens that the mathematics involved in
a scientific representation helps in discovering new laws or entities and fosters
new developments in physical inquiry. In Steiner’s account, however, the two
roles — descriptive, or representative, and heuristic — seems to have no con-
nection between them. This is a point which we will have to take care of in the
next sections; for an account of mathematical applicability cannot be consid-






Up to now I have intentionally avoided to take into consideration ontological
questions. This choice has been dictated by the general idea that the philosophy
of mathematics should first of all looks at mathematics as it is concretely prac-
ticed, and only then draw the opportune conclusions about any philosophical
question about mathematics. Hence, the problem of the applicability of mathe-
matics, pertaining a concrete fact of practiced mathematics, should be analysed
and discussed before and independently of any other philosophical question one
might issue. In other words, I think we should look at the applicability problems
without any ontological preconception.
However, in chapter 2 we took into consideration a possible reply to Wigner’s
thesis about the ‘mystery’ of applicability: if we interpret his claim that math-
ematical concepts are ‘invented’ as an anti-realistic declaration, one might sup-
pose that the source of all these problems is just anti-realism. On this perspec-
tive, the applicability of mathematics would be a problem only for an anti-realist
philosopher: for a realist philosopher all the anti-realist’s problems would vanish
89
90 CHAPTER 4. APPLICABILITY AND ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES
like fog beneath the sun’s rays. Analogously, also Steiner’s claim that mathe-
matics is anthropocentric can be undermined at its root by simply holding a
strong realistic position. The anthropocentric character of mathematics strictly
depends, on Steiner’s view, on the fact that mathematical concepts are invented
and constituted by means of aesthetical criteria. A radical platonist (à la Gödel,
for example) can simply reply that mathematics is not invented at all, that it
is just the study of an existing realm of objects that are discovered by means
of intuition, and that any Pythagorean and formalist analogies just show that
this realm is in some way deeply intertwined with the physical reality.1 Some
philosophers actually depict realism as the panacea of all the applicability prob-
lems;2 and all the contemporary versions of indispensability arguments seem to
bring grist to realist’s mill, since their arguments implicitly show that realism
is the only ontological choice compatible with the applicability of mathematics.
If the applicability of mathematics implies a realistic stance on mathematical
objects, then an anti-realistic stance should bring to apparently insurmountable
difficulties in accounting for the applicability of mathematics.
The problem is serious and deserve a closer attention, that’s why I have
preferred to discuss it extensively here in a separate chapter. The aim of this
chapter is to show that the problems of applicability are not a consequence of any
ontological option. They face any philosopher of mathematics, independently
of her specific ontological preference. It is probably true that they are more
intricated and complex for an anti-realist, but they face realists as well.
In general, the ontological discussions that pay more attention to the appli-
cability problems are centered around the so called “indispensability argument”.
Both those who do and who don’t endorse this argument base their considera-
1Actually, the situation is much more puzzling than this. In various passages of his book,
Steiner seems to sympathize with mathematical realism (see also (Steiner 1975)), but it is
not clear to me in which sense this sympahty could be made compatible with his analysis of
mathematics as “species-specific”.
2See for example Davies (1992, pp. 140-60) and Penrose (1990, pp. 556-7).
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tions upon the role of mathematics in empirical science. In the next section I
will first consider the reasons of the former and then the reasons of the latter.
My general criticism to this kind of arguments is that they are interested in
applicability only in a very general sense. The only question they focus on is
the generic question whether mathematics is really indispensable to science. In
this chapter I will try to show that both supporters and non-supporters of the
indispensability argument cannot escape the problems of applicability, and in
some cases their arguments even ask fo a more refined account of mathematical
applicability.
4.1 Indispensability and applicability
The indispensability argument is usually considered the most important and
compelling argument for mathematical realism. Its first formulation is jointly
credited to Quine (1961) and Putnam (1979a). For this reason the argument is
also usually called the “Quine-Putnam argument”. However, many commenta-
tors have pointed out that Quine and Putnam formulate the argument in two
distinct ways and that they aim to prove different claims.3 Quine’s argument
can be summarized in the following way:
(1Q) we ought to have ontological commitment to all and only those entities
that are indispensableQ to our best scientific theories;
(2Q) mathematical entities are indispensableQ to our best scientific theories;
(3Q) hence, we ought to have ontological commitment to (some) mathematical
entities.
Putnam’s argument, instead, can be summarized as follows:
(1P ) we ought to believe in the truth of any claim that plays an indispensableP
3For a more detailed discussion about the differences between Quine’s argument and Put-
nam’s argument, see Liggins (2008).
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role in our best scientific theories;
(2P ) mathematical claims play and indispensableP role in our best scientific
theories;
(3P ) hence, we ought to believe in the truth of (some) mathematical claims.
The main difference between the two arguments is that Quine argues in favour
of a metaphysical realism, while Putnam rather argues in favour of a semantic
realism; but it is not the only difference.4 As we will see, another important
difference is that they bestow different meanings to the word “indispensable” —
what is grafically expressed by the subscripts appended to the word “indispens-
able” in the different arguments.
A more detailed analysis of these two arguments is in order. Colyvan (2001a)
probably offers the most pervasive and complete analysis of these kind of ar-
guments. Colyvan thinks, in agreement with Quine, that the indispensability
argument is actually an argument for Platonism, and hence for metaphysical
realism. Hence, his argument is very close to Quine’s argument. However, as
Pincock (2012, chapt. 9) points out, Colyvan’s notion of indispensability is dif-
ferent both from Quine’s one and from Putnam’s one. So, Colyvan’s argument
must be kept distinct from the other two.
In the following sections I will try to make some considerations about each
of these arguments, and I remind that my main concern is not in understanding
whether these argument can or cannot conclude for mathematical realism, but
rather whether they say something about the problems concerning the applica-
bilty of mathematics or not.
4By “metaphysical” realism I mean the doctrine according to which mathematical enti-
ties do exist in some sense; by “semantic” realism I mean the doctrine according to which
mathematical statements are true in some sense.
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4.1.1 Quine’s and Colyvan’s argument
That Quine’s argument cannot dispense the mathematical realist from the ap-
plicability problems has been already noted by many. Colyvan (2001b) himself
points out that, whether the argument is right or not, it does not say anything
about why mathematics is indispensable, since it assumes the indispensability
as a brute fact — and for answering why mathematics is indispensable we have
necessarily to deal with the applicability problems.5 However, in this section
I will try to go further and I will try to argue not only that Quinean realist
has still to clear why mathematics is indispensable, but also that the argument
itself force her to account for the applicability problems.
There are two ways to defend Quine’s indispensability argument. The first
consists in taking the bull by the horns and trying to found the argument in
itself, autonomously. The second consists in considering the indispensability
argument as a particular case of a more wider class of arguments, which can be
grouped in by the fact that they all share the same logical form. In this second
way we can, in some sense, ‘transfer’ epistemic confirmation from one argument
to another.
Remarks on the notion of indispensability
Let us start with the first strategy. It usually implies that one focuses on
the two premises and on what can support them. Premise (1Q) is usually
considered as founded on two important Quinean thesis: Conformational Holism
and Naturalism. Conformational Holism is the thesis according to which we
cannot confirm (or disconfirm) a single belief, but only a (more or less) wide
collection of them. When we make a prediction, such a prediction is based on a
large body of beliefs. So, if our best scientific theories lead to correct predictions,
the credit for this success must be assigned to all the beliefs that allowed for
5An analogous objection has been move by Kitcher (1984, pp. 104-105).
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those predictions. The second thesis, Naturalism, is described by Quine as «the
recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy,
that reality is to be identified and described» (Quine 1981a, p. 21). Science is
therefore the main source for understanding what is there and what is not. The
idea is that Naturalism tells us that we must commit ourselves in the entities
required by our best scientific theories, and Confirmational Holism prohibits
interpreting part of these theories non-realistically. Both these doctrines has
been variously called into question, and there is actually a wide debate about
the effectiveness of these two thesis in supporting (1Q).6 However, it is not
my intention to focus on these debates. I will rather focus on the meaning of
“indispensableQ”.
Quine’s argument is evidently centered around the notion of “indispensable”,
but it is not very easy to understand what he meant by this concept. The first
step consists in clarifying that “indispensability” cannot be intended as a generic
“non-eliminability”. If we understand “dispensability” as a mere “eliminability”,
for Craig’s theorem we would have the unpleasant conclusion that every entity
ξ is dispensable. The theorem can be formulated in the following way:
Theorem (Craig’s theorem). Let T be a recursively enumerable theory,7 and
consider any division of the predicate letters of T into two disjoint sets VA =
T1, T2, T3, . . . and VB = O1, O2, O3, . . .. Let TB consist of those theorems of T
which contain only predicate letters from VB. Then TB is a recursively axiom-
atizable theory.
If we take the two disjoint sets VA and VB as, respectively, the set of theoreti-
cal terms and the set of observation terms, we have that TB has only observation
6See, for example, Panza & Sereni (forthcoming).
7We are assuming that a theory T is an infinite set of well-formed formulas which is closed
under the usual rules of deduction. One way to present T is to specify a set of axioms S and
to define T as the set of sentences in S together with all sentences that can be derived from
sentences in S. A theory is recursively axiomatizable if it has at least one set S of axioms that
is recursive, and it is recursively enumerable if it is recursively axiomatizable and its axioms
and theorems can be ordered in a sequence that can be effectively produced.
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terms. Now, the predictions of T are to be found, presumably, among those the-
orems of T which are in the vocabulary of VB . So, we have that TB will make
exactly the same predictions as T (in this sense we can consider the two theories
equivalent) and will have no theoretical term. So, Craig’s theorem implies that
we can eliminate any theoretical term.8 Therefore, if “indispensable” simply
means “non-eliminable”, it turns out that any mathematical entity is actually
eliminable and the second premise of the indispensability argument is untenable.
Indispensability must then be intended in a different sense.
According to Quine, an entity ξ appearing in a theory T can be said to be
indispensable only when its elimination from T produces a new theory T ′ that
can even be equivalent to T but is notwithstanding less preferable than T . So,
the notion of indispensableQ involves the notion of “preference of a theory over
another”. Now, in order to clarify the concept of theory preference (and, conse-
quently, the notion of indispensabilityQ), we must take into consideration what
Quine called the process of “regimentation”. When we want to systematically
present our beliefs, we aim to do it in a way that is as most coherent and simple
as possible. According to Quine, this goal is reached when we regiment our
beliefs in the language of the first-order logic. This process of regimentation is
particularly important because we can clarify our ontological committment only
after this process of regimentation has been done. If Quine is right in claiming
that the proper language in which we should regiment our scientific beliefs is
the language of the first-order logic, then it is quite easy to see which entities
we are ontologically committed to: we have simply to check which sentences of
the form “∃x . . . x . . .” are implied by our beliefs. It is at this level that we can
prefer a theory over another. That said, we can better understand what Quine
means by “indispensableQ”: an entity (or a class of entities) ξ is indispensable
precisely in the sense that, once the regimentation has been done, it is not pos-
8For a more detailed analysis of Craig’s theorem, see (Putnam 1965) and (Field 1980, p. 8).
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sible to eliminate sentences which quantify over such an entity (or over such a
class of entities). Mathematical entities seems to be ‘indispensable’ precisely in
this sense: «certain things we want to say in science may compel us to admit
into the range of values of the variables of quantification not only physical ob-
jects but also classes and relations of them; also numbers, functions, and other
objects of pure mathematics» (Quine 1957, p. 16). But the regimentation, as
Quine puts the matter in different places, is not very different from the general
process of belief choice and belief adjustment, and hence is not very different
from the general process of doing science:
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our
acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least
insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which
the disoriented fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged.
[. . .]. To whatever extent the adoption of any system of scientific theory
may be said to be a matter of language, the same — but no more — may
be said of the adoption of an ontology. (Quine 1961, p. 16)
And again:
We can draw explicit ontological lines when desired. We can regiment our
notation [. . .]. Various turns of phrase in ordinary language that seem
to invoke novel sorts of objects may disappear under such regimentation.
At other points new ontic commitments may emerge. There is room for
choice, and one chooses with a view to simplicity in one’s overall system
of the world. (Quine 1981a, p. 9-10)
Regimentation seems thus to be guided by a general criterion of simplicity and
transparency. To decide whether an entity is indispensable or not consists, ac-
tually, in deciding whether the theory in which the entity appears is preferable
over the other in relation to its simplicity. However, as we saw in the previous
chapter on Steiner’s work, in some cases it is just the mathematical apparatus
that makes a theory preferable over another, often just in virtue of a greater
simplicity granted to the theory by the mathematics itself. Mathematical con-
cepts often make the theory easier in relation to its effectiveness in making
predictions and new discoveries. In this sense, one might say that the math-
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ematized theory is simpler than a non-mathematized theory. If this is so, the
situation turns out to be quite odd: mathematics is indispensable because a
scientific theory mathematically formulated is to be preferred over a scientific
theory non-mathematically formulated; it is to be preferred because it is sim-
pler; and it is simpler because it is mathematically formulated.9 This is not
necessarily a problem, provided that we are able to explain why, how and in
which sense mathematics contributes to this preference. But this means that
the quinean realist should directly face the applicability problems if she wants
to hold the validity of her argument. Otherwise, one might object that the no-
tion of indispensability is, in some sense, vicously circular, since it should grant
an indipendent and autonomous foundation for the claim that mathematics is
indispensable, but mathematics turns out to play a role in shaping the notion
of indispensability itself. So, it seems that, if we want to defend the indis-
pensability argument in its autonomous validity, we must face the problems of
applicability.
An anaologous remark can be moved against Colyvan’s indispensability ar-
gument. Colyvan proposes an argument that, in his intentions, is aimed to
support metaphysical realism, as well as Quine’s argument. However, his no-
tion of “indispensability” is a bit different from Quine’s one. Colyvan (1999)
defines “indispensability” in the following way: an entity is dispensable to a the-
ory T if there exists a second theory T ′ with the following properties: (i) T ′
has exactly the same observational consequences as T , but in T ′ the entity in
question is neither mentioned nor predicted; and (ii) T ′ is preferable to T . If
an entity is not dispensable in this sense, then it is indispensable. The main
difference between “indispensableQ” and “indispensableC” is that Colyvan’s no-
9By the way, as Sober (1993) notices, there is no non-mathematical competing physical
theory. From this follows that, if we accept the idea that scientific hypotheses are confirmed
relative to competing hypotheses, then we cannot accept what the indispensability argument
seems to claim, i.e. that mathematical theories are confirmed along with our best empirical
hypotheses.
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tion is not centered around the quinean process of regimentation. As we have
just seen, Quine’s regimentation prescribes that the ontological commitment is
to be pulled out from the simplest and most transparent regimentation of our
theories, and this is actually not very different from the process of theory choice
— at least regarding the simplicity criterion. Colyvan, in a certain sense, goes
much further than Quine on this road, and actually identifies the criteria ac-
cording to which we can determine whether an entity is indispensable or not to
the criteria according to which we can determine whether T ′ is preferable over
T or not. As he says,
whether an entity is indispensable or not is really a question of theory
choice and so is guided by the usual canons of theory choice. These
may include: simplicity, unificatory power, boldness, formal elegance and
so on. It seems, then, that an entity can be indispensable even though
empirically equivalent theories exist that do not quantify over the entity
in question. (Colyvan 2001b, p. 270)
I think this point is primarily aimed to ruled out any attempt, standardly nom-
inalistic or à la Field, to offer a non-mathematical reconstruction of contempo-
rary physics: even if such a reconstruction is theorically possible, the result will
be hardly preferable to our standard formulation and hence the indispensabil-
ity of mathematics is save. However, in this way Colyvan exposes himself to
the same remark we pointed out for Quine: in some cases it is just the math-
ematical apparatus that makes a theory preferable to another. In this sense,
mathematics can be one of the criteria according to which we judge whether a
theory is preferable over another or not. Once again, as well as for Quine, the
mathematical realist should first avoid the charge of being viciously circular in
his definition of “indispensable”, and in order to do that she seems to be forced
to offer some account of mathematical applicability.
So, it seems that, if we want to defend Quine’s or Colyvan’s indispensability
argument in its autonomous validity, we must face the problems of applicability,
since, given their definitions of “indispensable”, the way in which the applica-
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bility is accounted for seems to play a role in the definition of indispensability
itself.
Transferring epistemic confirmation
The second way to defend to indispensability argument for metaphysical realism
in mathematics is by considering it as a particular case belonging to a wider
class of arguments having the same form. Those, who hold that a realistic
stance on mathematical entities would escape the realist from dealing with the
applicability problems, usually appeal to this strategy in order to support their
claim; therefore it is important to focus on this strategy in order to understand
whether they are right in claiming this or not.
According to Colyvan (2001a), the general form of these arguments can be
presented in the following way (G):10
If apparent reference to some entity (or class of entities) ξ is indispensable
to our best scientific theories, then we ought to believe in the existence of
ξ. (p. 7)
As an example of application of this kind of arguments in a context different from
mathematical ontology, Colyvan mentions the scientists’ belief in the existence
of dark matter:
Most astronomers are convinced of the existence of so called “dark matter”
to explain (among other things) certain facts about the rotation curves
of spiral galaxies. [. . .] this is an indispensability argument. Anyone
unconvinced of the existence of dark matter is not unconvinced of the
cogency of the general form of the argument being used; it’s just that
they are inclined to think that there are better explanations of the facts
in question. (p. 8)
In this case, the existence of dark matter is explicatively indispensable to our
best scientific theories, and in this sense it can be considered as a particular
case of inference to the best explanation. In Quine’s version of the indispens-
ability argument, however, mathematical entities seems to play no explanatory
10Since this strategy to defend the indispensability argument is not centered on the meaning
of “indispensable”, I will not distinguish any more Quine’s from Colyvan’s argument.
100 CHAPTER 4. APPLICABILITY AND ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES
role — or at least, no explanatory role is assumed in order to draw the conclu-
sion. All that matters is that mathematical entities are referentially indispens-
able; namely, there seems to be no way to formulate our best scientific theories
without quantifying over mathematical entities (according to the meaning of
“indispensableQ” we have just seen). But this is the general meaning of “indis-
pensable” as it is assumed by the formulation of the argument. So, it seems
that we can variously specify the meaning of indispensable, but in Quine’s ar-
gument it is assumed in its original and unspecificated meaning. We can find
different specifications of the adjective “indispensable”, for example in terms of
‘causal effectiveness’, 11 but I cannot think of another argument (employed in
science) that, as well as Quine’s argument, does not need any specfication of
the adjective “indispensable” in order to draw the conclusion.
Thus, it seems that indispensability arguments in empirical science always
go along with a specification of the adjective “indispensable” in terms of ‘ex-
planatory powers’ or ‘causal effectiveness’, and that the general form of the
argument never appears in empirical science. This bring me to think that, even
if we can admit that Quine’s argument can be seen as an application of (G) as
well as the dark matter case, the two applications cannot be considered on the
same level: in the latter case we have a (more or less) clear application of the
notion of indispensability (indispensability in terms of explication); in the first
case we don’t. The furrow we have just cut between the two cases prevents us
from transferring epistemic value from one case to another. What makes the
latter argument plausible cannot be simply transferred on the former case, since
part of this plausibility is played by the fact that the adjective “indispensable” is
employed, in the dark matter case, in a specified sense. More precisely, the in-
dispensability argument employed in the dark matter case (and in all the other
11“Explicatively” and “causally” are the only two specifications of “indispensable” that I am
able to find. It must be noted that they could even be considered as a unique specification,
since explanation and cause are the two faces of a same medal.
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examples we can gather from empirical sciences) assignes to the dark matter
a role, and it also assumes that this role is indispensable. Why is the theory
X (which apparently refers to ξ) more explicative than the theory Y (which
does not apparently refer to ξ)? Because ξ exists. Or, put in different words,
what is it that makes X more explicative than Y ? Because X apparently refers
to ξ, and then ξ is explicatively indispensable to X in order for it to be more
explicative than Y . But if X is more explicative than Y , we have more reasons
to believe X is true rather than Y , and hence to believe that ξ does actually
exist. The role of ξ in X is to increase the explanatory power of X, and it seems
to be an indispensable role: if we remove X’s reference to ξ, the explanatory
power of X decreases. So, in order to preserve the superiority of X over Y ,
we must accept the existence of ξ. It is important to notice from where the
indispensability arguments in empirical science gains its epistemic power. The
theory X is better than its competitors because of its reference to ξ. It’s the
fact that X is more reasoned to be believed true that justifies us in believing
that ξ does actually exist.
However, one might still claim that a possible reason to transfer epistemic
confirmation from one argument to another is based on the fact that both the
indispensability arguments (Quine’s one and that concerning the dark matter)
share the appeal to what is usually called “no miracle argument”. The “no
miracle argument” is usely appealed by scientific realist in order to justify their
position: we must accept the existence of the entities postulated by our best
scientific theories, otherwise we must admit that the fact that the nature works
as it works is just a miracle. For example, if we don’t believe in electrons
(I mean, if we accept the electron theory without believing in the existence of
electrons), how can we possibly explain the behaviour of a galvanometer? There
seems to be no way other than accepting it is a miracle. The analogy between
Quine’s argument and the argument in favour of the existence of electron is
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underlined and criticized also by Colyvan (2001b):
It’s no miracle, claim scientific realists, that electron theory is remarkably
effective in describing all sorts of physical phenomena such as lightning,
electromagnetism, the generation of X-rays in Roentgen tubes and so on.
Why is it no miracle? Beacuse electrons exist and are at least partially
causally responsible for the phenomena in question. Furthemore, it’s no
surprise that electron theory is able to play an active role in novel discov-
eries such as superconductors. Again this is explained by the existence of
electrons and their causal powers. (pp.270-1)
If we reject the scientific realistic claim according to which electrons do exist,
we should admit that the extraordinary effectiveness of this theory in making
predictions and describing a large class of phenomena is just a miracle. In the
case of scientific realism, there is indeed a pressure on anti-realists, since they
seem not to be able to explain the efficacy of the electron theory in describing
reality.12 But can we raise the same problem for the case of mathematical
entities? According to Colyvan (2001b) himself, the argument can hardly be
exported in the field of mathematical realism, since
There is an important disanalogy [. . .] between the case of electrons and
the case of sets. Electrons have causal powers — they can bring about
changes in the world. Mathematical entities such as sets are usually taken
to be causally idle — they are platonic in the sense that they do not exist
in space-time nor do they have causal powers. So how is that the positing
of such platonic entities reduces mystery? (Colyvan 2001b, p. 271)
The fact that the existence of electrons is able to remove the aura of mystery
around the theory does not come from the bare existence of the electron, but
from the fact that they exist in a certain way, namely they are causally active.
The same cannot be immediately said about mathematical entities, since a
platonist usually conceives them as abstract entities with no causal power.
These considerations suggest that it is not possible to transfer epistemic con-
firmation from the indispensability arguments as they are employed in empirical
sciences to Quine’s argument, for the very reason that the notion of indispens-
ability refers, in the first case, to a well specified role played by the entities
12As an example of such an argument for scientific realism, see (Smart 1963).
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at issue; in the latter, to no specific role. However, one might still insist that
the two arguments are substantially the same (and that hence we can transfer
epistemic confirmation from one argument to the other) by arguing that math-
ematical entities do really have a specified and non-generic indispensable role
in science, either explanatory or causal. We have therefore two possible direc-
tions of development, both of which have been actually followed in recent times.
Bigelow (1988) and Maddy (1990), for example, have argued for a causally effec-
tiveness of mathematical entities. However, in her next works Maddy seems to
have abandoned such a view (see Maddy 1997, ?). This option is quite marginal
in the contemporary debate, and actually the fact that the quinean realist is
compelled to say that mathematical entities are causally active is rather seen as
a difficulty for Platonism (see for example Cheyne & Pigden 1996). On other
side, great part of recent debates around the indispensability argument tries to
show that mathematical entities actually play an indispensable explanatory role
in empirical sciences.13 In both cases, the supporters of the indispensability
argument try to boost the indispensability argument by showing that the indis-
pensable role mathematical entities play in science can be specified in one sense
or in another.
Explanatory indispensability argument
Of these two strategies, the first seems to be the most difficult. Unfortunately,
at least for now, there is no convincing argument that can satisfactorily clarify
in which sense mathematical entities can be said to be causally active. One
might say that we can employ the mathematical entity (or class of entities) ξ
in describing the physical phenomenon P because ξ is part of the causal chain
that determines the nature of P . It is not completely clear to me whether this
claim could be of any help in clarifying the applicability of mathematics or
13See for example (Colyvan 2002, Lyon & Colyvan 2008, Colyvan 2010, Baker 2005, Baker
2009).
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not; but surely this claim cannot be considered as a satisfying account of the
applicability of mathematics until we offer a satifying account of what means for
a mathematical entity to be part of the causal chain of a certain phenomenon.
The second strategy, instead, has been widely discussed in recent times. It
turns out in an explanatory version of the indispensability argument that can
be summed up as follows:
(1EXP) we ought to have ontological commitment to any entity that plays an
indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories;
(2EXP) mathematical entities play an indispensable explanatory role in our best
scientific theories;
(3EXP) hence, we ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
As for the previous indispensability arguments, this argument needs some clar-
ifications. First of all, one should precise what she means by “explanatorily
indispensable”. Secondarily, she should define what she means by “mathemat-
ical explanation” in science. Finally, she should offer a convincing example of
indispensable mathematical explanation in science. The first two points are usu-
ally answered toghether. A scientific explanation is said to be “mathematical”
if it makes use of a mathematical claim. But in order to understand that the
explanation is really mathematical (i.e. , that the mathematics in it is non-
eliminable) we should put it on probation by means of a replacement test: if we
eliminate the mathematical claim form the explanation and the explanation is
no longer an explanation, then the explanation can be said to be “mathemati-
cal”. However, this ‘replacement test’ clarifies what we mean by mathematical
explanation in science, but it does not exhaust the meaning of “explanatorily in-
dispensable”, since we can have different, competing explanations, one of which
may make no use of mathematical claims. Hence, we must submit the explana-
tion to another test, let us call it the “comparison test”: consider all the possible
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explanations of a certain phenomenon; if the mathematical one is the best one
(i.e. if it has the greatest explanatory power), then the mathematics employed
is explanatorily indispensable. Given this definitions, we can now look if there
really are, in empirical sciences, indispensable mathematical explanations.
Are there indispensable mathematical explanations in science? The answer
to this question is the subject of a wide debate among philosophers. On the
one side, there are philosophers like Colyvan, Baker, Batterman and Pincock
who think that there really are examples of such explanations. Three examples
have become paradigmatic: the explanation of the periodic life cycle of some
species of cicada, the explanation of the hexagonal form of the bee’s honeycomb
and the explanation of why it is not possible to cross all the bridges of Königs-
berg exactly once in a circuit that returns to the starting point. On the other
side, philosophers like Melia, Daly and Langford have tried to show that these
explanations are not real examples of mathematical explanations.14 I am not
going to get into the details of this debate (I remember that my main concern
in this chapter is to understand whether there is an ontological option that can
be of any help in solving or clarifing the applicability problem). However, let
me make some considerations.
First of all, as Pincock (2012, pp. 206-207) points out, it must be noted
that we explained the notion of “indispensable mathematical explanation” by
means of two tests that require to eliminate or substitute the mathematical
claims appearing in the scientific explanation. However, premise (2EXP) refers
to mathematical entities. Hence, we need an argument that shows the link be-
tween these two tests and the relevance of mathematical entities in explanation.
In absence of this link, it would be probably better to reformulate the whole
argument as an argument for semantic, rather than metaphysical, realism. I will
deal with these kind of indispensability arguments in the next section, so I will
14See for example (Melia 2000, Melia 2002, Daly & Langford 2009).
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leave open the question for now.
The second consideration is that even if we admit that there are indispens-
able mathematical explanations in science, this is of no help for the analysis
of the applicability problems. For two reasons: first, the explanatory role of
mathematics is not the only role for mathematics in science, and hence we have
still to clarify the effectiveness of mathematics in all these other roles; second,
the indispensability argument does not offer an account for why mathematics
is helpful in explaining physical phenomena. The eliminability test and the
comparison test permit us to say whether a mathematical claim plays an in-
dispensable role in explaining a certain phenomenon or not, but they are not
aimed to account for the conditions that a mathematical claim has to satisfy in
order to have an explanatory power.
Hence, also the explanatory indispensability argument seems not to be of
any help in claryifing the applicability problems. One can, of course, opt for a
realistic stance about mathematical entities, but there seems to be no sense in
which this stance can help in accounting for the effectiveness of mathematics in
empirical sciences.
4.1.2 Putnam’s argument for semantic realism
About the truthness of mathematical claims
Although it is often confused with Quine’s argument, Putnam’s one is differ-
ent from it. The main and the most evident difference is that Putnam argues
not for a metaphysical realism, but for a semantic realism about mathemati-
cal statements: his conclusion is that the confirmational holism commits us to
believe that mathematical statements employed in science are true, along with
other true scientific statements that appear in our best scientific theories. The
second important difference consists in the different meaning they bestow to the
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notion of “indispensability”. As we saw, Quine’s notion of “indispensableQ” is
centered around the practice of regimentation. Putnam’s indispensability, in-
stead, is rather aimed to grasp the real meaning of scientists’ claims. According
to him, «one of our important purposes in doing physics is to try to state ‘true
or nearly true’ (the phrase is Newton’s) laws, and not merely to build bridges
or predict experiences» (Putnam 1979a, p. 338). Therefore, one of the main
tasks of philosophy consists in acknowledging this purpose and to respect this
character of physical inquiry. Thus, Putnam’s argument assumes that scientific
claims have a more or less clear meaning that philosophical reflection should
respect and should not demand to reformulate (as in Quine’s regimentation).
It follows that the notion of “indispensableP ” refers to the scientific claims in
their original formulation: something is indispensableP if it is required by the
scientists in their very formulations.
This feature of Putnam’s indispensability seems to fit better with an argu-
ment for metaphysical realism: if there is no need of regimentations or refor-
mulations (that, depending on their fulfilment, could eliminate the reference
to abstract entities), and since it seems that scientific claims directly refer to
mathematical entities, the argument could easily argue for the existence of math-
ematical entities rather than for semantic realism. However, Putnam is cautious
and prefers to opt for a weaker (semantic) conclusion. The reason for this is
that Putnam is worried by what he calls “equivalent constructions” in mathemat-
ics, something that seems to be very intrinsic in the mathematical formulation:
«the chief characteristic of mathematical propositions is the very wide variety of
equivalent formulations that they possess»(Putnam 1979b, p. 47). Among these
possible formulations, some of them do not need abstract objects (for example,
modal formulations à la Hellman (1989)), and hence it may be not necessary to
include abstract entities in our ontology.
That said, let us go back to our main question in this chapter: how can
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semantic realism be of any help in solving the applicability problems? A first
possible answer is that if mathematical propositions are true, then we can apply
them just because they are true. The applicability of mathematical claims is
therefore justified by their being true. However, this answer cannot be consid-
ered satisfying: after all, the proposition “My right incisor is chipped” is true,
but I can hardly believe that such a proposition, even if true, can be of any em-
ployment in science. In other words, there are billions of true propositions that
have no application in science. Why mathematical propositions are different?
A slighlty more articulated answer is that mathematical claims can be suc-
cessfully employed in science because they are true and pertain to the nature
of the world. However, this answer too can be hardly considered satisfying,
since it does not avoid the difficulites of the previous answer: in which sense,
exactly, mathematical claims ‘pertain to’ the natural world? In the absence of
an answer on this point, semantic realism cannot be of any help in accounting
for the effectiveness of mathematics.
Explanatory indispensability argument for semantic realism
As we saw at the end of section 4.1.1, it is also possible to formulate an explana-
tory indispensability argument for semantic realism:
(1exp) We ought to believe in the truth of any claim that plays an indispensable
explanatory role in our best scientific theories;
(2exp) mathematical claims play an indispensable explanatory role in our best
scientific theories;
(3exp) hence, we ought to believe in the truth of mathematical claims.
The argument is similar to the analogous argument for metaphysical realism, but
premise (2exp) refers to mathematical claims instead of mathematical entities.
In this sense, the two tests we previously discussed about the explicative value of
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a claim can directly support premise (2exp), while for premise (2EXP) we needed
another argument to show that if a mathematical claim plays an indispensable
explanatory role in our best scientific theory then the entities entailed by that
claim are indispensable as well.
Apparently, this argument seems to be able to remedy to the difficulty of the
previous argument. There I noted that semantic realism cannot be of any help in
explaining the effectiveness of mathematics in science because it does not explain
in which sense mathematical (true) claims would pertain to natural world. This
argument seems to suggest that mathematical claims pertain to the scientific
description of natural world precisely in the sense that they are explanatorily
relevant to this description. So, one might say, on the basis of this argument,
that mathematics is effective in science because mathematical claims are true and
they explanatorily pertain to scientific subjects. However, it must be noted that
the addition of the adverb “explanatorily” does not add very much to the sense
of “to pertain to”. This is just a way to beg the question: if we are interested
in understanding why and how mathematics can be so effective in science, then
we are interested in understanding in which sense mathematical claims can be,
among other things, explanatorily relevant for the scientific discourse. Thus,
once again, it seems that a stance on mathematical realism, be it semantic or
metaphysical, is of no help in clarifying the applicability problems.
But there is something more. Let us consider the following, typical example
of mathematical explanation: why do some species of cicada have a prime life
cycle? The answer involves a biological claim and a mathematical theorem:
1. It is evolutionary advantageous to have a life cycle which minimizes inter-
sections with other periods (for example of predators) [biological claim].
2. Prime periods minimizes intersections better than non-prime periods [math-
ematical theorem].
3. Hence, organisms with periodic life cycles are likely to evolve periods that
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are prime.
Since this explanation seems to be presently the best explanation of the phe-
nomenon at our disposal, the mathematical theorem in (2) can be reasonably
said to have an indispensable explanatory role. Thus, by applying the explana-
tory indispensability argument, we can conclude that the mathematical claim
in the second premise is true. Confirmational holism compels us to believe in it
as well as we believe in the existence of, say, atoms. However, as Pincock (2012,
chapter 10.2) points out, we could reformulate this explanation by substituting
the mathematical theorem (2) by another, weaker mathematical theorem. For
example, we could substitute (2) with the following theorem (2′): «Prime peri-
ods of less than 100 years minimize intersections». The theorem is equally true
(actually, it is implied by 2), and even if it is weaker than (2) it can support
the explanation as well. Thus, what is really indispensable, (2) or (2′)? In a
certain sense, (2′) is even preferable over (2), since (2′) is easier to be proved.
So, why should we prefer (2) to (2′)? One might say that we should prefer (2)
over (2′) because (2′) lead to explanations having a less explanatory power, and
hence (2) can lead to a more unified scientific theory. However, this is a general
prescription that needs a wider and more general argument. After all, there is
nothing in the previous cicada example that leads us to prefer (2) or (2′). As
Pincock (2012) points out, «the weaker mathematical claims are able to cover
all the actual instances of the phenomena at issue [. . .]. I do not believe that
the ability to explain nonactual instances of these phenomena should heighten
the explanatory power of these explanations» (p. 213).
Thus, confirmational holism seems to allow us to conclude that if a math-
ematical claim is explanatorily indispensable then it is true, but it seems we
cannot indentify any mathematical claim that is really indispensable in this
sense. The problem is even more difficult if we look at the question from an
epistemic point of view, as Pincock (2012) suggests. Suppose I am a biologist
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and I don’t know whether the mathematical claim in (2) is a theorem or not.
Suppose also that, by empirically comparing the periods of intersections for the
primes and non-primes from 1 to 100 I find that prime periods minimize inter-
sections, and thus I come to believe premise (2′). But how can I come to know
that (2) is a theorem of mathematics? Pincock’s thesis is that there is nothing
in application that could bring me to believe (2).
My claim [. . .] is that the ways mathematics helps with scientific explana-
tion are not sensitive enough to sort out the various options that agents
must choose between when they need to decide which stronger mathe-
matical claims to believe. The differences between these options are so
fine grained that it would be unreasonable to base such a choice on their
application in explanation. (p. 214)
Pincock objects that we cannot consider the application as a source of belief
for mathematical claims. Actually, it seems rather the opposite: we apply
mathematical claims only after (and because) we believe in them.
Thus, Pincock suggests that this argument is actually affected by some kind
of vicious circularity: we try to conclude that mathematical claims are true by
arguing from their application, but application already assumes that they are
believed to be true.15 One might object by saying that the circularity reported
by Pincock is really a problem only if we assume that the indispensability argu-
ment should also tell us which mathematical propositions we should believe in.
However — the objection might go on — this is not the case: the indispensabilty
argument just gives us a reason to believe that, in general, mathematical claims
are true propositions. Given that there really are indispensable mathematical
claims (it is not important to know exactly which), the conclusion can be con-
sidered to properly follow from the premises. Anyway, be this objection right
or not, Pincock’s criticism seems to show an apparent conflict between natu-
15For another kind of circularity related to the example of the cicada’s prime life cycle,
see Bangu (2012, chapter 8.2). According to him, the explanationist strategy works only if
we assume that the explanandum is true. But if the explanandum contains an irreducible
mathematical component (as it seems to be in this case), we must admit that its truth makers
(mathematical entities, among them) do exist. It follows that the realist is here assuming
realism before arguing for it.
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ralism and confirmational holism: on the one side, confirmational holism leads
us to think that mathematical claims receive the same kind of justification that
scientific claims receive; but on the other side, this conflicts with naturalism,
since the practice of working mathematicians does not seem to suggest, in any
sense, that mathematical claims require any application to be considered true:
confirmational holism, at least when applied to mathematics, seems to conflict
with mathematical practice — and hence with naturalism.
Another criticism is the following.16 In the analysis of water waves disper-
sion, scientists starts with a suitable form of Navier-Stokes equations from fluid
mechanics, and then they consider the limit where the ratio of the depth of
the ocean to the wavelenght goes to infinity. In different words, they assume
that such a ratio is infinite.17 Analogously, in formulating the Navier-Stokes
equations, scientists implicitly assume that matter is continuous. Both these
assumptions are clearly false: the first assumption concerning the deep of the
water is patently false; the second one is false if we assume that our best scientific
theories about the ultimate composition of matter are true. Notwithstanding,
scientists make such assumptions in order to explain the behaviour of water
waves and of fluids, respectively; and these assumptions seem to have an indis-
pensable explanatory role, even if they are false claims and nobody will hold
them for true.18 These assumptions are not mathematical, strictly speaking.
However it seems that now we have two different classes of claims: (1) true
claims having an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories,
and (2) false claims (idealisations, for the most part) that notwithstanding play
an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories. The problem
is: how can we say that mathematical claims fall within the first of the two
16The argument is analogous to the ones presented in (Maddy 1992, Maddy 1995), and it
is actually inspired by these. However I hold there is a substantial difference in the way the
argument is aimed. Therefore, I prefer to present it as mine, so to assume all the responability
for it.
17See Batterman (2010) and Pincock (2011) for more details.
18See Batterman (2010).
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classes? It seems that we need a specific argument to show that, but how can
such an argument be? To prove that a mathematical claim p falls into (1) we
should prove that it is true (or, at least, that it is not false), but if we have an
argument to prove that p is true we don’t need any indispensability argument
to prove what we have already proved in a different way!
However, this does not only stigmatize the risk of a vicious circularity in
the argument; it also shows — once again — a conflict between naturalism and
confirmational holism: scientists do not hesitate to assume patently false claims
in order to get the job done, but confirmational holism does not permit us to
account for this peculiarity of the scientific practice, thus pushing us away from
naturalism. This second criticism also shows an important feature of the indis-
pensability argument that is more interesting for us. After all, it is not clear to
which extent confirmational holism is needed to support premise (1exp).19 If we
can do without it, these criticisms do not really undermine the indispensability
argument. However, if we give up confirmational holism, then we can avoid
the previous difficulty by means of an analysis of the roles that a mathematical
claim can play within a scientific theory. In this way we can distinguish between
mathematical claims which play an explanatory role from those which play a
causal/acausal, representative or heuristic role. But this exactly amounts to
dealing with the applicability problems, with particular reference to the rep-
resentative, explicative and heuristic roles of mathematics in science. In other
words, the indispensability of mathematics cannot be uncritically assumed to
justify ontological realism, but it is important (and indispensable — let me say)
to deal with the concrete problems posed by the application of mathematics to
remove all the difficulties previously shown.
19This point is currently matter of discussion. See for example Panza & Sereni (forthcom-
ing).
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4.1.3 Conclusions
In the previous sections, I considered various versions of the indispensability
argument, both for metaphysical realism and for semantical realism, and I moved
several criticisms against them. The criticisms are not conclusive, and it is
probably possible to pass over them. However, the conclusions of any section
were always the same:
1. even assuming that the indispensability argument at issue is sound, noth-
ing is said about the applicability problems which we are concerned with.
Moreover,
2. a preliminary, closer and deeper analysis of the applicability of mathemat-
ics seems to be indispensable in order to refine the argument and avoid
some tricky difficulties.
Therefore, my general conclusion is that not only a realistic stance on mathe-
matical ontology would not exempt us from the applicability problems; but also
that a coherent argument for mathematical realism seems to require a prelimi-
nary and deep inquiry into the tecnicalities of the mathematical applicability.
However, the realist philosopher might still claim that she is in a better posi-
tion than the anti-realist to account for the applicability of mathematics. After
all, the previous criticisms to the indispensability argument were not intended
to support anti-realism against realism. Even if they effectively undermine the
realist’s expectations, they were intended not to criticize the realism in itself,
but only the indispensability argument as a good argument for mathematical
realism. Even if realism cannot offer us a solution to the applicability problems,
it can still turn out to be a better choice than anti-realism when we are going
to deal with this kind of problems. Thus, in the next section I will consider the
anti-realist’s arguments and I will check whether we should give some credit to
the realist’s claim or not.
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4.2 Field’s anti-realism
4.2.1 Science without numbers
The most interesting nominalist counter-proposal to the Quine-Putnam argu-
ment for mathematical realism has probably been advanced by Field (1980). He
proposed an articulated reply to the indispensability argument that aims
1. to belie the indispensability argument,
2. to defend the nominalism’s reasons, and
3. to explain, at the same time, why mathematics is so effective in science.
In order to justify our interest in Field’s proposal, it must be said that many
nominalistic systems have been proposed, but what is interesting in Field’s
one is that it is probably the only which explicitly focuses on the necessity
of accounting for the applicability of mathematics in science. He aims to get
this goal by means of a ‘non-standard’ nominalistic strategy: while ‘standard’
nominalistic strategies aims to eliminate the reference to abstract mathematical
entities by offering a nominalistic ‘translation’ of mathematical statements, he
accepts mathematical statements at their face value and develops a strategy
that straightly focuses on applicability.20 As he points out,
what I do here gives an attractive account of how mathematics is ap-
plied to the physical world. This is I think in sharp contrast to many
other nominalistic doctrines, e.g. doctrines which reinterpret mathemat-
ical statements as statements about linguistic entities or about mental
constructions. Such nominalistic doctrines do nothing toward illuminat-
ing the way in which mathematics is applied to the physical world. (p. 6)
Field’s proposal is actually based on three fundamental components:
• a fictionalist attitude toward mathematical entities,
• principle of conservativity, and
• nominalization.
20An example of this ‘standard’ nominalistic approach can be found in (Chihara 1973).
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The first component, fictionalism, is the philosophical thesis according to which
mathematical statements are false or ‘untrue’, as well as the proposition “Sher-
lock Holmes has lodgings at 221b Baker Street, London” is said to be false or
‘untrue’: the latter can be (unproperly) regarded as true only within the liter-
ary fiction of Arthur Conan Doyle’s tales, while the formers can be (unproperly)
regarded as true only within the fiction of mathematical practice. From this fol-
lows that, if no part of mathematics is true, then no mathematical entities have
to be posited to account for mathematical truth. To commit ourselves to the
existence of, say, the number π would make no more sense than to commit
ourselves to the existence of Sherlock Holmes.21
However, fictionalism by itself is not enough:
If one just advocates finctionalism about a portion of mathematics, with-
out showing how that part of mathematics is dispensable in applications,
then one is engaging in intellectual doublethink: one is merely taking back
in one’s philosophical moments what one asserts in doing science, without
proposing an alternative formulation of science that accords with one’s
philosophy. This (Quinean) objection to fictionalism about mathematics
can only be undercut by showing that there is an alternative formulation
of science that does not require the use of any part of mathematics that
refers to or quantifies over abstract entities. (Field 1980, p. 2)
In other words, since the indispensability argument is the only serious argument
for the existence of mathematical entities, Field needs now to undermine this
argument. While the previous objections to the indispensability argument that
we dealt with in the previous section were all aimed to undermine the first
premise, Field take a different route, and tries to undermine the second premise,
by showing that
1. mathematical entities are useful, even if not in the same sense in which
we say that theoretical entities are useful; and
2. mathematical entities are notwithstanding dispensable.
21A further consequence is that the problem of accounting for the knowledge of mathematical
truths vanishes. Benacerraf’s (1973) dilemma is thus radically sweeped away: since there is no
mathematical truth, we don’t need a uniform semantic for them anymore, and since there is no
mathematical entity the knowability of mathematical statements is not a problem anymore.
4.2. FIELD’S ANTI-REALISM 117
The first goal is reached by means of what he calls the principle of indis-
pensability, which can be stated as follows:
Principle (C). Let N = {Ai}i∈N any body of nominalistically statable asser-
tions, and S any mathematical theory. Now, for any Ai let A∗i be the assertion
that results by restricting each quantifier of Ai with the formula ‘¬M(xj)’ for the
appropriate variable xj, where M(xj) intuitively means “xj is a mathematical
entity”.22 Finally, let N∗ be the set of all the A∗i . Then A∗ is not a consequence
of N∗ + S + ∃x¬M(x) unless A is a consequence of N .
Intuitively, and a bit improperly, this means that for any mathematical the-
ory S and any body of nominalistic assertions N , N + S is a conservative
extension of N . Assuming this principle, it follows that a nominalist is free to
use any mathematical existence-assertion to deduce nominalistically-stated as-
sertions from nominalistically-stated premises, and «he can do this not because
he thinks those intervening premises are true, but because he knows that they
preserve truth among nominalistically-stated claims» (p. 14). Of course, this
can be done only once we have a nominalistic axiom system for the particu-
lar sciences, therefore the next step will obviously consists in offering such a
nominalistic axiom system.
However, why should we believe in this principle of conservativeness? The
principle of conservativeness follows from the following
Principle (C′). Let A, A∗, N and N∗ be as in the prevoius principle. Then
A∗ is not a consequence of N∗ + S unless it is a consequence of N∗ alone.
In turn, Principle (C′) is equivalent (assuming that the underlying logic is
compact) to the following
22Thus, if Ai = ∀xjP (xj) then A∗i = ∀xj(¬M(xj) → P (xj)), and if Ai = ∃xjP (xj) then
A∗i = ∃xj(¬M(xj) ∧ P (xj)). The introduction of A∗ is required by the fact that, being N a
nominalistic theory, it may imply somethig that rules out the existence of abstract entities,
and hence N + S might be inconsistent.
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Principle (C′′). Let A, A∗ and S be as in the two following principles. Then
A∗ is not a consequence of S unless it is logically true.
Now, according to Field, that mathematical theories satisfy principle (C′′)
is perfectly obvious, for otherwise it would have been absolutely impossible to
regard mathematical theories as ‘a priori true’ or ‘true in all possible worlds’:
«though these characterizations of mathematics may be contested, it is hard
to see how any knowledgable person could regard our mathematical theories in
these ways if those theories implied results about concrete entities alone that
were not logically true» (p. 12).23
The principle of conservativeness shows that mathematics can be really use-
ful in science, since it can be employed to make deductions that turn out to
be considerably shorter and easier than their non-mathematical equivalents.
Moreover, assuming fictionalism, we are not commited to the existence of any
mathematical entities. But the principle of conservativeness also shows that
this utility is very different from the utility of theoretical entities. The utility
of theoretical entities consists in the fact that, by adopting a theory T quanti-
fying over some theoretical entities, we can draw new and explanatorily fruitful
consequences. On the contrary, in the mathematical case we don’t arrive at any
genuinely new conclusion, since all the conclusions we can draw were already
derivable from the premises, without recourse to mathematical entities (even if
in a long-winded fashion).
Having shown that mathematics can be proved to be useful without assuming
the truthness of mathematical claims, Field must now prove that mathematical
entities are notwithstanding dispensable. Up to now he has merely argued that
if we had a nominalized science (namely, a nominalistic axiom system for any
branch of science), we are legitimated to introduce mathematics as an auxiliary
23Field offers also a proof for all these derivations, but it is not necessary to report it here.
The place — which I refer the interested reader to — is (Field 1980, p. 12; pp. 16-19; and
pp. 108-110, note 9).
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device in drawing inferences. However, he still has to argue that such a nom-
inalized science is possible and can effectively offered. The task of offering a
complete nominalized axiom system for the whole science is obviously an enor-
mous task, and Field restricts himself to the more reasonable task of offering a
partial nominalization of a particular, representative («fairly typical», he says)
branch of physics, the Newtonian theory of gravitation.
We don’t need to report here all the details of Field’s proposal; a general
sketch of the strategical line he adopted is enough for our aims. He follows
the strategy adopted by Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899). In
this work, Hilbert distinguishes between two different approaches: metric and
synthetic. The key idea of the synthetic approach proposed by Hilbert consists in
replacing any discourse about metric (concerning distances and locations, which
require a quantification over real numbers) with the two following predicates:
• betweenness: y Bet xz, meaning “y is a point on the line-segment whose
enpoints are x and z”; and
• segment-congruence: xy Cong zw, meaning “the distance from point x
to point y is the same size as the distance from point z to point w”.
Now, since Hilbert’s theory does not quantify over real numbers, the notion of
distance cannot be defined within the theory. However, by means of the follow-
ing representation theorem, we have a metatheoretic proof which, by associating
claims about distances with what we can say in the theory, permits us to show
that the standard Euclidean theorems about lenghts can be restated as theorems
about function d.
Theorem (Representation Theorem). Given any model of the Hilbert axiom
system for space, there would be at least one function d mapping pair of points
onto the set of the non-negative real numbers satisfying the following ‘homomor-
phism conditions’:
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(a) ∀x, y, z, w(xy Cong zw ↔ d(xy) = d(zw));
(b) ∀x, y, z(y Bet xz ↔ d(xy) + d(yz) = d(yz)).
In virtue of this theorem, numerical claims can be considered as abstract
counterparts of purely geometrical claims.
Along with this representation theorem, Hilbert is also able to prove a
uniqueness theorem:
Theorem (Uniqueness Theorem). Let d1 and d2 be two functions mapping
pairs of points into non-negative reals, and let both of them satisfy the two
homomorphism conditions (a) and (b) of the Representation Theorem. Then
d1 and d2 differ only by a positive multiplicative constant; and conversely, if d1
and d2 differ only by a positive multiplicative constant, then d1 satisfies (a) and
(b) if and only if d2 does.
The importance of this theorem consists in its explicative value. Geometric
laws, when folumalted in terms of distance, are invariant under the multiplica-
tion of all the distances by a positive constant, but are not invariant under any
other transformation of scale. Now, this fact receives, in virtue of the Unique-
ness Theorem, a satisfying explanation — and what makes this explanation
‘satisfying’ is the fact that the explanantes are intrinsic facts about physical
space, namely facts concerning physical space that do not refers to numbers.
The Uniqueness Theorem plays a very important role in Field’s system, as we
will see in a while.
Now, Filed’s key idea to offer a nominalistc axiom system for physics follows
the Hilbert’s synthetic strategy just exposed. In short, Field tries to extend
Hilbert’s synthetic theory for space to a synthetic joint axiom system containing
axioms for space-time, gravitational potential and mass-density, and then to
prove a general representation theorem and a general uniqueness theorem for
this new axiom system. Thus, we can employ mathematical (abstract) entities
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to formulate abstract counterparts of concrete statements. «Then, in proving a
conclusion in N∗ from premises in N∗, we can at any convenient point ‘ascend’
from concrete statements to their abstract counterparts, proceed at the abstract
level for a while, and then finally ‘descend’ back to the concrete» (p. 24).
I can omit to report here the specific way in which Field thinks to reach
this purpose. What is interesting is rather that the general uniqueness theorem
offers, as in the previous case, a reason to prefer Field’s nominalized axiom
system to other non-nominalized theories: the reason is that in this way we
can offer intrinsic explanations of physical facts, without appealing to extrinsic
entities like mathematical objects. As Field says,
I believe that such ‘synthetic’ approaches to physical theory are advan-
tageous not merely because they are nominalistic, but also because they
are in some ways more illuminating than metric approaches: they explain
what is going on without appealing to extraneous, causally irrelevant en-
tities. [. . .]. If, as at first blush appears to be the case, we need to
invoke some real numbers like 6.67 × 10−11 (the gravitational constant
in m3/kg−1/s−2) in our explanation of why the moon follows the path
that it does, it isn’t because we think that real numbers plays a role as
a cause of the moon’s moving that way; it plays a very different role in
the explanation than electrons play in the explanation of the workings of
electric devices. The role it plays is as an entity extrinsic to the process
to be explained, an entity related to the process to be explained only by
a function (a rather arbitrarily chosen function at that). Surely it would
be illuminating if we could show that a purely intrinsic explanation of
the process was possible, an explanation that did not invoke functions to
extrinsic and causally irrelevant entities. (p. 43)
The possibility of giving intrinsic explanations is considered by Field a clear ad-
vantage of his synthetic approach, and he is persuaded that this advantage makes
his nominalistic theory more attractive both than other nominalistic ‘standard’
systems and other platonic systems.24
Now, Field has completed the circle: fictionalism suggests that we don’t
need to regard mathematical statements as true; the principle of conservativity
shows that mathematics can be useful merely as a truth-preserving tool; and the
24Remember that a key point for defining the notion of indispensability was the attractive-
ness of the new theory. If we don’t impose on the new theory such a condition of attractiveness,
we fall into the difficulties raised by Craig’s theorem. See above, p. 94.
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synthetic, nominalistic axiom system he offered for Newton’s theory of gravity
shows that, thanks to the principle of conservativity, the consequences which
we arrive at by means of mathematical tools were deducible from the nominal-
istic axiom system alone, without any reference to mathematical entities. Field
thinks thus of having belied the indispensability argument, of having offered a
coherent nominalistic solution, and of having offered a satisfying account for
mathematical applicability. Therefore, we should now consider whether he is
right in holding this, especially for what concerns his last claim about applica-
bility.
4.2.2 Nominalism and applicability
Various aspects of Field’s project have been criticized. The critics can be col-
lected within two different categories: criticisms concerning the real possibility
of extending his project to the whole science (and not only to a small, even if
representative, part of it), and criticisms that blame the project of not being
really satisfying. As an example from the first category, I may mention Mala-
ment (1982), who objects to Field that his project can be hardly extended to
some branch of physics like, for example, quantum mechanics. Balaguer (1998)
tried to offer a nominalization of quantum mechanics on the fictionalist line
traced by Field, but his solution is not compatible with all the interpretation of
quantum mechanics and some doubts remain about whether it is really nomi-
nalistic or not.25 As an example from the second category, on the other hand,
I may mention Resnik (1985), who objects to Field that his nominalization of
the Newton’s theory of gravitation actually presents some features that would
be hardly acceptable by a ‘standard’ nominalist philosopher.
However, it is not my concern to focus here on this kind of objections, since
I am mainly interested in understanding whether Field can legitimately claim
25See Bueno (2003) for more on this point.
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of having offered a satisfying account of mathematical applicability.
In Field’s account, the role of mathematics in physics is reduced to the com-
putational simplification. Mathematics can be used because it satisfies the prin-
ciple of conservativeness, and it is actually used in physics because it permits
simpler calculations and easier conceptual manipulations. However, as we saw
in the previous chapter, the problems raised by the application of mathematics
are more and more complicated than this alone. Mathematics is surely useful as
a calculational tool, but this is not its only merit. Apart from the fact that, to
be meticulous, Field does not even tell us why mathematics permits easier cal-
culations, we are left with a number of problems concerning applicability which
Field does not address at all. For example, we discussed in the previous chapter
the role of mathematics in discovering new laws and even new physical entities.
The examples that we considered were all taken by the quantum mechanics.
This suggests that, maybe, the ‘piece’ of physics nominalized by Field was not
so ‘fairly representative’ as he said — or, at least, it is not representative at all
if our main concern is about heuristic problems of applicability.
Field claimed that his nominalistic account avoids the troubles related to
Craig’s theorem because epistemic considerations (i.e. the possibility of offer-
ing intrinsic explanations) make his account preferable to the other platonsitic
accounts.26 However, this ‘preferability’ is questioned if we consider the roles
played by mathematics in science. Mathematics is surely an excellent tool for
simplificating calculations, but this is not the only role played by it. If we admit
that mathematics do really play these other roles, it seems to me that the idea
according to which we should prefer Field’s account because of its epistemic su-
26At this proposal, it has been variously noted, however, that the advantge of intrinsic
explanations seems to hide some kind of circularity. As Colyvan (2001a) points out, «if
one thinks, as the indispensabilist does, that numbers are real and intimately (although not
causally) involved with the way the world works, it is not clear that explanations of features
of space that do not involve numbers are any more intrinsic than electron-free explanations of
lightning. The point is that if you think nominalism is correct, then nominalist explanations
will seem intrinsic while Platonist ones will not. The Platonist need not concede this» (p. 88).
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periority turns out to be untenable. The nominalist à la Field might either try
to argue that mathematics actually does not play these predictive and heuristic
roles, or she might try to show that even these roles can be nominalistically
accounted, but — as far as I know — none of these strategies has been satis-
factorily developed up to now. Anyway, it seems to me that, whatever strategy
she might follow, the moral is that she cannot argue in one sense or in the other
without dealing with the problems of applicability, in a deeper and wider way
than they have done up to now.
4.3 Conclusions
In the present chapter I took into consideration the main arguments for ontolog-
ical realism in mathematics. As we have seen, the applicability of mathematics
seems to play a certain determining role in supporting these arguments. How-
ever, this applicability remains unanalysed and it is assumed only in its generic
and undisputed sense. Therefore, even if based on the applicability of mathe-
matics, these arguments do not say anything about the problems concerning it,
and do not help in any sense to clarify the concrete roles played by mathematics
in science.
Not only. On closer analysis, it turns out that this generic and unanalysed
assumption leaves the realist open to some possible criticisms, and for this rea-
son she has rather to deal with these applicability problems. So, not only a
realistic stance on ontological matter does not help in clarifying the applicabil-
ity problems, but — if my remarks are right — a preliminary examination of
these problems seems to be indispensable.
For the anti-realist the question seems not to be very different. Even if
she adopts a non-standard nominalistic strategy (à la Field), this very strat-
egy seems to push her to a closer examination of the applicability problems,
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otherwise she risks to expose her position to serious criticisms and objections.
To sum up, from the applicability point of view there seems not to be any
real advantage in adopting a realist over an anti-realist view — or viceversa.
Wherever our ontological preferences may go, we are inevitably pushed back
to the applicability problems. It seems that a discussion about the ontology of
mathematical objects cannot avoid to take seriously the applicability problems
we discussed in chapter 3. Thus, these considerations shows that the prob-
lem of the applicability of mathematics deserves to be considered on the same
level as the other typical problems usually discussed in philosophy of mathe-
matics, and even — as Field properly points out — as «the really fundamental
one» (Field 1980, p. vii). For these reasons, I deem desirable a different ap-
proach — an approach that, instead of starting from ontology for moving on
towards applicability, starts from applicability intended as an autonomous and
valuable problem. The hope is that also the other open questions in philosophy
of mathematics will benefit from such an analysis.27
27Examples of this kind of approach — in which ontological conclusions stem out from
applicability considerations — can be found in Pincock (2012) and Bangu (2012). Bangu,
particularly, argues for an indispensable heuristic role of mathematics in science, and then
he proposes a new indispensability argument based on such a new mathematical role. I will
discuss in chapter 6 the cases which he brings forward to argue in favour of this heuristic role
of mathematics and I will show that these cases should be rather accounted in a different way,
so that no indispensable heuristic role (as he intends it) need to be invoked for mathematics.
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5.1 Aims and purposes of the present chapter
In chapter 3 I discussed Steiner’s attempt to define a multiplicity of philo-
sophical problems concerning the applicability of mathematics. As we saw, he
distinguishes between four different problems:
1. a semantic problem,
2. a metaphysical problem,
3. a descriptive problem, and
4. a heuristic problem.
Among the criticisms I moved against Steiner’s work, I pointed out that the
third problem — the descriptive one — had been poorly accounted for. Par-
ticularly, I noticed that the descriptive effectiveness of mathematics would be
better characterized as a representative effectiveness, and that ‘description’ is
but one of the representative roles mathematics can play. Appealing to this
multiplicity of representative roles, I also suggested that Steiner’s inexplicable
cases of descriptive applicability could rather be accounted as representative-
but-not-descriptive cases of mathematical effectiveness, and that hence their
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effectiveness could have been justified in a representative-but-not-descriptive
manner. However, I did not offer such a justification in chapter 3, hence my
suggestion remained in the abstract.
To consider the descriptive role of mathematics in a more general represen-
tative background amounts to admitting that mathematical import in scientific
representations can follow different lines. A representation is not necessarily
bounded to reproducing the causal (physical) elements appearing in the phe-
nomenon, but can vary along different components — as we saw when I men-
tioned Pincock’s (2012) work in section 3.2.2. Thus, mathematical relevance
does not consist solely in reproducing a physical nexus among physical compo-
nents of reality, but it can also have an epistemic import. For example, when
we modelize the behavior of a fluid substance by means of the Navier-Stokes
equations, the model does not aim to reproduce the causal nexus laying in the
phenomenon, since the model is continuous while the phenomenon is supposed
to be discrete (at least according to our best theories concerning the ultimate
composition of matter). However, this acausal feature of the model has an epis-
temic import, since it is easier to work with a differential-equation model than
with a corresponding discrete difference-equation model. In this case, the model
offers a falsified image of the phenomenon at issue, but nonetheless (and even
thanks to this falsification) it can offer a better tool (epistemically speaking) to
understand the behavior of the fluid substances. In other words, to confine the
effectiveness of mathematics to its descriptive role would amount to admit that
mathematics can contribute in scientific explanation only by means of isolating
causal chains. However, as we saw in chapter 4, the role played by mathemat-
ics in scientific explanation is often divided from purely causal considerations
(remember the example of the cicada’s periodic life cycle). Therefore, we ex-
pect that a philosophical explanation of mathematical effectiveness will have to
account for this general feature of mathematical representation.
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Another criticism I moved against Steiner’s reconstruction pertained the fact
that he did not connect the representative problems with the heuristic ones.
I think this is a key point. Heuristic and representative roles of mathematics
cannot be considered separately, since often a good mathematical representation
is the indispensable prodrome of important discoveries. To put the matter
in different words, there is no possibility of analogy if no representation has
been setted out; the representation is the indispensable ground upon which the
analogical creativity can be exercised.
Let me offer an example, so as to highlight the real nature of the problem at
issue. As we have already seen, one of the example made by Steiner to illustrate
what he calls “Pythagorean analogies” is Dirac’s discovery of the positron (or
‘anti-electron’, as he initially called it). At the very base of his discovery there
is the attempt to extent the Klein-Gordon equation (a relativistic version of
the Schrödinger equation) to the electron. By introducing a higher dimension
4 × 4 matrices, he found a new equation that both describes the behaviour of












where Aµ(x) are the electromagnetic potentials (specifying the electric and mag-
netic fields acting on the electron at every point x of spacetime, and γµ with
µ = 0, 1, 2, 3 are the so-called “Dirac matrices”:
γ0 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0




0 0 0 −1
0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

,
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γ2 =

0 0 0 i
0 0 −i 0
0 −i 0 0




0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0

.
The equation turns out to have four possible solutions, two ‘positive-energy’
solutions and two ‘negative-energy’ solutions. However in 1928, when he derived
the above equation, no situation was known in which these ‘negative-energy’
solutions played any role. Instead of discarding these ‘strange’ solutions, Dirac
conjectured that these solutions actually describe a new elementary particle —
the positron.
As Steiner (1998) and Bangu (2012) notice, there is something strange in this
line of though. The shift to a 4×4 dimension matrices is not so obvious as it may
appear, and the conclusion that there must exist something real corresponding
to the two ‘negative-energy’ solutions is quite odd.1 However, I think it is
quite clear that the ground on which the new discovery can sprout up is the
new representation of the behaviour of electrons made possible by the new
mathematical equation described by Dirac. The discovery is deep-rooted in the
representation offered by the new equation and there is clearly a cooperation
between the heuristic and representative roles of mathematics operating here.
Thus, a better comprehension of the ‘oddities’ latent in the discovery of the
positron cannot avoid to take into consideration the representative ground from
which it is arosen.
I am not saying that heuristic problems are nothing but representative prob-
lems in disguise. I am just saying that a good representation is the indispensable
ground for any heuristic role of mathematics, and that a closer analysis of the
relations between representation and heuristics may help in clarifying the (illu-
1Bangu, particularly, insists on this existential deduction to endorse that there is at work
here a non-naturalistic reasoning. See (Bangu 2008, Bangu 2012) on this point. I will deal
with Bangu’s reconstruction in the next chapter.
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sory?) miraculous effectiveness of mathematics in some discoveries. This point
has already been noted, for example by French (2000). However, I want to
precise that my concern here is not that of proving that any case of heuris-
tic applicability of mathematics can be reduced to a representative application,
but rather that some cases of heuristic applicability may be better clarified by
a deeper account of mathematical representative role.2
In this chapter I am going to discuss the possibility to offer an account for
representative problems relative to the applicability of mathematics. In doing
this, I will just focus my attention on this intertwine between representative
and heuristic roles of mathematics. I will take into consideration one of the
most recently discussed accounts for representative roles of mathematics, the so-
called ‘structural account’ (also called ‘mapping account’). According to it, the
representative effectiveness of mathematics can be satisfactorily accounted for if
we say that, when a mathematical structure satisfies certain conditions, it can
be considered as a good representation of a physical system. These conditions
should grant a certain correspondence between the mathematical structure and
the physical system under analysis, and once this correspondence has been made
explicit, it should permit us to interpret the mathematical formalism of the
theory over the physical elements of which the theory speaks.
Such a structural account has many advantages. First of all, it fits well with
the contemporary tendency to look at scientific theories as models, so empha-
sizing the semantical perspective. A structural account of the applied mathe-
matics is surely in compliance with this approach. Moreover, such an account
underlines what is often considered a “familiar enough point” (Baker’s (2003)
expression), namely that «it is solely the structural features of mathematical
theories that are relevant to their use in science» (Baker 2003, 54). Indeed, as
2In this chapter I am going to discuss the question from a pure theoretical point of view.
In the next chapter I will offer some examples of Steiner’s cases of heuristic applicability that
may benefit from this approach.
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also Suppes (1967b) noted,
We cannot literally take a number in our hands and apply it to a physical
object. What we can do is to show that the structure of a set of phe-
nomena under certain empirical operations is the same as the structure of
some set of numbers under arithmetical operations and relations. The def-
inition of isomorphism of models in the given context makes the intuitive
idea of same structure precise. The great significance of finding such an
isomorphism of models is that we may then use all our familiar knowledge
of computational methods, as applied to the arithmetical model, to infer
facts about the isomorphic empirical model. (p. 59)
5.2 The structural account
A very naïve formulation of the structural account is the following: mathe-
matics is so useful and effective as a representative tool in science because (A)
mathematics studies structures and (B) these structures can be found in nature
and their description is hence part of the scientific picture of reality. This is the
way in which Steiner presents, in the introduction of his book, the structural
account, referring to it as «a distressingly common “explanation” for the effec-
tiveness of mathematics in physics». His judgement on it is negative yet: «I
believe that the currency of this explanation stems from a confusion among the
various senses of “applicability”, which I also want to clarify in this book» (p. 6).
The mention is very cursory and it is not clear why he thinks that this account
is to be rejected. I guess that the confusion of which he talks is about metaphys-
ical and descriptive problems. However, it must be noted that we are presenting
here the structural account only as an account for representative roles of math-
ematics, and not also as an account for metaphysical problems. However, if
this is the aim for which the structural account is usually presented, there are
also cases in which there seems to be a metaphysical intention in proposing it.
Steiner’s formulation (and his consequent attack) does not sound so remote if
we consider the following, likewise naïve, formulation by Shapiro (1997):
the contents of the nonmathematical universe exhibit underlying math-
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ematical structures in their interrelations and interactions. According
to classical mechanics, for example, a mathematical structure much like
the inverse-square variation of real numbers is exemplified in the mu-
tual attraction of physical objects. In general, physical laws expressed in
mathematical terms can be construed as proposals that a certain mathe-
matically defined structure is exemplified in a particular area of physical
reality. (p. 248)3
The problem of such a formulation is that it leaves many questions unre-
solved. First of all, it does not clarify in which sense mathematical structures
can be “exemplified” in the nonmathematical universe. The structures that we
found in nature are the very same structures that we study in mathematics?
Or should we rather think that we have two different structures among which a
structure-preserving relation exists? But then, how can we define the ‘physical’
structures that exemplify mathematical structures? And again, if it is clear
that the structural account is based on the idea that there is some kind of
‘structure-preserving’ relation between the mathematical formulation of a the-
ory and what the theory speaks about, it is absolutely not clear how this relation
can be spelled out in an explicative or explicit way.4
Moreover, Steiner’s presentation of the structural account may led one to
think that there must be some implicative relation among the structural account
itself, mathematical structuralism and structural realism.5 Premise (A) seems
to allude to mathematical structuralism — the idea according to which what
matters to a mathematical theory is not the nature of the objects of which it
talks, but rather the internal relations among its objects. Steiner mentions the
structural account in a passage where he is discussing the impossibility of finding
a criterion for a structure to be mathematical, and it is just this impossibility,
according to Steiner, to remove from consideration the structural account. So,
it seems that, according to Steiner, mathematical structuralism is implied by
3See also Shapiro (1983).
4In the next sections I will deal with these problems. As it will become clear later, these
difficulties do not concern only the naïve presentation of the structural account.
5For an introduction to mathematical structuralism, see (Resnik 1981, Resnik 1982, Resnik
1997, Shapiro 1997). As to structural realism, see (Worrall 1989, Ladyman 1998).
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the structural account and that one cannot mantain the latter without holding
the first. The structural account can be obviously worked out in harmony with
mathematical structuralism, but there is nothing that forces a supporter of the
structural account to hold mathematical structuralism. After all, premise (A)
says only that mathematics studies structures. It does not say that mathematics
is nothing but the study of structures, or that this is the best way to characterize
the mathematical practice. Rather, the structural account only needs that we
agree on the simple fact that mathematics can be presented as the study of
structures — and this is quite undisputed. Of course, one may discuss about
the fact that this is, or is not, the best way to present mathematics; or that
mathematics can, or cannot, be reduced to the study of structures; or that
this is, or is not, the most productive way to study mathematics. However, it
is a fact that any branch of mathematics can be described as the study of a
particular (class of) structure(-s) — and this is all that the structural account
requires. In other words, we are not forced to buy mathematical structuralism
together with the structural account.
However, Steiner’s rejection of the structural account is apparently based
just on this misunderstanding — that one could not mantain the structural
account without accepting mathematical structuralism. Since this belief is ac-
tually untenable, as we have just shown, Steiner’s consideration appears now to
be quite hasty. We can accept the structural account even if we do not agree
on any kind of structural reductionism in mathematics.
An analogous remark can be made about the premise (B). Such a premise
may be seen as an implicit allusion to scientific realism, and one may think
that the supporter of the structural account is forced to be a structural realist
as well. However, as well as for mathematical structuralism, this is not exact.
The problem is here a little more complex, depending on what we mean by
“structural realism”. However, premise (B) only says that structures are part of
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our scientific image — it does not say that they are all what we found in nature.
Once again, therefore, to buy the structural account does not force us to buy
scientific realism along with it.6
Up to now we considered two quite naïve formulations of the structural
account, Steiner’s (1998) and Shapiro’s (1997) ones. Further and more sophisti-
cated formulations can be found, for example, in French (2000), Pincock (2004),
van Fraassen (2008), Bueno & Colyvan (2011) and others. These accounts differ
under many aspects. Actually, the structural account can be stated in various
ways, depending on the author’s main interests. For example, one may focus, as
Pincock (2004) does, on the conditions that a statement of applied mathematics
(a ‘mixed’ statement) must satisfy in order to be considered as true: «Accord-
ing to the mapping account of applications, the truth of a statement of applied
mathematics (or ‘applied statement’) depends on the existence of a mapping of a
certain kind from a physical situation to a mathematical domain» (p. 69). Thus,
if such a mapping exists, we are entitled to say that our ‘applied statements’
are true. However, my focus in this chapter will be on the epistemic conditions
that enable us to consider a mathematical structure as a good representation
of a given physical system (the target). In other words, how do we come to
know that a certain mathematical structure can be used to represent a physical
system in such a way that we can employ that mathematical structure to gain
(possibly new) knowledge about the physical domain at issue?
However, before facing these epistemic problems, it is important to under-
stand what this ‘structural similarity’ consists in. The mathematical represen-
tation has obviously to preserve the structure of the physical domain, but this is
not something that can be easily done when we do not completely know the tar-
get, or when our knowledge of it is still tentative — and here is where heuristic
6This is, by the way, in line with what we said in the previous chapter: ontological and
metaphysical discussions over mathematical entities lies outside the structural account, and
rather the structural account can in case be considered as a starting point for ontological
debates.
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role of mathematics comes into play. At least two problems afflict the structural
account about this point:
1. which kind of relation is the structure-preserving relation that should grant
the representativeness? And
2. How can we define a relation between a mathematical structure and a
physical system, if on the one side we have an abstract entity and on the
other side a concrete one?
This two points are usually neglected in the discussions of the structural ac-
count I have previously mentioned. For example, this is how Pincock (2004)
exemplifies the kind of structure-preserving relations he has in mind:
Counting, for example, involves isomorphisms from the objects counted
to an initial segment of the natural numbers. More sophisticated applica-
tions will involve other kinds of mappings, such as homomorphisms that
respect certain features of the physical situation, e.g., the mass of physical
objects. (p. 69)
The example is surely appropriate but is also very simple and do not really help
in clarifying the matter. Moreover, Pincock mantains a certain vagueness about
the minimal structure-preserving relation that should grant the representative-
ness. This is a point on which I think is important to insist. Usually, supporters
of the structural account just exemplifies some kind of structure-preserving re-
lations: homomorphism, isomorphism or, by appealing to the ‘partial’ structure
program proposed by da Costa and others,7 ‘partial’ homo- or iso-morphism,
and so on; and then they say that this or that relation obtains according to the
specific case at issue. So, it turns out that in some cases the proper structure-
relation seems to be the homomorphism, in other cases it seems to be the iso-
morphism, in other cases again it seems to be something else. Now, it seems
to me that once we admit that the condition of representativeness is properly
captured by some kind of structure- preserving relation, we should at least be
7See for example Bueno (1997).
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able to specify the minimal relation according to which the representation is
valid. I mean, we should specify the minimal necessary structure-preserving
relation that permits us to say that the mathematical structure can represent
the physical system at issue. This relation may even not be sufficient, but at
least it should fix a minimal threshold under which the representation cannot
take place. I think that the neglect of this point leaves the supporter of the
structural account open to possible criticisms, since it leaves the whole problem
of these structure-preserving relation into an unhelpful, hazy vagueness.
In section 5.2.1 I will deal with this problem and I will try to specify a
minimal structure-preserving relation that could grant to a mathematical struc-
ture an access to representativity. However, before doing this, it is previously
necessary to define in a proper way what I mean by ‘structural relation’ and
‘structure-preserving relation’. It will turn out that this definition is not so
easy as one might think, and several difficulties nestle within such a definition.
Some of this difficulties are rarely discussed in the literature, despite of their
importance. In the next sections I will try to overcome these problems by inte-
grating the structural account with some considerations that — I hope — will
clarify in which sense we can legitimately employ the notions of ‘structure’ and
‘structure-preserving relation’ to account for the representative (and, in some
sense, also heuristic) effectiveness of mathematics.
5.2.1 Minimal condition
The first problem to solve is to understand how to define this ‘structural relation’
in a rigorous manner. As a first attempt, let say that M is a mathematical
structure and S a structured physical domain, or a ‘physical structure’. I take
a mathematical structure to be defined, as usually, as an ordered quadruple
M = 〈dom(M), {Ri}i∈I , {fj}j∈J , {ck}k∈K〉,
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where dom(M) is a non-empty set of objects (this is our ‘universe’; it must be
noted that the nature of these objects is absolutely irrelevant); {Ri}i∈I is a non-
empty set of ni-ary relations defined on dom(M); {fj}j∈J is a set of functions
defined on dom(M); and {ck}k∈K is a set of special elements belonging to
dom(M) (including, for example, the unity element). I, J,K are three disjoint
sets of indices. I will leave open, for the moment, the question concerning what
a ‘physical’ structure is.8 For the moment, we can just take S as a specular
ordered quadruple, with a domain composed by physical objects with various
relations defined over them. We will say that S is homomorphic to M iff there
exists a φ : S →M such that:
1. for any function fA in S there exists a correspondent fB in M such that,
for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ dom(S),
φ(fA(x1, . . . , xn)) = fB(φ(x1), . . . , φ(xn));
2. for any relation Ra in S there exists a correspondent Rb inM such that, for
any (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ dom(S), (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Ra iff (φ(x1), . . . , φ(xm)) ∈
Rb;
3. for any constant cα in S there exists a cβ in M such that φ(cα) = cβ .
With this definition in mind, we can now say that when φ is injective we have
a monomorphism, when φ is surjective we have an epimorphism, and when φ is
both injective and surjective we have an isomorphism.
All these structural relations guarantee some kind of structure preservation.
The problem now is to understand whether there is a ‘minimal’ structural rela-
tion that an applied mathematical structure has to satisfy in order to guarantee
its representative effectiveness. At a first glance it seems that isomorphism is
the best situation to work with, since it grants a perfect correspondence be-
8This problem will be discussed in section 5.3.
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tween the two domains. Of course it is, but it is also a very tight condition to
be imposed as a minimal request. It is not difficult to find a case of mathe-
matical representation which does not meet this condition and nevertheless is
effective in representing a physical domain. A typical example is offered by the
Navier-Stokes equations. Here we use a set of equations to succesfully model the
behaviour of a fluid substance. These equations implicitly assume that the sub-
stance at issue is continuous, although our best theories say that the ultimate
composition of matter is not continous. So, assuming that our best theories
are true, it does not seem to be possible to set up an isomorphism between the
mathematical structure and the physical one, since the former is ‘richer’ than
the latter. Nonetheless, these equations are effectively employed in representing
the behaviour of the phenomenon at issue.
On the other side, the loosest condition we can impose is the homomorphic
one. However, in this way we run the risk that the condition we impose does
not suffice to secure the representation with a content. Namely, fixed a physical
domain, there will always exist a homomorphism from it to a mathematical
structure that has no representative content. Let us take, as an example, the
trivial homomorphism that collapses all the elements in dom(S) to one element
in dom(M) (the unity element, if it exists) and all the relations in RS to the
identity relation. This is a homomorphism, but we all agree that this would
not be a good mathematical representation. It seems that a minimal condition
should be found between these two extreme cases, isomorphism and (trivial)
homomorphism; and that the way to articulate such a minimal condition is by
taking into consideration the notion of ‘content’ of a representation.
In order to clarify the notion of ‘content’, let us take the example of a city
map. What we desire is that the map reproduces the relevant aspects of the
geographical area at issue, where by “relevant aspects” I mean those peculiari-
ties (streets, distances, corners, eventually altitudes, and so on...) that we are
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interested in knowing and that make the map effective for the aims it has been
created for. These relevant aspects will be the content of our representation.
Also in this case we have to avoid the case of the trivial homomorphism; namely,
we want that every relevant aspect of the represented area be distinctly repre-
sented by a mark (a line, a dot, or whatever else) on the map. One might think
that this amounts to demanding that the map be such that there is a monomor-
phic relation from the land to the map.9 But the monomorphism is such only
when we have fixed what we mean by “relevant aspect”. If we are interested
only in distances, we can reasonably avoid any indication about the altitude;
but if we want to know also how much exertion we will have to bear in going
from point A to point B, we will need in addition an indication of the altitudes
and of the differences in elevation.
Similarly, the same considerations can be made for the case of a mathe-
matical representation. Also in this situation we want that the mathematical
representing structure be able to grasp univocally and distinctively every single
relevant element of the physical domain we are going to represent. We want
that the mathematical structure be able to grasp all the relevant elements and
all the relevant facts and relations in the physical system, without any loss of
information — and it seems that the only way to grant this is to impose that
the homomorphism is injective, i.e. that it is a monomorphism. Thus, it seems
that the minimal condition we are searching for is the monomorphism condition
— but such a monomorphic relation can be defined only when we have clear in
mind what the relevant aspects of the physical domain are.
Bueno & Colyvan (2011) consider the same problem, although under a dif-
ferent perspective. As they say, «It would seem that the mapping employed will
depend on the richness of the two structures in question» (p. 348), S and M .
9Injective homomorphisms are aslo usually called “embeddings”, but in this chapter I will
continue talking of monomorphisms instead, since in the literature on the argument “embed-
ding” is often used as a generic term (see for example Pincock 2004).
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If S is richer than M (i.e., there are more objects or more structural relations
between them in the physical domain than can be represented in the mathemat-
ical structure), then φ can be a simple homomorphism (neither injective, nor
surjective) or an epimorphism. But ifM is richer than S, then we must consider
a third possibility, monomorphism. But we also want, in order for mathematics
to be useful, that φ be invertible, so that we can «move freely into and out
of the mathematics, just as we can move freely between our street directory
and the city» (pp. 348-9) — and this implies that φ must be a monomorphism,
with the further consequence that it is apparently not possible for the physical
structure to be richer than the mathematical one. However, Bueno & Colyvan
(2011) bring forward examples of mathematical representations in which this is
exaclty what seems to be the case; namely, cases in which the physical struc-
ture seems to be richer than the mathematical. For this reason, they prefer
not to conclude in favour of a relation over another as a minimal condition for
representativeness. It simply depends on the situation which relation is the best.
Now, I want to resist this conclusion. Actually, I think that the cases of richer
physical structure they present are the consequence of their overlooking the
fact that, when we represent a physical domain, we are interested only in some
relevant aspects of that domain. If we keep this point into consideration, cases in
which S is structurally richer thanM are simply ruled out. For if we admit that
M is a good representation of S and nevertheless S is richer thanM , this means
that there are objects or relations in S that simply are irrelevant for the aims
which we made the representation for: if the mathematical representation is not
able to grasp them and remains nonetheless effective, then these elements cannot
be considered as relevant. The toy example offered by Bueno and Colyvan in
their article can be easily trated this way. «Consider, for example, modeling time
with a 12-hour clock — essentially arithmetic mod 12. As it stands such a clock
does not allow one to make sense of 2 am on different days, for instance» (p. 349).
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We can easily see that such a time representation is made with a very narrow
scope, and the possibility of distinguishing 2:00 am of 23rd May from 2:00 am
24th May does not fall within this scope. In other words, once we identify
the aims of the representation, this aim will define a class of relevant elements
associated with that aim— and days are not within the class of relevant elements
defined by the scope of misuring hours and minutes.
Our conclusion is then that we can identify a minimal condition for a repre-
sentative mathematical structure, and this minimal condition ismonomorphism.
However, we can do that only relating the minimal structure-preserving relation
with the content of the representation, which is in turn a very high pragmatic
notion. But problems do not end here.
5.2.2 Some remarks on the structural account
My conclusion in the previous section has been that we can identify a min-
imal condition for a representative mathematical structure, and this minimal
condition is monomorphism. However, such a minimal condition can only be
articulated around the notion of ‘content’ of a representation, and this notion
immediately leads us to the highly pragmatic (and highly problematic) notion
of ‘relevant aspects’ of a physical domain. The representation is made with a
certain aim in view, and it is this aim that determines which is the relevant
content of the representation.
This is a very delicate point. For example, if I want to give a mathematical
representation of the kinematics of a system of bodies I will ignore the colours
of the bodies, since they are irrelevant to my representation. So, I will consider
a physical structure S that has no colors among its objects (or among its re-
lations), but I will only consider the relevant relations between masses, bodies,
positions on the one side, and the structure of real numbers on the other side.10
10In order to avoid a possible objection (that has been sometimes excepted to me), I want
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The problem is: how can I select the relevant aspects of the piece of nature
that I am trying to represent? It seems that this task should precede the ap-
plication of mathematics, but it often happens that it is just mathematics that
helps us in selecting the relevant aspects of a physical system. We have already
seen an example of this when I presented Dirac’s discovery of the positron.11
The point I want to stress is that the world does not come equipped with a
structure; rather such a structure is often determined just by our theories and
by the mathematical structures we employ in the representation. The realist
might say that, after all, we can ‘carve nature at joints’, but this is not very
helpful, because we don’t know from the beginning which is the proper way to
‘carve nature at joints’. This is a very complicated issue which is not possible to
discuss extensively here, but I will shortly try to say something more. However,
this remark seems to suggest that there is no hope to articulate an account of
representative effectiveness of mathematics in purely structural terms, since the
pragmatic component seems to be irreducible.12
to precise the following point. In the example at issue, to each body will correspond a mass,
and to each mass will correspond a real number. Now, two bodies may have the same mass,
and hence may correspond to the same real number. Therefore, one might notice that in
this case the physical domain (the bodies of the system and the relations among them) is
(non-trivially) homomorphic to the mathematical structure (the additive structure of real
numbers), but is not injective, since two bodies can correspond to the same mass-number —
and hence the monomorphism rule seems to be infringed. If it were so, it would turn out
that the monomorphism cannot be considered as a minimal condition for representativeness.
However, in this case the structure-preserving relation should be not from the physical system
to the additive structure of real numbers, but rather from the physical system to a vector
space, whose number of dimensions depends on the number of bodies composing the system
(in the Euclidean space, for each body we will have three dimensions for its position, three
for its velocity, and one for its mass), on which a relation of correspondence between these
vectors is fixed. In this way the monomorphism is preserved. I recall I am dealing only with
the representative effectiveness of mathematics and that the monomorphism condition I am
trying to defend as the proper minimal request refers just to this particular effectiveness of
mathematics. Measuring is surely an important way in which we ‘apply’ mathematics, but
it is different from representation — even if representation, of course, subsumes measuring
practices. Even if measuring can be accounted for in structural terms as much as mathematical
representation can, it will satisfy different conditions — which I will not deal with in this work.
11Another example, the discovery of the omega minus particle, will be discussed at lenght
in the next chapter. Other examples are offered by Batterman (2002), who stresses the
importance of ‘asympthotic reasoning’ in removing explanatory non-relevant aspects. The
problem is here interwoven with mathematical explanatory power in science.
12Bueno & Colyvan (2011) come to the same conclusion. They also say that Pincock’s
(2004) aim was precisely to account for the applicabilty of mathematics in purely structural
terms, but I must disagree with them on this point, since in no place does Pincock make such
a claim.
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That an account of the representative effectiveness of mathematics cannot
be achieved in purely structural terms, is also shown by the fact that (whatever
be the minimal condition to be prescribed) the mathematical structure can be
richer than the targeted physical domain, and that is what usually happens.
So, as Bueno & Colyvan (2011) rightly point out, we may be confronted with
situations in which our mathematical structure predicts more than one possible
solution and not all these solutions have an empirical counterpart. Let us take
the very simple case of a quadratic equation used to predict where a projectile
will land. Such an equation will have two solutions and it may happen that
these two solutions will not coincide. If, for example, we want to predict the
landing of a projectile launched from the cliff of a mountain, one of the two so-
lutions will be negative and will have no physical interpretation. In other cases,
instead, mathematical solutions previously considered as physically meaningless
are suddendly and unexpectedly reassessed in virtue of a new interpretation of
them. Once again, Dirac’s postulation of the existence of positrons we saw in
section 5.1 perfectly exemplifies the point at issue. Now, the problem is: how
can we distinguish, within a mathematical structure, its representing from its
non-representing parts? The problem is quite simple for the case of a projectile,
but what about more complex and intricated cases? According to Bueno &
Colyvan (2011),
such crucial information required to solve this physical problem is not part
of the mapping between mathematical structure and physical structure. In
short, the mapping account of mathematical applications is incomplete.
[. . .]. Moreover, the incompleteness of the mapping account is seen clearly
as a result of problems relating to the specifications of the mappings in
question. (pp. 349-50)
The structural account is not able, by itself, to tell us which of the possible
choices is the right one (or, are the right ones) and which is not. What is more,
it is even unable to justify why, in the projectile example, the positive solution
is the right one while the negative one is not. From a purely structural perspec-
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tive, both of them are indistinguishable as far as their rightness is concerned.
The lesson to be learned is: our account cannot avoid taking non-structural
components into consideration.
Secondarily, this way to set out the issue presupposes that we already have
a structured physical domain. That is just what permits us to say that the
mathematical description of that domain is effective because the mathematical
structure employed is a ‘good copy’, or a ‘good representation’, of the physical
structure underlying the physical domain. But what is this ‘physical’ strucure,
and in which sense the physical domain is ‘already structured’? Moreover, that
the physical domain has to be in some sense pre-structured seems to suggest
that we already know at least what elements compose this domain. But in many
contexts this is not the case, and nevertheless mathematics helps us to deepen
our knowledge of the elements of the domain. For example, in particle physics
mathematical models play a very valuable role in discovering new particles.13
How is that possible? I will try to say something more about this aspect in
section 5.3.
Thirdly, the considerations presented until now justify us in saying that,
whatever the minimal structural condition be, this condition is just necessary,
but not sufficient in order to account for the representative effectiveness of
mathematics. In other words, if M is effective in representing S, then we can
say that there is a monomorphism from S to M — but the converse is not true.
In order to prove the converse, we should prove that any monomorphism from S
to M makes of M an effective representation of S. But we have already noticed
that the monomorphism must go from the relevant elements and relations in
S to the elements and relations in M . So, in order to prove the converse, we
should already know what the relevant aspects of a physical domain are.
13An interesting case in this regard is the discovery of the omega minus particle, made by
Gell-Mann and Ne’eman in 1963. I will extensively discuss this interesting case in the next
chapter.
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Finally, the structural account, as we have seen, says that a mathematical
representation is effective only if there exists a preserving structure relation
(whatever it be: monomorphism, homomorphism, or anything else) from the
physical domain to the mathematical structure. But how do we come to say
that such a structure-preserving relation really subsists? To say that, we have
to know in advance how the physical domain is structured — we have at least
to know what elements compose it and how they interact. However, as I have
already noted, mathematical representations are usually employed to discover
new entities or new relations in the physical domain. In these cases, there is
a difficulty about how we can come to know that a particular monomorphism
really subsists.14
To sum up, we saw that a mathematical structureM seems to be succesfully
applicable only if there exists a monomorphism from the (relevant) physical
structure S to M . This seems to be a necessary condition, since, if such a
monomorphism does not exist, some elements of S (objects or relations) will be
not distinguished by the representing mathematical structureM , and this would
be a loss of information. Yet, this cannot be taken to be a sufficient condition,
for the reason I have just pointed out. Moreover, the structural account suffers
from different problems that must be solved in some way. In the next sections
I will try to give my modest contribution to make the structural account more
satisfying, but it seems clear since now that it will be impossible to exclude from
the account some non-structural, pragmatic components.
14It must be noted that it is not sufficient that there is a monomomorphism: we must be
able to spell it out in order to make the representation effective — i.e., in order to make the
representation a useful tool to make verifiable predictions and hypotheses.
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5.3 Physical and mathematical structures
5.3.1 The Problem of the Coordination revised
In the previous section, I have pointed out that the physical domain has to
be already, in some sense, ‘structured’ in order to define a structure-preserving
relation from it to a mathematical structure. Namely, on the physical side
we should already have something like a ‘physical’ structure. But what does
this expression mean? What is a physical structure? One might say that a
physical structure is just a mathematical structure embedded in nature, so that
the only difference between the two is that the first is abstract and the second
is a model for it. Well, but how do we know that the latter is a model for
the former? What we have not considered, up to now, is the fact that the
physical structure is something that we do not know, something hidden in the
phenomena of nature. The mathematical structure is often just a ‘tool’ by means
of which we manage to grasp this hidden physical structure. But, given that the
monomorphic relation is the only way for us to be sure that the mathematical
structure can be effectively and successfully used to know the physical structure,
how can we set up such a monomorphic relation if one of the two terms of the
relation is unknown? And how can we know that such a relation really subsists?
Actually, there are two problems here that we should keep distinct: the
former concerns how we can set up a relation between physical and mathematical
structures; the latter concerns how we can understand that such a relation is
actually a monomorphism. Let us start with the first problem. The point
is: how can we fix a relation (whatever it is: isomorphism, homomorphism
or monomorphism) between a mathematical structure and a physical structure
that we do not know? Or, to use a different terminology, how can we compare a
structure to an alleged model of it if we do not know the proper interpretation
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that links the former to the latter — and we do not even know the structure?15
The problem just sketched can be seen as a variation of the well-known
problem of the coordination raised by Reichenbach (1965).16 «The mathemati-
cal object of knowledge — he says — is uniquely determined by the axioms and
definitions of mathematics» (p. 34). On the contrary,
The physical object cannot be determined by axioms and definitions. It
is a thing of the real world, not an object of the logical world of mathe-
matics. Offhand it looks as if the method of representing physical events
by mathematical equations is the same as that of mathematics. Physics
has developed the method of defining one magnitude in terms of others
by relating them to more and more general magnitudes and by ultimately
arriving at “axioms”, that is, the fundamental equations of physics. Yet
what is obtained in this fashion is just a system of mathematical relations.
What is lacking in such system is a statement regarding the significance
of physics, the assertion that the system of equations is true for reality.
(p. 36)
If, in a certain sense, mathematical truths are granted by the internal coherence
of a mathematical structure, the same cannot be said for the physical relations.
In this case we need something like a ‘coordination’: «physical things are coör-
dinated to equations. Not only the totality of real things is coördinated to the
total system of equations, but individual things are coördinated to individual
equations» (p. 37). Of course, one might say that what we are looking for is
just a function (a mapping, an intepretation) between mathematical objects
(and operations, and relations) and physical objects (and operations, and re-
lations) — so, what’s the problem? Well, in the specific case of the physical
coordination, the matter is much more complex than this:
[. . .], if two sets of points are given, we establish a correspondence between
them by coordinating to every point of one set a point of the other set.
For this purpose, the elements of each set must be defined; that is, for
each element there must exist another definition in addition to that which
determines the coordination to the other set. Such definitions are lacking
15This point is strictly linked to the fact that a mathematical representation can be (and
often is) useful also in fostering new discoveries. Bueno & Colyvan (2011) do not pay any
attenation to this point, and it seems to me that an account of the representative effectiveness
of mathematics which fails in accounting for it should be considered unsatisfying.
16On this parallelism with Reichenbach’s problem of coordination, see also van Fraassen
(2006, 2008).
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on one side of the coordination dealing with the cognition of reality. Al-
though the equations, that is, the conceptual side of the coordination, are
uniquely defined, the “real” is not. (p. 37)
In short, baldly stated, the problem is that if the target of the representation
is not a mathematical object, then we do not have a well-defined range for the
function.
The situation is re-stated and analysed by van Fraassen (2006) as follows:
a function that relates A [the phenomenon] and B [the mathematical struc-
ture] must have a set as its domain. If A is, for example, a thunderstorm
or a cloud chamber — a physical process, event, or object — then A is not
a set. Fine, the realist answers, but A has parts and the function’s domain
is the set of these parts. Moreover, there are specific relations between
these parts, and these relations have as their extensions sets of sequences
in that domain. The function provides a proper matching provided that
the images of these relations are relevant relations in the model. (p. 540)
So, we have A (the phenomenon at issue), B (the mathematical representation
of it), and something that we could call S(A) = 〈SA1, SA2〉, where SA1 is the
set of parts of A, and SA2 is the family of sets that are extensions of relations
on these parts. In this account, S(A) is actually a mathematical structure and
the Reichenbach problem in comparing S(A) with B is ruled out, for both are
abstract (mathematical) structures. But in this way we are just pushing the
problem one step back; now the problem is: how can we compare A with S(A)?
But that is not all. We have several ways to divide up A. Which of these is the
right one? Realist might answer that the right one is that that ‘carves nature
at joints’, but this sounds more like beating about the bush, since we do not
know what is the proper way to ‘carve nature at joints’.
5.3.2 Phenomena, data models and theory models
So, let us take one step back, and try to find a way out. There are some points
that should be noted and that may permit us to deflate (at least part of) the
problem. The problem at hand is clearly a problem of representation: how can
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we represent a concrete physical system by means of an abstract structure such
as a mathematical one? Now, as Van Fraassen properly points out,
The question of how a specific mathematical object can be used to rep-
resent some specific phenomena makes sense only in a context in which
some description of the latter is at hand. Reichenbach, it seems to me,
mistakenly pursues the ‘profound’ ‘fundational’ question of how such use
is possible outside any such context — as if theories are received by babies
or primitives before the acquisition of language.
[. . .].
He is explicitly addressing a situation in which there is no description at
hand for what is to be represented. (van Fraassen 2006, pp. 541-2)
But we actually have a description at hand for physical entities, and this is
just that offered by our own language and by our presupposed scientific the-
ories. All this, evidently, involves a large amount of pragmatic elements, but
it is quite obvious that mathematics is not an instrument that we apply in an
aseptic context. Therefore, all things considered, the question of how we can
represent a physical phenomenon by means of abstract objects such as mathe-
matical ones is not really problematic. At least, it is no more problematic than
the problem of denotation in philosophy of language. In other words, there is
nothing problematic in using mathematical objects in order to denote parts of
a physical phenomenon, where these parts are those delivered by our language
and theories.
However, there are still two problems to solve: (1) since there are several
ways to divide up a phenomenon into parts, which of these ways is the right
one, and how can we recognize it? (2) How can we understand that a certain
mathematical structure has a monomorphic relation to the target phenomenon
(so that we can say that such a mathematical structure is a suited and effective
representation of it)?
Question (1) and (2) are particularly tangled up. As van Fraassen (2008)
interestingly points out,
[. . .] the assertion or denial of isomorphism depends on a certain selection
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on our part. In the case of two mathematical objects we can make the se-
lection in a straightforward way, since they are already ‘given’ in a format
which lends itself to us. Given a particular Hilbert space and a family of
operators on it singled out by some equations, the relevant questions can
obviously be formulated: for example, does this family contain an element
I such that for all its members X, IX = XI = X? But how do I fomu-
late questions of this sort for a part of nature, without using a selective
description of it that already rests on a ‘mathematization’? (p. 366, note
7)
Now, Van Fraassen analyzes the issue as follows. In concrete settings, the
structure-preserving relation intervenes not between the phenomenon and the
theory model, but between the data model and the theory model. When we
collect the data, what we have is already a mathematical structure, and the
mathematical structure of the theory model tries to embed the mathematical
structure of the data model. However, according to Van Fraassen, this does
not push the problem one step back. Why? Because the «construction of a
data model is precisely the selective relevant description (by the user of the
theory) required for the possibility of representation of the phenomenon» (van
Fraassen 2006, p. 544). The point that Van Fraassen emphasizes is that
There is nothing in an abstract structure itself that can determine that it
is the relevant data model, to be matched by the theory. That is why our
talk of data models ‘between’ the theoretical model and the phenomena
does not simply push Reichenbach’s question one step back, to be faced
all over again in the same way. [. . .].
That is, the phenomenon, what it is like, taken by itself, does not de-
termine which structures are data models for it. That depends on our
selective attention to the phenomenon, and our decisions in attending to
certain aspects, to represent them in certain ways and to a certain extent.
(pp. 544-5)17
In representing a phenomenon, there is an ineliminable indexical component: the
representation is a representation of something (as thus and so) by somebody.
The data model is the phenomenon as represented by someone, and when we
want to check a claim of adequacy, we will compare the theory model with
the data model. But to say that the theory is adequate to the phenomena as
17Italics and bolds are in the text.
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represented by us (namely, our data model) is the same, for us, as to say that
the theory is adequate to the phenomenon tout court. This last point is, on Van
Fraassen’s point of view, a pragmatical tautology, and «Appreciating that this
equivalence for us is a pragmatical tautology removes the basis for the challenge»
(p. 545) — that is, removes the necessity to push Reichenbach’s question one
step back.
5.4 In Search of a Way Out
5.4.1 A proposal of integration for the structural account
Van Fraassen’s solution, by appealing to the notion of ‘pragmatical tautology’,
sounds quite tricky, and not many would follow him on this road. Nevertheless,
there are two points in Van Fraassen’s analysis that I want to retain and empha-
size: (A) there is nothing in the phenomenon that determines which structures
are data models for it — namely, which mathematical structures are able to
capture its relevant aspects; (B) when we want to check a claim of adequacy for
a theory, we compare the theory model with the data model (and not with the
phenomenon itself). So, the effectiveness of mathematics is not simply a matter
of conditions that we have pre-emptively to satisfy for its application. What
we need is a system that permits us to check the adequacy of a mathematical
representation in the double sense of: (I) checking the adequacy of the model
theory as properly embedding (namely, monomorphically — as we saw) the
data model, and (II) checking the adequacy of the data model in representing
the relevant aspects of the phenomenon at issue. Moreover, all these consider-
ations show that the structural account — as presented so far — is not enough
in order to account for the applicability of mathematics. It can constitute, at
best, a good starting point, but it needs an integration, and such an integration
has to consider the pragmatical elements that intervene in the realization of a
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mathematical model for a physical phenomenon.
In this section I am going to propose an integration of the structural account
that, I think, can solve part of these problems, and can also answer question
(2), which I left open (“How can we understand that a certain mathematical
structure has a monomorphic relation to the target phenomenon, so that we can
say that such a mathematical structure is a suited and effective representation of
it?”). My idea aims to fuse together the structural account with the DDI model
account proposed by Hughes (1997), in a fashion that resembles the ‘Inferential
Account’ proposed by Bueno & Colyvan (2011), yet different from it on some
important points. The DDI model is a general account of modeling in physics.
According to it, modeling is conceived as consisting of three main components:
denotation, demonstration and interpretation (from which the name “DDI”). As
Hughes clarifies, he is
not arguing that denotation, demonstration and interpretation constitute
a set of speech acts individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an
act of theoretical representation to take place. [He is] making the more
modest suggestion that, if we examine a theoretical model with these
three activities in mind, we shall achieve some insight into the kind of
representation that it provides. Furthermore, we shall rarely be led to
assert things that are false. (p. 329)
In short, I can sum up the DDI account as follows. A model denotes a physical
phenomenon; it is a symbol for it and stands for it. In this manner, denotation
plays the fundamental representative role, in accordance with Goodman’s (1968)
dictum that «denotation is the core of representation and is independent of
resemblance» (p. 5). Such a representation has also an internal dynamics, which
permits us to make demonstration within it and make novel predictions. But
the predictions that we draw in the model remain predictions about the model
if we do not intervene with a process of interpretation that permits us to move
back from the model to the phenomenon at issue.
Now, my idea consists in integrating this account by means of our previous
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considerations about the structural account and the data models, plus some
extra considerations about the way in which we can recognize the existence of a
monomorphism between a mathematical structure and the structure of a data
model. The following figure gives a visual representation of my proposal.
Figure 5.1: Integration of the structural account
The DDI account is preserved, as it is evident by the presence of the de-
notation-demonstration-interpretation triad. Yet, whereas in the DDI scheme
denotation and interpretation occurred between the phenomenon and the model,
here the ‘model’ is composed by two parts: the data model and the theory model.
According to Van Fraassen’s considerations, the phenomenon is represented by
the data model (and only derivatively, or secondarily, by the theory model),
and this representative role is centered on the notion of denotation. Still, we
have to add an important remark: such a denotation is only ‘partial’; namely,
the denotation does not give a complete coordination between elements of the
phenomenon and terms of the data model. The only elements for which we give
a denotation are those that appear in the data model. So, for example, if we are
trying to describe the interrelations among pressure, volume and temperature
in a termic system, we will register the value for each of these values in different
situations, and we will associate a number for any measurement. So, in our data
model, we will denote pressure, volume and temperature by means of positive
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numbers. But this denotation is only ‘partial’: nothing is said about — for
example — the denotation of negative numbers. We do not know if the structure
that we are delineating in this way will be defined only on positive numbers or
also on negative numbers. It will be a matter of interpretation to understand
whether and how we will have to interpret negative numbers appearing in the
mathematical structure as values for temperature, or pressure, or volume.
The data model, obviously, is not a complete mathematical structure. It is
rather a clue, or a trace, of mathematical structure. Our task consists in finding
the proper mathematical structure according to which the consequents in the
physical phenomenon — as represented by the data model — are always a con-
sequence in our mathematical structure, which corresponds to the monomorphic
condition.18 Now, the problem is that, given this condition, we cannot take for
granted any consequence that we can demostrate in the mathematical structure.
For the monomorphic condition gurantees that, if something is part of the hid-
den structure of the data model, then such a part will be surely deducible within
our mathematical structure; but it does not guarantee that every consequence
deducible from our mathematical structure is a consequence in the data model
(and, hence, also in the phenomenon represented by it). So, how can we do?
The answer is that every consequence that we can demonstrate in the math-
ematical structure must be empirically checked by means of an interpretation
that permits us to go from the mathematical side to the empirical one. But this
leads to two possibilities. Let us suppose that γ is a mathematical term deduced
from the mathematical structure M , and suppose that we do not know how to
interpret such a term. The two possibilities are either to hazard an interpreta-
tive guess at γ and then check its correctness; or, if we have no idea concerning
18On this regard, I think that the famous quotation from Hertz ([1894] 1956) — «the neces-
sary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents
of the things pictured» (p. 2) — should be revised in the following way: the necessary conse-
quents of the things pictured should always be the necessary consequents of the images. The
original claim corresponds to the isomorphic condition, but we saw that such a condition is
too restrictive.
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how such a term could be interpreted, to say that γ is just a mathematical sign
having no interpretation, depending on the fact that the structure-preserving
relation is not an isomorphism but a monomorphism.
Let me make a toy example to better explain this point. Let us take the fol-
lowing puzzle: five men find themselves shipwrecked on an island, with nothing
edible in sight but coconuts, plenty of these, and a monkey. They agree to split
the coconuts into five equal integer lots, any remainder going to the monkey.
Man 1 suddenly feels hungry in the middle of the night, and decides to take his
share of coconuts at that very moment. He finds the remainder to be one after
division by five, so he gives this remaining coconut to the monkey and takes his
fifth of the rest, lumping the coconuts that remain back together. A while later,
also Man 2 wakes up hungry, and does exactly the same thing: takes a fifth of
the coconuts, gives the monkey the remainder, which is again one, and leaves
the rest behind. So do men 3, 4, and 5, too. In the morning they all get up,
and no one mentions anything about his coconut-affair on the previous night.
So they share out the remaining lot in five equal parts finding, once again, a
remainder of one left for the monkey. Find the initial number of coconuts.19
There are in fact an infinite number of solutions to this problem, but obviously
we are asked to find the smallest number of coconuts that satisfies the condi-
tion. The answer is 15,621 (the reader may check by himself the correctness of
this solution). However, a story says that it was Paul Dirac to note that such
a puzzle may have also another solution: −4 coconuts! This answer is right:
each time a man arrives at the heap of coconuts, he finds −4 coconuts; since
−4 ÷ 5 = −1 with a reminder of +1,20 he takes away the remainder from the
heap and gives it to the monkey (i.e., he gives +1 to the monkey); what remains
19Reported in (Barrow 1988, p. 254).
20Typically, quotient and remainder functions are defined only for natural numbers, hence
such an expression makes no sense until we define these functions for negative numbers too.
Alternatively, one can check the validity of this negative solution by substituting −4 in the
diophantine equation, assuming that the equation is defined also on negative numbers.
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in the heap is −5 coconuts; his one-fifth share is −1, which he takes, leaving −4
coconuts behind for the next man; and so on, till the final division.21 The point
is that when we set up the equation for the solution of the problem, we have a
linear diofantine equation. Now, in a problem like this we are obviously led to
search positive solutions, since we are interpreting numbers as set of coconuts,
and intuitively we do not handle sets of coconuts having negative cardinality.
We know that there could be negative solutions, but we consider this only as
a mathematical fact without interpretation against reality. However, if we can
find a possible interpretation for such negative numbers, there is nothing to
stop us to check this interpretation in reality and to examine whether it could
be fruitful. In the case of coconut puzzle, our experience of the macroscopic
world suggests us that such a negative interpretation will not be very fruitful;
but in more abstract physical contexts (like quantic world, for example) this
fact could be less obvious, and by giving credit to this interpretation we could
be led to new interesting discoveries.
I think there is nothing ‘miraculous’ here, as Wigner (1960) alleged. It is just
a matter of interpretation: some interpretations could be entirely unproductive,
some other interpretations could be very fruitful; but whether it is the first or
the second case that occurs, it is not (only) a matter of which mathematical
structure we adopt, but also of whether the interpretation that we stick to the
mathematical structure passes the empirical test or not.22
The way in which we set up our interpretation is quite complex and involves
different aspects. The basis is obviously given by the initial denotation on
21The story also says that, by thinking about this problem, Paul Dirac came to the idea
of the anti-matter. Such a story is quoted also by Barrows, but I was not able to check its
reliability.
22As it has been often noted, Wigner’s analysis seems to have been led astray by an over-
stimation of successful over unsuccesful cases of mathematical application in physics (see for
example Azzouni 2000, Pincock 2012). A closer attention to unsuccesful cases would have
probably pointed out that the apparent ‘miracle’ of applied mathematics is often just the re-
sult of a long chains of failure in finding the proper interpretation for the suitable mathematical
structure.
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which we have built up our data model. As far as the terms, for which we
have given a denotation, are concerned, the interpretation is simply the inverse
of the denotation. But then we have to extend this initial, partial denotation.
In general, empirical verification is the main judge for interpretation; so, there
are no tight prescriptions to be rigorously followed.23 However, we usually
extend the interpretation in conformity with a general principle of ‘coherence’.
It is hard to precisely clarify what this principle is; perhaps an example can
be more helpful. Let us suppose we denote the velocity of a body along a
certain direction by means of a vector v1. If, very trivially, this vector is then
transformed into a different vector v2 in virtue of a certain relation describing
the kinematics of that body in the system at issue, we will coherently interpret
this new vector as the velocity of that body at a later instant of time. We will
not interpret it as, for example, the mass, or the acceleration of the body, since
this interpretation would be incoherent with the original one. A less trivial
and more interesting example of the ‘principle of coherence’ is offered by the
already mentioned case of the discovery of the omega minus particle — which I
will extensively deal with in the next chapter. Here we have that each particle
belonging to a particular class (the spin- 32 barions), along with its properties,
is represented by means of a position in the S − I3 (strangeness-isospin) plane
(according to the SU(3) formalism). Given that the nine already known (in
1962) spin-32 barions determined that this class of particles would have formed
a decuplet scheme in such a plane, a tenth position was still vacant. So, since all
the other “positions” in the scheme represented a certain particle of the class, a
general principle of coherence led Gell-Mann and Ne’emann to think that this
position represented a particle too — a new particle still to be discovered and
23In some cases, the theory model can refer to the past. In these cases it would be impossible
to empirically test the ‘predictions’ of such a theory, because the initial conditions cannot be
recreated at the present time. The evaluation of this question is quite complex and cannot be
examined in the present work. I would say that in these cases, all we can do is to rely on an
inference to the best explanation, or hope that some other experiment could offer an indirect
confirmation of the theory.
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whose existence was experimentally certified one year later.
Moreover, the extension of the original interpretation will have to be made
so as to mantain a certain coherence also with our experience. In the previ-
ous coconuts case, for example, experience suggests us that it is meaningless to
extend the interpretation for negative numbers, because in our empirical expe-
rience we never meet with a set of −4 objects. However, in some cases, what
we need for advancement is just the breaking of such an apparent coherence —
and the more we go far from our immediate experience, the less we will have
difficulty to ‘force’ this coherence in order to explore new possibilities. This is
particularly evident in Quantum Mechanics.
It is important to note that the non-existence of coherent interpretations
for some statements about a mathematical structure does not invalidate the
whole structure as a suitable representation. We can abandon a mathematical
structure for several reasons. We can do it because the mathematical structure
is too complicated and we are not able to handle it; or, we can abandon it
because it is not complicated enough and we are not able to draw interesting
predictions from it; or, we can abandon it because, at a certain point, we realize
that a relevant fact or a relevant property of the phenomenon at issue is not
(properly) represented by it. However, the fact that a mathematical structure, in
a sense, represents more than what it is asked to represent is not a real problem;
potentially, it is rather a source of richness and novelty which we should keep
into consideration. If our mathematical structure makes a prediction which
is not verified, we can try to shuffle off the guilt of such a failure upon the
interpretation. If we can do it in a coherent way, we can continue working with
that mathematical structure; but if we cannot do it, then we have to revise our
mathematical structure and find a more suitable one.
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5.4.2 How do we detect the monomorphism?
There is still a question I left open: the question concerning how we understand
that a mathematical structure is monomorphic to a data model. Indeed, if we do
not know the structure that the data model partially represents, how can we say
that such a structure is actually monomorphic to the mathematical structure
under scrutiny? We know the mathematical structure, but we do not know
the structure partially revealed by the data model (which, in our intentions,
should represent the phenomenon). In some cases we know in advance that the
mathematical structure we are going to adopt is richer than the phenomenon
we aim to represent, and we test the mathematical structure assuming that
the data model is at least monomorphic to it. This is the case, for example,
of the Navier-Stokes equations, where we know in advance that the continuous
mathematics we are going to apply is richer than the ultimate discrete dynamic
of the phenomenon at issue. In some cases, yet, we have no idea about it. So,
what can we do?
In these cases, it seems to me, there is no alternative but to suppose that
the mathematical structure we want to adopt is actually isomorphic to the data
model structure. If this hypothesis were true, then it would be true that — to
repeat Hertz’s words — «the necessary consequents of the images in thought are
always the images of the necessary consequents of the things pictured». In other
words, if this hypothesis were true, we could be sure that any consequence in the
mathematical structure has some correspondence in the data model structure,
and hence that it represents a fact in the phenomenon. So, if we run into a
difficulty (for example, when my mathematical structure tells me that a possi-
ble solution for the coconut puzzle is −4), we can shuffle off the guilt of such a
failure upon the isomorphism hypothesis: the solution suggested by the mathe-
matical structure does not take place in the real world because our mathematical
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structure is too rich, and the data model is only monomorphic (not isomorphic)
to it. We do not have to abandon the mathematical structure, since we can
simply abandon the hypothesis of isomorphism. We have thus a proof that the
mathematical structure is not isomorphic to the data model, but in spite of this
we can still rely on the hypothesis that the data model is monomorphic to our
mathematical structure — and hence, on the hypothesis that the mathematical
structure can still be representatively effective. Of course, not all the difficulties
can be settled in this way. In the coconut example, we can proceed in this way
because the mathematical structure gives us also a valid solution (i.e. 15,621).
But if the only solution given by our mathematical structure were not valid,
then we could not shuffle off the guilt upon the hypothesis of isomorphism, but
directly upon the mathematical structure itself. In that case the mathematical
structure would not be suitable, and we would have to find a more suitable one.
The following diagram, showing the possible working flow of a scientist en-
gaged in representing a physical domain by means of a mathematical structure,
should help in clarifying the previous considerations. At the beginning of the
process, the scientist has a mathematical structure M that she thinks is a good
candidate for representation, but she does not know whether it perfectly (namely,
isomorphically) represents the data model or not. So, she initially supposes that
the data model is isomorphic to the mathematical structure.24 This could turn
out to be a good hypothesis and then she can go on working with such an
assumption. But such a hypothesis may bring to a failure. In that case, de-
pending on the kind of failure at issue, she can shift to a different assumption,
i.e. that the data model is rather monomorphic to the mathematical structure;
otherwise she can shift to a different interpretation; or she can shift to a com-
pletely different mathematical structure to work with. Also the monomorphism
24I am not saying that this hypothesis is always necessary. In some cases she already knows
that M does not perfectly represent the phenomenon, and then the isomorphism hypothesis
need not to be assumed, of course.
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Figure 5.2: Working flow of a scientist engaged in representing a physical domain
by means of a mathematical structure.
hypothesis can turn out either satisfying or not. Again, just like before, depend-
ing on the kind of failure, she can attempt to shift to a different interpretation
or to a different mathematical structure. In different words, she makes a strong
hypothesis (isomorphism) and if this hypothesis turns out to be too strong, she
tries to come to a compromise, by weakening the hypothesis, by modifying the
interpretation, or by shifting to a different mathematical structure.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I presented the structural account for the representative effec-
tiveness of mathematics and I took into consideration some difficulties related
to it. Part of these difficulties can be settled, as we saw; but some criticalities
remain. This shows that the structural account needs to be integrated in order
to account for representative applicability, especially where mathematical rep-
resentations seem to play an active role in making new discoveries and to foster
new advancements in scientific research. I tried to provide the required inte-
gration, by considering the problems and the deficiencies emerged by means of
the DDI model proposed by Hughes’s (1997) and van Fraassen’s considerations.
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It seems to me that the resulting account is in a better condition to make the
applicability of mathematics less misterious and miraculous than it is often pre-
sented. In this integrated account, a major role is played by a certain number of
pragmatical and contextual elements. Such a role is not always schematizable
in a rigorous manner, but I think this is not an imperfection. Rather, I think
that all this bestows upon the account an amount of dynamism and plasticity,






In the previous chapter I presented a proposal of integration for the structural
account of mathematical representative effectiveness. I highlighted some limits
of the structural account as it is usually presented and I offered some arguments
to show how to improve it and make it more effective. However, I considered the
question only from a purely theoretical point of view. In the present chapter, I
am going to introduce some concrete examples by means of which I will show
the advantages that follow by adopting such an approach.
Since one of the main aims of an account for the effectiveness of mathematics
consists — as I underlined in the previous chapter — in accounting both for
representative and heuristic role of mathematics in scientific discoveries, I will
focus my attention on cases that are usually presented as interesting examples of
the mathematical heuristic potential in physics. The two main examples which
I will discuss are:
1. the prediction of the existence of the omega minus particle by Gell-Mann
and Ne’eman in 1962; and
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2. the prediction of the existence of the positron by Paul Dirac in 1930.
Both these examples are mentioned by Steiner (1998) as examples of formal
analogies in science. In his reconstruction, the heuristic potential of these exis-
tential predictions rested on the anthropocentric character of mathematics and
on the ‘human-friendly’ feature of the universe. The reconstruction I will offer in
the following pages will show that such an effectiveness can be better explained
and accounted by means of the account previously illustrated.
6.2 The prediction of the omega minus particle
What is interesting in the discovery of the Ω− particle is the fact that the predic-
tion of this new physical entity seemed to be motivated only by the mathematics
employed (the theory of irreducible group representations) and by purely math-
ematical considerations. Apparently, no empirical fact or consideration justified
the belief that such a particle should be included in the number of the particles
already known at that time.
The case of the prediction of the omega minus particle is only touched on
by Steiner (1998). He just mentions it as an example of analogy reasoning in
physics, but he does not enter into the details of the discovery. A more detailed
analysis is offered by Bangu, first in his (2008) article and then in his (2012)
book. Here, he offers a detailed historical and theoretical reconstruction of
this discovery, and, in the spirit of Steiner’s work, makes a case for naturalistic
philosophers. In a clearer way than Steiner’s, he shows that the prediction of
the omega minus seems to rely on a methodological principle — what he calls
“reification principle”1 — which is not justifiable by naturalistic criteria.
In this section I will take into question Bangu’s reconstruction and I will
1In (Bangu 2012) the principle is called “identity principle”, but the shift of terminology
does not change the substance of his argument. Since no argument is offered to motivate the
latter terminology over the first, I will refer to this principle by means of the first terminology,
since I think is less unambiguous.
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show that, by relying on the account I have previously presented, a different
reconstruction can be offered, without any commitment to such a reification
principle.
6.2.1 Brief historical outline
The introduction in quantum mechanics of the mathematical framework of ir-
reducible group representations dates from around 1930, and was mostly due to
the works of Weyl and Wigner.2 Indeed it was initially not well accepted by the
physicists’ community, because of the difficulties in learning and manipulating
such a complex mathematical formalism,3 but after the early successes, physics
began to systematically use internal symmetries in the classification of elemen-
tary particles. It was just this mathematical framework that gave Gell-Mann
and Ne’eman the proper mathematical tools for accomplishing their prediction.
In general terms, followingWigner (1939), an elementary particle is identified
with a physical system whose possible states transform into each other according
to some representation of the appropriate symmetry group. For example, the
proton-neutron symmetry was originally captured in terms of the group struc-
ture called SU(2). Subsequently it became evident that the strong interactions
are governed by a bigger symmetry: when the conservation of strangeness was
recognized to be a characteristic of strong interactions and a new quantum num-
ber was added to that of isospin, the new symmetry governing these interactions
turned out to be SU(3).
2For more details, see (Weyl 1931, Wigner 1926, Wigner 1927, Wigner 1939, Wigner 1959).
3Althought this was the principal reason, it was not the only. For example, Max Born said
to Ehrenfest in September 29, 1930: «I find group theory a very beautiful mathematical tool
but its application in atomic physics always seemed to me to be inappropriate (like shooting
sparrows with artillery)» (von Meyenn 1983, p. 341). His objection was not because group
theory was not easy to use, but because «in reality it is not in accord with the way things are»
(Gavroglu 1995, p. 56). As Bonolis points out: «He probably meant that from the fact that
certain mathematical tools (such as group-theoretic techniques) are useful for solving a given
problem (for example to establish convenient representation theorems in QuantumMechanics),
it does not necessarily follow that one has to believe that the structures generated by these
techniques truly describe the world» (Bonolis 2004, pp. 78-79).
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Given the symmetry group governing a physical system, the superposed
states of the system transform into each other according to the irreducible repre-
sentation of the symmetry group. These physical transformations are expressed
mathematically as operators on the state space corresponding to the observ-
ables and these operators are conceived as invariants of the symmetry group in
question: their eigenvalues supply the labels for identifying and classifying the
irreducible representations of the appropriate symmetry groups.
The discovery of the omega minus particle was based on a very simple strat-
egy, just a particular case of the general suggestion given by Dirac:
The most powerful method of advance that can be suggested at present
is to employ all the resources of pure mathematics in attempts to per-
fect and generalize the mathematical formalism that forms the existing
basis of theoretical physics, and after each success in this direction, to
try to interpret the new mathematical features in terms of physical enti-
ties. (Dirac 1931)4
The complete history is obviously full of technicalities and is not easy to be
followed through, but we do not need to get into these technicalities in order to
understand the idea behind the discovery of the omega minus particle. Actually,
as Bangu glosses,
the main idea is rather strightforward: given the classification scheme for
the already known spin- 3
2
baryons, the unoccupied, apparently superfluous
entry in the scheme was taken as a guide to the existence of a new particle.
It was exactly this surplus that suggested the existence of a new physical
reality (in the form of new particles, to fill in gaps in multiplets). (Bangu
2008, p. 243).
6.2.2 Bangu’s reconstruction
Bangu’s reconstruction of the Gell-Mann and Ne’eman predictive reasoning
(hereafter, GMNPR) is based on the detailed account given by Ne’eman. Here
is the whole passage to which Bangu referred:
4Quoted by Bonolis (2004, p. 50).
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In 1961 four baryons of spin 3
2
were known. These were the four resonances
∆−, ∆0, ∆+, ∆++ which had been discovered by Fermi in 1952. It was
not clear that they could not be fitted into an octet, and the eightfold way
predicted that they were part of a decuplet or of a family of 27 particles.
A decuplet would form a triangle in the S−I3 [strangeness-isospin] plane,
while the 27 particles would be arranged in a large hexagon. (According
to the formalism of SU(3), supermultiplets of 1, 8, 10 and 27 particles
were allowed.) In the same year (1961) the three resonances Σ(1385)
were discovered, with strangeness −1 and probable spin 3
2
, which could
fit well either into the decuplet or the 27-member family.
At a conference of particle physics held at CERN, Geneva, in 1962, two
new resonances were reported, with strangeness−2, and the electric charge
−1 and 0 (today known as the Ξ(1530)). They fitted well into the third
course of both schemes (and could thus be predicted to have spin 3
2
). On
the other hand, Gerson and Shoulamit Goldhaber reported a ‘failure’: in
collisions of K+ or K0 with protons and neutrons, one did not find reso-
nances. Such resonances would indeed be expected if the family had 27
members. The creators of the eightfold way, who attended the conference,
felt that this failure clearly pointed out that the solution lay in the de-
cuplet. They saw the pyramid [in fig. 6.1] being completed before their
very eyes. Only the apex was missing, and with the aid of the model they
had conceived, it was possible to describe exactly what the properties of
the missing particle should be! Before the conclusion of the conference
Gell-Mann went up to the blackboard and spelled out the anticipated
characteristics of the missing particle, which he called ‘omega minus’ (be-
cause of its negative charge and because omega is the last letter of the
Greek alphabet). He also advised the experimentalists to look for that
particle in their accelerators. Yuval Ne’eman had spoken in a similar vein
to the Goldhabers the previous evening and had presented them in a writ-
ten form with an explanation of the theory and the prediction. (Ne’eman
& Kirsh 1996, pp. 202-203)
Figure 6.1: spin- 32 baryon decuplet.
Credits: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/diary/march_2007.html.
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Actually, when few years later, in 1964, experimentalist physicists looked
for the omega minus particle in their accelerators, they found out exactly what
Gell-Mann and Ne’eman predicted: the particle exists and it has exactly the
predicted characteristics (see fig. 6.2).5
Figure 6.2: Photograph (left side) and line diagram (right side) of the decay of
an omega minus particle in a bubble chamber. The short track of the omega
minus particle is highlighted by the circle in the low left corner.
Credits: Barnes et al. (1964) (Brookhaven National Laboratories).
Now, one might ask: why did the experimentalist physicists trusted Gell-
Mann and Ne’eman’s prediction? On which ground they carried on the detection
of the new particle, and why did they think that the (supposed) new entity
would have had exactly the same characteristics as guessed by Gell-Mann and
Ne’eman?
Here are the logical steps that, according to Bangu, underpin the previous
historical report:6
5Actually, the story is not so simple. They could prove the existence of the omega minus
particle, along with its characteristics, except for its spin. Although this hyperon was dis-
covered more than 40 years ago, a conclusive measurement of its spin has only recently been
obtained by Aubert et al. (2006).
6See (Bangu 2008, pp. 243-248).
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(P1) – Each of the upper nine positions in the symmetry scheme has a
physical interpretation.
(H) – Spin- 32 baryons fit the symmetry scheme.
(P2) – The apex is formally/mathematically similar to the other nine posi-
tions. (It is similar in so far as it is, like them, an element of the scheme).
(P3) – The physical existence of a baryon having the predicted character-
istics is not forbidden (can occur in nature).
(RP) – If Γ and Γ ′ are elements of the mathematical formalism describing
a physical context, and Γ ′ is formally similar to Γ , then, if Γ has a physical
referent, Γ ′ has a physical referent as well.
(C) – The apex position has a physical interpretation. (That is, the coor-
dinates of this position describe a 10th spin- 32 baryon.)
Obviously, the truth of C entails the confirmation of H. «This line of reasoning
— Bangu glosses — is supposed to answer the question asked by the experimen-
talist physicist ready to perform the detections, namely ‘What are the grounds
to believe that (a) there is an entity (b) having the predicted physical charac-
teristics?’». (Bangu 2008, p. 245)
GMNPR and the DN model
The need to introduce RP is not prima facie evident and in order to justify its
employment Bangu compares the omega minus prediction with other two cases
of ‘standard’ prediction (standard in respect to the DN model)7: the Urbain
Leverrier and John Adam’s prediction of the planet Neptune and Wolfgang
Pauli’s prediction of the neutrino. In both these cases, the existential predictions
are accounted for within this model with no particular difficulties: when accurate
measurements reveal that there is an anomaly in a physical system (which we
7According to the DN model (see, for example, Hempel 1965), to explain a scientific fact
is to show how that fact can be derived from (i) a set of laws of nature and (ii) some initial
conditions — which is the same as to predict it by applying the laws to the appropriate
circumstances.
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previously supposed to be properly described by a set of laws), then we have two
possibilities to explain away this anomaly: either (A) we try to correct the laws,
keeping the initial conditions unchanged; or (B) we keep the laws unchanged
and we hypothesize that the initial conditions are different from what we have
previously supposed to be the case. It appears clear that (A) is a very costly
option to follow. So, if following (B) we are lead to suppose that something
there should exist that was not previously accounted for, we make a prediction
and then we test it empirically.
In the two standard cases the new entity is postulated for explanatory rea-
sons: the neutrino and the planet Neptune were postulated in order to explain
away a physical anomaly. Moreover, the physical characteristics of the postu-
lated entity are inferred from an analysis of the physical interactions between
the hypothetical entity and the rest of the system. For example, the character-
istics of Neptune (mass, position, velocity, etc) were inferred from the analysis
of how the new entity should be in order to explain (away) the anomaly. Thus,
the criteria on which Bangu bases his comparison are the following two: (a)
explanation and (b) interaction.
(a) Explanation: In order to say that the omega minus particle prediction
was made for explanatory reasons, Bangu has to show what the anomalous
phenomenon to be explained away is. His answer is:
The expectation that another spin- 3
2
baryon exists was fostered by the per-
ceived regularity mentioned in the P1 premise: the fact that nine other
similar positions (out of 10!) had a physical referent was regarded, nat-
urally, as a (striking) coincidence, a regularity in need of explanation.
And, as usual, the best explanation for it could be that, in fact, the law-
like generalization H: ‘Spin- 3
2
baryons fit the symmetry scheme’ is a true
law of nature. The idea then is to attempt to account for/explain the
‘nine-out-of-ten’ regularity by saying that it is a nomological property of
spin- 3
2
baryons in general to fit the symmetry; the next step would be
to somehow use this property to infer that another spin- 3
2
baryon exists.
The basic insight is thus quite simple: by assuming the law-like gener-
alization H, it would be an anomaly not to have a referent for the apex
position. (Bangu 2008, p. 247)
6.2. THE PREDICTION OF THE OMEGA MINUS PARTICLE 175
The anomaly to be explained away is, in this case, the presence of an empty
place in the SU(3) scheme. So far, there is no difference between the case under
examination and the two standard cases of existential prediction.
(b) Interaction: It is here that RP comes in. The properties of Ω− are
obtained on the basis of the analogy between the elements of the formalism
(by means of P1 and, mainly, P2). But to conclude C from P1 and P2 —
Bangu argues — we need RP. More precisely, RP is indispensable in “spelling
out” the properties of Ω− from the formalism: «[. . .] Gell-Mann did just that,
indicating that the new baryon should have the characteristics arrived at via Γ ′,
the unoccupied spot in the scheme. Thus, this principle plays the crucial role of
giving precise indication about the characteristics of the new particle». (Bangu
2008, p. 248)
The crucial role played by RP is just what makes the omega minus different
from the other typical DN predictions. The point at issue is that its physical
characteristics «[are] not based on the calculation of the parameters of its inter-
actions with other elements of the system. These characteristics are postulated
directly from the formalism, by relying on RP». (Bangu 2008, p. 249)
Bangu’s conclusions
Bangu’s article continues by making some remarks about what we have said
above. First of all, RP cannot be assumed as a generalized methodological
principle. Although the omega minus particle case seems to suggest that a
novel, non-standard, pluralistic stance of methodology should be taken (and in
spite of Mark Steiner’s advocating of a sort of “Pythagorization” of the concept
of prediction),8 Bangu claims that this proposal may not avoid a number of
problems — above all, the fact that there is no naturalistic explanation of why
RP could work. For there are situations in physics in which RP does not work,
8See (Steiner 1998, p. 162).
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so that we are not justified in taking RP as a valid methodological principle.
Secondly, he takes into consideration, and rejects, three possible attempts
that a standard empiricist/naturalist methodologist could make to solve the
problem raised in connection to the DN model.
1. The first consists in saying that RP «served in fact a heuristic role – to
conjure, or invent a hypothesis, not to prove it. Unlike the physicist’s
justification method, his discovery method is not even supposed to make
the object of critical inquiry» (Bangu 2008, p. 251). In this way, the
methodological unreliability of RP does not have any effect on the scien-
tific respectability of the GMNPR. Bangu’s reply is that the case at issue
does not fall under the scheme presupposed by the traditional distinction
between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification”. In
particular, «A heuristics typically helps us discover the equation of X, not
X itself — getting to X itself is possible only via a very problematic reifica-
tion step» (Bangu 2008, p. 252). Moreover, since the prediction/discovery
of the new baryon played a justificatory role (for it established that the
SU(3) scheme is the correct symmetry) and since this prediction relied on
using RP, it follows that RP played rather a justifiatory role.9
2. The second attempt to solve the problem consists in emphisizing the role
of P3 in the GMNPR, to the detriment of RP — namely, to emphasize
the “physical reasons” underlying the prediction to the detriment of the
formal ones. Bangu replies by noticing that P3 has in fact no role in the
GMNPR.
[. . .] a carefull look at the GMNPR scheme — Bangu writes —
reveals that this premise was only a consistency check upon the exis-
tential conclusion (C), and not part of its derivation — the derivation
consisting of course of P1, P2, H and RP. [. . .], (P3) plays only a sec-
ondary role: it is the final check upon the credibility of the predictive
9See (Bangu 2008, p. 253).
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existential conclusion already advanced. More precisely, (P3) has no
role in drawning the existential conclusion per se; it only became rel-
evant in a weak, secondary, or passive sense, in accepting it after the
inferential existential step was taken. (Bangu 2008, p. 254)
3. The third attempt consists in observing that the crucial reificatory step
(namely, the indication of the new particle’s characteristics) was taken by
interpreting the mathematical formalism: it is not the formalism itself that
predicts, but our interpretation of it. However, Bangu noticed that the
notion of interpretation at work in the omega minus case is a non-standard
and more problematic notion of interpretation:
Gell-Mann did interpret the formalism, but not in the standard sense
[. . .]. Indeed, as it should be clear by now, his interpretation pro-
ceeded (consciously) along pythagorean lines and was brought to a
specific conclusion by using the (RP). And, again, it is the physicists’
employment of this principle that stirred up the empiricist method-
ologist’s concerns. (Bangu 2008, p. 255)
Therefore, we must conclude that the DN model is not able to account for
the omega minus prediction.
Having certified that neither the standard DN model accounts for the omega
minus prediction, nor could a “Pythagorean” model be used as a substitute
for it, Bangu suggests that a third, “weaker” approach could be taken into
consideration: so called “methodological opportunism”. Since the problem dealt
with until now concerns more the scientist-qua-methodologist than the working
scientist, Bangu — following a suggestion by Einstein10 — claims that the
working scientist should not be inhibited by epistemological considerations:
This kind of puzzle, the scientist-qua-methodological opportunist stresses,
should not be allowed to interfere with the practice of science, as no at-
tempt to offer a principled, systematic account (either standard or non-
standard) of those episodes should be followed too far or taken too seri-
ously. (Bangu 2008, p. 256)
10See (Einstein 1949, p. 684): «[The scientist] accepts gratefully the epistemological concep-
tual analysis; but external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not
permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world
by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic
epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist».
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In his (2012) book, however, Bangu seems to be no more interested in this
methodological considerations. Rather, he accepts the shocking strangeness of
the reification principle (or “identity principle”, as he now prefers to call it) and
levers on it to propose a new version of the indispensability argument.
6.2.3 Avoiding reification: a different reconstruction of
the GMNPR
The difficulties raised by Bangu have their roots in the employment of RP in
order to obtain the conclusion C. In this section I advance another reading of the
GMNPR argument by appealing to the considerations I spelt out in chapter 5.
Such a new reading has the merit of totally dispensing with the recourse to RP,
and consequently with the difficulties connected to it.
Where is the anomaly?
Before of presenting my reconstruction, I want to take into consideration an
aspect on which Bangu seems to be confused. He seems to be persuaded that in
the history of the omega minus prediction, as reported by Ne’eman and Kirsh,
there is an “anomaly” to be explained away. In this regard, he says, there would
be no difference between the omega minus case and the other standard cases of
existential prediction. However, when he tries to pindown this anomaly, he says
that it consists in the fact that if no resonance (having the predicted charac-
teristics) were observed, then there would be an empty place in the symmetry
scheme: «by assuming the law-like generalization H, it would be an anomaly
not to have a referent for the apex position». (Bangu 2008, p. 247)11
Actually, he is saying that there isn’t any anomaly yet: there would be
only if no resonance were observed (or if a resonance without the predicted
characteristics were observed). Bangu evokes a ghost anomaly as if it were
11Italics mine.
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real, but in effect we do not have to do here with an actual anomaly. In the
standard cases, the anomaly is revealed by the measurements (it is actual in
this precise sense) and its presence looms over the theory like the sword of
Damocles: until the anomaly is removed, the ability of the theory to account
for the phenomena at issue is seriously jeopardized. On the contrary, in this case
there is no empirical observation that jeopardizes our law-like generalization H.
Thus, we could say, the prediction of the omega minus particle seems to be made
in order to prevent an anomaly, rather than to explain it away. Later on, in his
(2012) book, Bangu seems to realize that the alleged anomaly is just a ‘ghost’
anomaly; so, he precises the point by saying that the omega minus prediction has
been made in order «to deal with (eliminate, prevent) an anomaly» (Bangu 2012,
p. 102).
However, there is another aspect we should consider. The anomaly that
we should prevent may assume two different forms: either (A) we could find
no particle at all; or (B) we could find a particle not having the predicted
characteristics. These two cases must be carefully distinguished. In case (B)
we would have a real anomaly, since the measurements cannot be accounted for
by our theory. In case (A), instead, the anomaly seems to consist simply in the
fact that the symmetry scheme could turn out to have an empty place. But if
this were the case, would it be really an anomaly?
The presence of an empty place in the symmetry scheme (i.e., of a place
in the formalism having no physical referent) can be regarded as an anomaly
only if we presuppose the validity of RP. The situation appears to be very odd:
the anomaly exists only if the principle that should explain away the anomaly is
valid. Namely, the anomaly can be identified as such only in the light of RP.
Moreover, if (A) were the case, would we be compelled to drop out our math-
ematical structure as no longer reliable? Namely, suppose that experimentalist
physicists had not found any new particle corresponding to the characteristics
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pointed out. Should we drop out the SU(3) symmetry scheme? We wouldn’t, of
course. It could still be regarded as a valuable tool for representing the class of
spin- 32 baryons, for it continues to account for what happens in physical reality.
The fact that the formalism seems to commit ourselves to the existence of
an entity that does not exist cannot be regarded as a wrong conclusion. There
are many cases in which some formalism commits us to entities that we do not
regard as actually existing, but still we continue to use those formalisms without
worrying about these “fictional” entities. We have already seen cases like this.
Remember, for example, the case of the applicability of analytic funtions to
termodynamic discussed in 3.1.3: we know we can treat the critical temperature
of a ferromagnet as an analytic function of the number of its dimensions. But,
following the formalism, we should admit magnets of dimension 3.5, or even
2 + 3i. This is patently meaningless. Analytic function seems rather to be a
calculational tool. Since we cannot calculate the problem for the 3-dimensional
magnet, we calculate it for a 4-dimensional magnet, then we expand the function
as a power series in a complex plane around the number 4, and finally we plug
in the value 3.
In my account, this can be perfectly treated. If (A) were the case, then
we can simply admit that the mathematical structure does not isomorphically
fit the phenomenon we are trying to represent. This is perfectly sound, and
we do not drop out the formalism, since the phenomenon countinues being
monomorphic to the mathematical structure and hence the latter continues
being representatively effective.
Despite these considerations, Bangu thinks of (A), as well as of (B), as an
anomaly. But if I am right in claiming that there is no anomaly here to be
explained away, then we should admit that the standard cases of existential
prediction and the omega minus case are different in so far as the latter does
not serve an explanatory purpose. If there is no anomaly to be explained away,
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all that Bangu says about the relations between the case of the omega minus
prediction and the standard DN model is cut out at the root: the case of the
omega minus prediction cannot be accounted for in the same way as we can
accout for the prediction of Neptune.
One may ask: If the omega minus prediction was not made in order to
explain away an anomaly, why did physicists actually make that prediction? My
answer is: they simply suggested a hypothesis, as it often happens in science,
and the motivation for suggesting such a hypothesis was not entirely based on
mathematical formalism.
A different reconstruction of the GMNPR: outline
Let me first present my proposal for a different reconstruction of the GMNPR,
and then I will offer some clarifications about it. My reconstruction is articulated
as follows.12
(P1∗) – The nine spin- 32 baryons are suitably represented by the symmetry
scheme.
From this premise, by generalization, we can obtain the following hypothesis:
(H∗) – The symmetry scheme suitably represents the whole class of spin- 32
baryons (be it completed by the nine baryons already known or not).
Now, we notice the following mathematical observation:
(MO) – The symmetry scheme reveals another possible element (another
state vector); namely, the symmetry scheme says that another ideal (math-
ematical) object exists, belonging to the set of objects described by the
scheme.13
12The asterisks mark those statements which are reformulations of Bangu’s statements
named by the same abbreviation. The Hs are hypotheses.
13“MO” stands for “Mathematical Observation”.
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Then, we ‘force’ hypothesis H∗ and we formulate the following, stronger hypoth-
esis:
(HA) – The symmetry scheme is (not only suitable, but also) not “redun-
dant”, where by “redundant” I mean that the mathematical structure is not
only monomorphic, but also isomorphic to the physical system.
Hypothesis HA is stronger than H∗ in the very sense that HA implies H∗, but
the converse does not hold. If hypothesis HA is assumed to be true, then from
HA and MO follows that:
(HB) – The ‘empty place’ in the mathematical structure must have a phys-
ical interpretation, and the most coherent interpretation for it is that it
represents a tenth spin- 32 baryon. Also its characteristics are interpreted
coherently with the characteristics of the other nine spin- 32 baryons.
Then, we consider the following premise:,
(P3∗) – The existence of a tenth baryon (having the predicted character-
istics) is possible (prima facie). Namely, there is no a priori reason to
exclude that HB is true.
Finally, from HB together with the premise P3∗, the following conclusion follows,
which still has a hypothetical character:
(HC) – There exists a tenth baryon having the predicted characteristics.
The argument starts from a reasonable hypothesis (H∗) and finishes with
another hypothesis (HC). Along its development, however, the argument makes
use of other intermediate hypothesis (HA and HB). Thus, the reasonableness of
HC depends over the reasonableness of HB and HC . In particular, we have to
show that none of these assumptions conceals RP among its wrinkles. Let us
review the argument and linger on every single step, in order to clarify it and
make some remarks.
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A different reconstruction of the GMNPR: remarks
Premise P1∗ is a reformulation of Bangu’s P1 “Each of the upper nine posi-
tions in the symmetry scheme has a physical interpretation”. The difference
is substantial. Bangu’s formulation is in terms of “physical interpretations” of
the symmetry scheme; my formulation, instead, is in terms of “representative
effectiveness” of the symmetry scheme for the nine baryons already detected.
However, the two formulations are equivalent: if each of the upper nine positions
in the symmetry scheme has a physical interpretation (and we are satisfied by
this interpretation), then we can consider the symmetry scheme as a good rep-
resentation at least for those nine baryons; conversely, if the symmetry scheme
is a good representation for at least those nine baryons, then we must have an
interpretation from elements in the formalism to the nine baryons.
Premise P1∗ reproduces more closely the physicists’ perspective: when they
deal with a mathematical structure, they do not look at it as an interpreted
structure, but rather as a representation, whose representative effectiveness they
are interested in evaluating. However, this may be seen just as a ‘stylistic’
preference and it is not clear why one should prefer P1∗ over P1. The real
advantage of adopting P1∗ instead of P1 consists rather in the fact that P1∗,
unlike P1, permits the generalization H∗. This point is very important. Also
P1 can be generalized, but the resulting generalization would be very different
from H∗. It would appear as follows:
(H∗∗) – Each position in the symmetry scheme has a physical interpreta-
tion.
H∗∗ is much stronger than H∗, to the extent that it is very close (if not equiv-
alent) to RP. Actually, H∗∗ already suggests the existence of a tenth 32 -spin
baryon, and such a generalization would be completely unmotivated. Hypoth-
esis H∗, on the contrary, is perfectly reasonable. It is just an induction over
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what observed up to now: the symmetry scheme adopted has alredy revealed
itself effective in representing the nine known baryons, so why do not we guess
that it is effective in representing the whole class of 32 -spin baryons too? This
hypothesis does not suggest, in any sense, that there must be hidden baryons
still to be discovered, neither it suggests that we should look for such hidden
baryons. After all, the nine baryons we already know might be the whole class
of 32 -spin baryons. If nothing has to be added to this class, then H
∗ is justified
a fortiori. If, on the contrary, something else has to be added to this class,
then we will see whether this hypothesis will turn out to be right or not. But
up to now there is nothing that prevents us from making such a hypothesis.
Actually, hypothesis H∗ had already been made by physicists when they first
proposed such a symmetry scheme to classify this particular kind of particles:
they proposed it just because they thought that it could be a good candidate to
represent the class of 32 -spin baryons.
Remember that, when I say that the symmetry scheme represents the whole
class of the 32 -spin baryons, I am not saying that it is isomorphic to it. In
the previous chapter we saw that a mathematical structure M can be said to
represent a physical system S if and only if S is monomorphic toM , in the sense
that we previously precised. M might even be isomorphic to S, but this is not
necessary. When M is not isomorphic to S, we can say that M is ‘redundant’,
meaning that the domain of M is richer than S; namely, there are elements
in M that are not to be interpreted over S. Thus, in making hypothesis H∗,
we are just guessing that the class of 32 -spin baryons is monomorphic to the
symmetry scheme, leaving undecided whether it is also isomorphic or not. As I
precised in section 6.2.3, hypothesis H∗ would turn out to be false only if a new
3
2 -spin baryon were discovered having not the characteristics predicted by the
mathematical structure (case B in section 6.2.3). If no new 32 -spin baryon were
discovered, then there would be no need to drop out the mathematical structure
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adopted, but we would only admit that the mathematical formalism is, in this
case, suitable in representing the class of 32 -spin baryons but redundant.
However, we notice that, if we assume that a mathematical structure M
represents a physical system S, then only two alternatives are possible: generally
speaking, either the mathematical structure M is redundant; or it is not, in
which case it is isomorphic to S. In section 5.4.2, I have also poined out that
if we do not know whether a mathematical structure is redundant or not, we
have only one possibility: to force the original hypothesis in a stronger one and
try to verify whether M is isomorphic to S or not. In our case, we already
have good reasons to believe H∗, namely that our symmetry scheme is a good
representation for the whole class of 32 -spin baryons. But this does not imply
neither that the mathematical structure at issue is isomorphic, nor that it is
monomorphic-but-not-isomorphic. This case is similar to the case discussed in
section 5.4.2, and then we can do what I suggested in that chapter;14 namely, to
pass from hypothesis H∗ to hypothesis HA, which is stronger than the former.
Now, one might object: Why are we compelled to such a stronger hypothesis?
Is not hiding here the so much vituperate Reification Principle? Have we not
let it surreptitiously insinuate itself into HA?15 The suspicion is legitimate and
I cannot underestimate it. However, there are at least three good reasons why
HA is not RP in disguise:
1. The shift from H∗ to HA is methodologically justified, while the employ-
ment of RP is not; for, as Bangu admits, RP is not always reliable.
14In section 5.4.2 I was talking about how we can detect that a certain mathematical
structure is monomorphically injected from a physical system. Here, instead, I am discussing
a case which is a bit different: in the present case, we already have a structure which we
are justified to believe that at least embeds the physical system at issue; however, we do not
know whether it only embeds the physical system or it is also isomorphic to it. Nonetheless,
the cases are similar to the extent that the monomorphism hypothesis is a hypothesis which
we cannot work with unless we have already spelt out the complete interpretation from the
mathematical terms to the physical ones. But this can be done only if we perfectly know the
composition of the physical system at issue — and this is not our case.
15This is actually the objection that Sorin Bangu moved, during a private conversation,
against my account. I believe that the following considerations resolve his legitimate doubts.
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2. Hypothesis HA is just a hypothesis; it is not a principle. As such, HA can
be falsified and hence replaced by a better hypothesis, while RP cannot.
3. Hypothesis HA does not concern the reality, but rather the relation be-
tween the reality and the mathematical structure that we are using to
represent it.
Let me start from the first consideration. Why are we justified (methodolog-
ically justified) in passing from H∗ to HA? As I have precised in the previous
chapter, we can work with the monomorphism hypothesis only if we know the
extent of this monomorphic relation; i.e., if we know what we can, and what
we cannot, infer from the mathematical structure to the physical system. If we
do not know the limits of our monomorphism, then we have no other alterna-
tive than verifying the limits of the isomorphism hypothesis. Such a stronger
hypothesis has the merit of being the only hypothesis permitting us to make
inference from the mathematical structure to the physical system (unless we
have already defined the monomorphism). These inferences can then be con-
fronted with reality by means of experiments, and, consequently, be confirmed
or rejected.
Actually, there is no way to define the limits of a monomorphism except
forcing the isomorphism hypothesis.16 Let consider, for example, the following
case. Suppose we have two mathematical structures, A and B, and suppose that
A is monomorphic-but-not-isomorphic to B. How can we proceed? We should
prove either
1. that do no exist a function φ : A→ B such that any element b ∈ dom(B)
belongs to the image of φ; or, similarly, that for any function φ : A → B
16I am not considering here — since they are trivial — cases in which we have already
reasons to believe that a certain mathematical element or relation does not belong to the
image of the structure-preserving relation. In the coconut toy example discussed in chapter 5,
for example, we already know that an interpretation of the negative numbers (however it may
be) is not relevant for the problem at issue. In similar cases, we already know the limits of
the monomorphic relation.
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there exists an element b ∈ dom(B) such that b do not belong to the image
of φ. Or, alternatively,
2. that B has a property/function/relation that is surely not satisfied by A.
In order to prove one of the two point, one could proceed by assuming, per
absurdum, that there exists an isomorphism, and then show that such an as-
sumption led to a contradiction. But different ways to prove 1 or 2, which do
not need to assume the existence of an isomorphism, may be viable. However,
we are not facing the problem of confronting two mathematical structures. We
are trying to confront a mathematical structure and a ‘physical structure’ —
and we have seen in the previous chapter that this situation is much more com-
plicated. The complication is due, among other things, by the fact that here we
have also to interpret mathematical terms and relations, and moreover by the
fact that we don’t know exactly the ‘physical structure’. For these reason, we
cannot follow strategy (1), since we do not have a complete list of the elements
of A (our ‘physical structure’). This means that we know that all the known
elements of A are associated to elements in B (the mathematical structure), but
we do not know whether the known elements in A are all the elements in A.
There could be other elements whose existence we still ignore. Therefore, we do
not know whether, for any elements b in B, b belongs to the image of A or not,
and hence we do not know whether A and B are isomorphic or not. The same
can be said, mutatis mutandis, for the strategy (2). Thus, the only way to verify
whether effectively A and B are isomorphic is to proceed by ‘empirical way’: we
try effectively to associate every element and relation in B to an element and
relation in A (by means of an oportune interpretation), and then we check the
effective existence of such an element or relation in A by means of experiments
or empirical proof. If we do not find any empirical confirmation, then we can
either modify the interpretation, or admit that the isomorphism does not hold.
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These considerations shows that the shift from H∗ to HA is methodologically
legitimate: since we cannot work with the monomorphism hypothesis unless we
know the limits of the monomorphism, in some cases we are legitimate to force
this hypothesis by turning it into an isomorphism hypothesis, and then we can
try to delimitate the scope of ths isomorphism (if it can be delimitate) ‘from
outside’.
The second remark concerns the status of HA and RP. HA is a hypothesis,
RP is a principle (at least, this is how it is presented by Bangu). The difference
is substantial. After all, a hypothesis is just a hypothesis, and there is nothing
harmful in making a hypothesis. At least, there is nothing harmful if it can be
falsified — and we saw that there is at least one sense in which our hypothesis HA
is falsifiable. Thus, HA is not different from H∗, and no more methodologically
problematic than the latter. Moreover, since HA is just a hypothesis, it has
no methodological value; namely, it does not impose on us a prescription, or
a rule to follow in some cases. It is simply a guess. RP, on the contrary, is a
methodological principle, and as such it prescibe us how to behave given some
situations. In particular, RP prescribes us to find a physical referent for Γ ′
every time that Γ and Γ ′ are formally similar and Γ has a physical referent. A
part from the fact that this rule cannot be always followed, if we employ such
a rule in an argument, then we have the problem of justifying the legitimacy of
such a rule — and we saw that all the problems with Bangu’s reconstruction are
centered around the justification of RP. Instead, the employment of HA among
our premises do not raise any difficulty; at least — as already said — no more
than H∗ does.
Finally, the third remark concerns the scope of HA and RP. RP actually says
something on reality: it says that if the formalism is such and such, then reality
is such and such. On the contrary, HA is not an hypothesis on reality; it is rather
an hypothesis concerning the relationship between the mathematical formalism
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and reality described by it. If the mathematical formalism stands in a certain
relation with the physical phenomenon, then we are justified to make inferences
from the mathematical formalisms to reality. But these inferences ultimately
depend on the assumption that the relation between the mathematical formalism
and reality is such and such. If our inferences are disconfirmed by experience,
then we can simply conclude that our hypothesis on this relation was false.
Actually, RP completely bypasses this step: it does not call into question the
relation between the formalism and the reality; it simply forces us to find a
referent for those elements in the formalism that are still without a reference.
But this cannot be done in general. It can be done only if the formalism
(the mathematical structure) stands in an isomorphic relation with the physical
phenomenon, and we are justified to find a reference for these elements only if
we are justified to believe that such an isomorphic relation obtains between the
mathematical structure and the physical phenomenon.
Also notice that RP is a generic principle, and applies to any mathematical
structure we may want to employ (better: which should apply to any math-
ematical structure, since we already know that such a principle is not always
valid). On the contrary, HA does not refer to mathematical structures in gen-
eral, but is related to a very specific mathematical structure (in this case, the
decuplet scheme resulting from the SU(3) group). Thus, if we want to apply
the same kind of argument for making an analogous existential prediction from
a different mathematical structure (see, for example, my next example), we will
have to formulate a different isomorphism hypothesis, since the mathematical
structure and the physical system at issue will be different from those which
HA refers to. Such a new isomorphism hypothesis will have to be justified, and
its justification (if such a justification is possible) will be obviously independent
from the justification we offered for accepting HA. Therefore, we could say that,
if HA is true, then RP|MA is true, where “RP|MA” denotes RP restricted to that
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particular mathematical structure MA to which HA refers. In different words,
HA implies the truthness only of a particular instantiation of RP. The converse
does not hold: if RP is true in general, then we should be justified to say that
any mathematical structure, employed in representing a certain physical phe-
nomenon, is isomorphic to that physical phenomenon. But this is obviously
false; remember, for example, the coconut puzzle in the previous chapter: in
that case we are not justified to think that there is a physical reference also
for negative numbers. Hence, it follows that RP is false as well. Therefore, an
hypothesis like HA cannot be formulate in general, i.e. for any mathematical
structure we are dealing with; but it can be formulate for those mathemati-
cal structures only, which (1) are effective in representing a certain physical
phenomenon, and (2) can be isomorphic to the physical phenomenon they are
aiming to represent (i.e., for which an equivalent of our premise P3∗ holds).
Now, if we assume that HA is true, the mathematical observation MO per-
mits us to infer HB . Actually, if we assume that the symmetry scheme is iso-
morphic to the class of 32 -spin baryons (HA), then we have to find a referent also
for the empty place in the symmetry scheme. In searching for such a physical
referent for this empty place, we have to satisfy what in the previous chapter
I called the ‘general principle of coherence’. Namely, the physical referent for
the empty place must be coherent with the interpretation of other portions of
the formalism. In this case, there is no doubt that the only coherent inter-
pretation is that the empty place represents a tenth 32 -spin baryon having the
characteristics determined by the formalism.
From here to HC it’s a short step, and P3∗ just works as a laissez-passez
for this final step. However, if we compare our conclusion HC with Bangu’s
conclusion C, we notice a substantial difference. Actually, C talks about the
existence of a physical interpretation for the apex position, while HC talks
about the existence (tout court) of a tenth baryon. C is much similar to HB
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than to HC . Moreover, according to Bangu’s reconstruction, we need P3 to
conclude C, while in our reconstruction P3∗ is needed not to conclude HB (the
equivalent of C), but rather to conclude HC . This raises two questions: the first
concerns the reason why we need a further step; the second concerns the role of
P3/P3∗. The first question is easily answered: Gell-Mann and Ne’eman argued
for the existence of a new baryon, not for the possibility of an interpretation
of the apex position, and experimental physicists looked for the existence of a
tenth baryon, not for the existence of an interpretation for the apex position.
Regarding the second question, consider that P3/P3∗ claims that nothing in
nature seems to impede the existence of a tenth baryon having the predicted
characteristic. An interpretation is just an interpretation, and we are free to
adopt any interpretation whatsoever. But the fruitfulness of an interpretation
is valued on the basis of its fruits; namely, on the basis of the image of the world
resulting from such an interpretation. The only reason we can have to refute a
certain interpretation, is that such an interpretation compels us to the existence
of something that, according to our previous knowledge of the world, cannot
exist.17 P3/P3∗ is needed just to show that the existential consequences of
such an interpretation does not collide with anything in our previous knowledge
of the world, and hence that we can reasonably commit to the consequences
implied by such an interpretation. But the interpretation, per se, does not need
any legitimation.
We come hence to the conclusion of the GMNPR, HC , and such a conclusion
can then be verified by experimental physicists in their laboratories. Observe
that HC is as hypothetical as HA: HA implies HB and HB implies HC . An
eventual confirmation of HC is a confirmation not only of HC , but also of HB
and HA. The existence of a tenth baryon with the predicted characteristics
17Or, in more general terms, that such an interpretation compels us to accept something
(the existence of a new entity, the validity of a certain relation, and so on . . . ) that, according
to our previous knowledge of the world, we cannot accept.
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is a confirmation of the hypothesis that permitted such a prediction; i.e., the
hypothesis according to which the physical system at issue is not only monomor-
phic, but isomorphic to the mathematical structure we adopted to represent it.
If no tenth baryon had have been discovered, then we should admit that HC ,
HB and HA were bad hypothesis. If it were the case, we could just discard them
(actually, it would means that the mathematical structure adopted is not iso-
morphic to the physical system represented), but hypothesis H∗ would remain
untouched, since HC does not follow from H∗, but from HA only. Namely, that
the mathematical structure adopted is not isomorphic to the physical system
does not mean that the mathematical structure does not represent it at all.
In Bangu’s reconstruction, this distinction misses — and actually, if C were
disconfirmed, such a disconfirmation would throw a sinister light on H too, since
C depends on H, as well as on RP. Remember what I said about the presence
of an anomaly to be explained away: the anomaly exists only if we assume RP.
Actually, if C is disconfirmed, there can be only two culprits: H or RP. But if we
accept RP, then the only culprit remaining is H. Thus, as already reported in
section 6.2.3, RP itself creates the anomaly that aims to avoid! The problem —
now is clear — is that RP does not permit to distinguish between two different
features a mathematical structure can satisfies: its representative effectiveness
and its being isomorphic to its representative target. The former feature can be
satisfied even if the latter is not.
A further clarification is needed in order to conclude the exposition of my
alternative reconstruction of GMNPR. According to Bangu’s account, the main
role played by RP just consists in «giving precise indications about the char-
acteristcs of the new particle» (Bangu 2008, p. 248). The difference between
the DN standard model and the case of the omega minus prediction lies, ac-
cording to him, in the fact that the prediction (the calculation) of the specific
characteristics of the particle had not been made by a quantitative analysis of
6.2. THE PREDICTION OF THE OMEGA MINUS PARTICLE 193
its interaction, but rather «they were postulated directly from the formalism,
by relying on RP» (Bangu 2008, p. 249). Actually, Bangu distinguishes two
different questions:
(a) What are the grounds to believe that there is a new entity?
(b) What are the grounds to believe that the new entity should have the
predicted physical characteristics?
Question (a) can be answered by saying that the existence of a new baryon is
postulated in order to explain away an anomaly (according to the DN model),
but question (b) cannot be answered without assuming RP. So, all methodolog-
ical worries weigh on question (b).
I have already shown that, according to my account, the omega minus pre-
diction is not made in order to explain away an anomaly. Therefore, we cannot
hope that the DN model could account for this prediction in the same way
as it accounts for Neptune prediction. However, I have to take question (b)
into consideration in order to show that RP does not play any role even in the
prediction of characteristics. I do not agree with Bangu when he says that the
predicted characteristics were postulated directly from the formalism, since they
are postulated from the formalism plus an hypothesis on the relation between
this formalism and the physical system at issue; and I don’t agree when he
adds that they were predicted by means of RP. However, one might reply that
actually RP hides itself in my assumption HB , which answers (b).
In order to show that RP does not play any role in answering (b), I don’t
need to say much more than I have just said. I only want to show that in
my account the two questions (a) and (b) collapse into each other, so that my
previous considerations are enough to answer both. In order to achieve this
purpose, I will take into consideration the role played by the premise MO.
So far I have talked about the prediction of a new entity. But if we carefully
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examine the formalism at work, we see that SU(3) does not deal with “enti-
ties”; it simply deals with properties, whose possible combinations must obey
some invariance laws. Every position in the decuplet corresponds to a state
vector. These state vectors represent nothing but a distribution of properties
corresponding to each particle, and are linked to each other by some equations
given by the neutron-proton symmetry. Given the nine-out-of-ten state vectors
of the decuplet, Gell-Mann had simply to calculate the tenth state vector. It
provides a distribution of properties for the (supposed existing) corresponding
particle. MO simply consists in a mathematical observation about “clusters” of
properties (or state vectors): in order to complete the order of the symmetry
group, another element (another state vector) must be added to the system,
and the formal system itself forces this element to have certain particular prop-
erties. Namely, the symmetry scheme permits just one other possible state
vector. Now, since we previously interpreted the state vectors as particles (the
nine baryons), we coherently extend this interpretation to the tenth state vector
and we make the prediction in HB . Does RP play any role in this interpretation
of state vectors as particles (i.e. as distinct objects)? My answer is: no, it
doesn’t, because the interpretation simply meets a general coherence principle
and is not imposed by the formalism, but rather by the previous (satisfying)
interpretation of the other state vectors.
One might reply by observing that, if we make explicit what “extending the
interpretation” means, we find something very similar to RP. For it is possible
to state it in the following way: “If Γ and Γ ′ are elements of the mathematical
formalism describing a physical context, and Γ ′ is formally similar to Γ , then,
if Γ has an interpretation I, Γ ′ has an interpretation I ′ which is of the same
kind as I”. However, this similarity with RP does not imply that by extending
the interpretation for the state vectors we are also implicitly using RP. RP
talks about “physical referent”; on the contrary, the above principle talks about
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“interpretation of the same kind”. No reification is at work in the latter. For the
notion of interpretation does not imply the existence of a physical referent for
the element of the mathematical formalism that is being interpreted. Therefore,
the extension of the interpretation cannot be confused with the employment of
RP.
Thus, in answering (a), we are answering (b) too. While in the Neptune
case we can distinguish two moments (the prediction of a new entity in order
to explain away an anomaly and the prediction of that entity’s characteristics
in order that it may play its explanatory role), in the omega minus case we
cannot distinguish these moments, since what we predict is that a new cluster
of properties (a new state vector, according to the formalism) could exist, and
this (according to our previous interpretation of the formalism) amounts to say-
ing that a new entity with the predicted characteristics could exist. In other
words, in the Neptune case, first we predict the existence of a new planet, and
then we calculate (by interaction) its characteristics; in the omega minus case,
instead, first we predict a new combination of properties (by mathematical con-
siderations), and then (by ontological considerations) we associate them with an
entity which embodies them. What permits us to predict the new combination
of properties is just the formalism here at work (the finite group theory, the
vector space, etc.) plus some empirical facts (the discovery of those resonances
that force the SU(3) symmetry scheme into a decuplet) and a hypothesis on
the relation between the mathematical structure and the physical system repre-
sented by it, and not the usage of a controversial methodological principle such
as RP.
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6.3 Dirac’s prediction of the positron
Another case discussed by Steiner to illustrate the employment of formal analo-
gies in contemporary physics, is Dirac’s prediction of the positron. I have already
presented it in section 5.1,18 thus I do not need to linger on it as I did with
the omega minus prediction. According to Bangu, also this case would be ac-
countable only by assuming the validity of the highly controversial principle of
reification (RP).




1) – Each of the positive-energy solutions has a physical referent.
(P
′
2) – The negative-energy solutions are mathematically similar to the
positive-energy solutions. (They are similar since they are solutions for
the same equation.)
(RP) – If Γ and Γ ′ are elements of the mathematical formalism describing
a physical context, and Γ ′ is formally similar to Γ , then, if Γ has a physical
referent, Γ ′ has a physical referent as well.
(P
′
3) – The physical existence of a particle having the predicted charac-




) – The negative-energy solutions have a physical referent too. Call it
‘anti-electron’; it has the same mass m as the electron, and charge +e.
This reconstruction clearly mirrors the reconstruction of the reasoning that
led to the discovery of the omega minus particle. We can therefore extend to this
case our previous considerations, and reformulate the reasoning in the following
way, which excludes the employment of RP:
18See pp. 131-132.
19See Bangu (2012, pp. 95-109)
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(P
′
1) – The positive-energy solutions are suitably represented by the mathe-
matical structure identified by Dirac by means of his new relativistic equa-
tion for the electron.
(H
′∗) –His relativistic equation suitably represents the physical phenomenon
at issue; namely, the relativistic behavior of electron.
(H
′
A) – His relativistic equation represents the physical phenomenon at
issue not only suitably, but also non-redundantly; namely, the mathe-




) – Dirac’s relativistic equation for electron has two further negative
solutions; namely, the mathematical structure identified by Dirac’s equa-
tion admits the existence of two further ideal (mathematical) objects.
(H
′
B) – These further solutions (these further mathematical objects) must
have a physical interpretation, and such an interpretation must be coherent
with the global interpretation of the mathematical structure adopted. As
Dirac suggested, the most coherent interpretation is that these negative-
solutions corresponds to a new particle having the same mass m as the
electron but charge +e.
(P
′
3) – The physical existence of a particle having the predicted charac-
teristics is physically possible (it is compatible with the laws of physics).
Namely, there is no a priori reason to exclude that HB is true. Therefore:
(H
′
C) – There exist a new particle represented by the negative-energy solu-
tions. Call it ‘anti-electron’; it has the same mass m as the electron, and
charge +e.
Also in this case, we have expunged the reference to RP, and the conclusion





B . The conclusion H
′
C ,
depending on these hypothesis, has an hypothetical character as well. The same
arguments I previously advanced to show that RP is not concealed in anyone
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of these hypothesis can be reproduced here to the same extent. Hypothesis H
′∗




A is justified by the fact that we do not
know whether the physical system at issue is isomorphic or only monomorphic
to the mathematical structure adopted; thus, we adopt the only hypothesis that











However, some little differences between this prediction and the prediction of
the omega minus particle are worth of remark. First of all, the prediction of the
anti-electron shows, better than the previous case, that such a prediction has
not been advanced in order to eliminate or prevent any anomaly. Simply, there
is no anomaly, neither to eliminate nor to prevent. Actually, which would be
the anomaly? Suppose that no positron have been discovered, and that Dirac’s
prediction have turned out in a flop — or, if you prefer, that Dirac never realized
that such a prediction could have been made. Dirac’s equation would still be a
good representation for the relativistic behavior of electron, and I do not see any
difficulty in admitting that the two negative-energy solutions are just an odd
consequence of the mathematical structure adopted. It would be an anomaly
only if we pre-emptively assume RP — which would be a petitio principi. In this
case, the comparison with the coconut puzzle is as enlightening as possible. In
the coconut case, we saw that a negative solution is mathematically possible, al-
though no interpretation can be offered for such a solution. Similarly, we notice
that in Dirac’s case a negative-energy solution is mathematically possible, but
in this case a fruitful interpretation has been found, and its accuracy empirically
confirmed. The only difference between the two cases is that in the former we
cannot find any satisfying interpretation for the odd solution, while in the latter
we can. Thus, in the former case we come to the conclusion that the mathe-
matical structure employed is — according to our terminology — ‘redundant’,
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i.e. non-isomorphic to the physical system represented; while in the latter case
we come to the conclusion that the mathematical structure is — at least for the
moment, and barring further adjustments — isomorphic to the physical system
represented.
Secondarily, the interpretation of the negative-energy solutions as standing
for a new entity seems to be less immediate than the interpretation of the apex
position as standing for a new baryon. In a certain sense, such an interpretation
seems to be much more ‘open-minded’ and ‘unconventional’, as if in solving the
coconut puzzle we suggested that the −4 solution might make physical sense. As
I noted when I was discussing the coconut puzzle, the more we go far from our
immediate experience, the more we can hazard unconventional interpretation
for the mathematical structures we are dealing with, since the constrictions we
have to take into consideration are fewer. However, we must always remember
that an interpretation, as such, is just an interpretation and its agreement with
reality must always be checked. Remember the flow diagram represented at
p. 164: if the interpretation fails to match with reality (i.e., if no omega minus
baryon, or no positron were detected), we can (1) change the interpretation
and check this new interpretation again; or we can (2) modify our hypothesis
about the relation between the mathematical structure and the physical system
and say that the former is not isomorphic to the lattere, although it is still
effective in representig the latter; or we can (3) modify such an hypothesis in
a more radical way, and say that the mathematical structure actually does not
represent the physical system we are dealing with. Which of these options we
have to follow depends on the kind of failure we run into: for example, if we
detect a tenth baryon having different characteristics from those predicted by
SU(3), then we must admit that SU(3) fails in representing the class of 32 -spin
baryons; if, on the contrary, we do not detect any tenth baryon, we can insist
that the mathematical structure determined by SU(3) (the decuplet scheme)
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is still a good representation for the class of 32 -spin baryons, although it is not
isomorphic to it; or, again, if we have other interpretations available, we can still
insist that such a mathematical structure is isomorphic to the class of 32 -spin
baryons, in which case we have to check the validity of the new interpretations.
6.4 Final considerations
The two reconstructions I proposed in the present chapter have shown that we
do not need to assume RP in order to justify the reasons of those who employed
those mathematical structures to make the predictions at issue. We can do it in
a very reasonable way if we assume the ‘modified’ structural account I presented
in the previous chapter. These reconstructions have also shown that, at least in
the two cases just discussed, we do not need to assume any ‘Pythagorean’, or
extra-naturalistic assumption about mathematics in order to clarify its heuris-
tic role. Simply, such an heuristic role can be justified by assuming — once
again — my account for representative effectiveness of mathematics, a certain
physicists’ creativity in proposing verifiable interpretations for those terms in
the mathematical structure for which an interpreatation has not already given,
and — why not? — a certain amount of luck in proposing the right inter-
pretation.20 The key element in my account that permitted such alternative
reconstructions is the role played by the interpretation. As we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, standard structural accounts of the applicability of mathematics
are inclined to underestimate such a component — and even to completely over-
look it. However, it becomes decisive not only in permitting a preciser account
for the representative effectiveness of mathematics, but also in offering an ac-
count for the heuristic potentialities of a mathematical structure in terms of its
20Once again, we must remember that we usually tend to take into consideration only those
positive cases in which a certain interpretation, or a certain prediction, turns out to be, in
the end, right; but we must always remember that the history of science is full of unsuccessful
attempts, and that unsuccesful cases are as instructive as positive cases are. On this regard,
see Pincock (2012, ch. 7) and Azzouni (2000).
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representative values. Such predictions were possible because we already had a
good mathematical structure that represented the physical system at issue. On
this representative basis, physicists could then make hypothesis on the degree
of precision of these representations, and then — assuming that the precision
is absolute (i.e. that there is an isomorphic relation between the mathematical
structure and the physical syste) — make interpretative attempts in order to
fix the exact relation between the representative mathematical structure and
its target. Thus, what in Steiner’s terminology seems to be a case of analogy
between mathematics and physics, actually is just a case of good mathematical
representation that, under the opportune interpretation, turns out to be very
productive.
Let me conclude with a final observation. As I said, hypotheses like HA
or H
′
A concern the relation between a certain mathematical structure and the
physical system represented by them. However, one might notice that it is quite
strange that a physicist should formulate such hypotheses. After all, physicists
do not make hypothesis on the relation between mathematical structures and the
world, but make hypotheses on the world by means of mathematical structure.
Actually, I hold these two formulations are equivalent. It is maybe true that
physicists do not explicitly state such hypotheses, but when they make hypoth-
esis on the world by means of mathematical considerations, they are implicitly
claiming that they are justified in doing that beacause of a certain relation ob-
taining between the world and the mathematical structure. We might even say
that physicists are led, in their researches, by the (maybe implicit and unjusti-
fied)21 idea that for any physical system there is an isomorphic mathematical
structure which is a perfect (non-redundant, in my terminology) representation
of it. Thus, when physicists select a certain mathematical structure as a good
candidate to represent a certain physical system, they implicitly hope that such
21For more on this point, see my conclusions, p. 205.
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a mathematical structure is the perfect representation of that physical system —
i.e., that the mathematical structure is isomorphic to the target. It is probably
not an absurdity to consider such an idea as a leading idea in scientific research.
Conclusions
In the previous chapters, I considered several topics connected to the effec-
tiveness of mathematics in physics and I drew various conclusions. We saw
that the dismissal of the problem of mathematical applicability in contempo-
rary philosophical analysis is not justified by an effective overcoming of it, but
is simply due to contingent reasons. Moreover, by analyzing Wigner’s (1960)
and Steiner’s (1998) works, we saw that there is a philosophical problem con-
cerning the effectiveness of mathematics, and in fact there are several problems
concerning such an effectiveness, mainly because of the fact that mathematics
can play different roles in science (as we saw when I discussed Pincock’s (2012)
work). These problems are not isolated from the other philosophical problems
concerning mathematics (such as, for example, ontological and epistemological
problems), and they should be considered on a par with them, since a compre-
hensive account of the effectiveness of mathematics can help, in a consistent
way, to clarify these other issues. In the last two chapters of this work I offered
an account for the representative effectiveness of mathematics, with a particular
attention to the heuristic imports that such a representative effectiveness can
have (and actually, had) in some cases.
The account I proposed is grounded on a structural basis, but by analyzing
other ‘traditional’ structural accounts, I came to the conclusion that these ‘tra-
ditional’ structural accounts need to be improved and clarified under different
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respects in order to be considered satisfying. First of all, I precised which is
the minimal structural relation that has to obtain in order to grant representa-
tivity. I argued that such a minimal relation is the monomorphic relation from
the ‘physical structure’ at issue to the candidate mathematical structure. This
precisation, however, did not remove any vagueness, since the monomorphic re-
lation can be fixed only after we determined the relevant elements of a ‘physical
structure’. But this, in turn, can be done only once we have fixed our interests
in representing such a physical system. It must be noted that, in a certain sense,
traditional structural accounts do not avoid vagueness, since when they invoke
a structural relation between mathematical and ‘physical’ structures as a con-
dition for applicability they leave uncertain which this relation has to be (they
usually invoke homomorphism, but we saw that homomorphism is too generic).
Secondary, I underlined that a structural relation cannot, by itself, grant any
content at all if it does not go with an interpretation. It is mainly by emphasizing
the role of interpretation in mathematical representation that I could connect
representative and heuristic roles of mathematics in science. Finally, I stressed
that to speak about ‘physical’ structures to be match with mathematical struc-
tures is an improper way of speaking. In fact, I used several times the expression
“physical structure”, but I put it everytime among inverted commas, in order to
make it evident that it was just an abbreviate way of speaking. Actually, I pre-
cised that the monomorphic relation subsists among the mathematical structure
and the data model, which is already mathematically structured (even if in an
incomplete manner), and acts as an intermediatory between the mathematical
structure and the phenomena of the physical world.
However, the remarks I made, and the conclusions I drew, in the previous
pages, suggest some other general considerations concerning the relation be-
tween mathematics, world and physics, which I will present in the following
sections. These considerations are not to be considered, strictly speaking, as
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definitive or certain; they are compatible with my previous considerations, but
they need much more work in order to be satisfactorily argued. However, I will
insert them here just as a sketch for future researches, and as an evidence of the
fruitfulness of the analysis previously made.
Mathematics and the structure of the world
The account of the representative and heuristic effectiveness of mathematics I
offered in chapter 5 permits some interesting considerations about the relation
between mathematics and world.
When, in chapter 5, I pointed out that the minimal structural relation that
must obtain between a mathematical structure and a physical system, in order
for the former to be representatively effective, is the monomorphism from the
physical system to the mathematical structure, I also precised that this role
cannot be played by an isomorphism relation, since such a relation seems to be
too stronger. In fact, when we look at some concrete exemples of mathemat-
ical representation in physics, we find that often the mathematical structures
employed to represent some physical phenomena are richer than these latter.
However, it is clear that if we can find a mathematical structure which is per-
fectly isomorphic to a physical system, we are in the best situation we could
desire: we have found the ‘right’ structure and there is no improvement to seek
here; everything we can deduce from the mathematical structure must have a
correspondence in the physical system. Now, one might ask whether, for any
physical system or phenomenon we want to understand and represent, there is
a perfectly fitting (that is, isomorphic) mathematical structure.
It is not easy to find a conclusive and satisfying answer to this question. In a
(2000) article, Mark Wilson distinguishes between two philosophical ‘aptitudes’
or positions, which he calls “mathematical optimism” and “mathematical oppor-
tunism”. According to him, «Mathematical optimism [. . .] claims that for every
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physical occurrence there is a mathematical process that copies its structure
isomorphically» (p. 297). Thus, if we characterize mathematics as the “general
science of possible structures” (as mathematical structuralists do — but we saw
that we do not need to be mathematical structuralists to accept this very simple
claim), then
Presumably this large bag of general “structures” is expected to contain
an adequate copy of any “physically possible structure” that we could ever
assign to the physical world, on the grounds that if a structure is coherent
at all, it must have a suitable representative within mathematics. In
other words, somewhere deep within mathematics’ big bag must lie a
mathematical assemblage that is structurally isomorphic to that of the
physical world before us, even if it turns out that we will never be able to
get our hands on that structure concretely. (pp. 296-297)
Maybe we cannot find the “right” copy for a certain “physical structure”, but this
is just because sometimes the “right” structures are simply too much complicated
and we cannot handle their complexity. However, for mathematical optimists
it holds as a general principle that a certain “physical structure” has always an
isomorphic mathematical copy.
However, as Wilson notices,
many of the originators of mathematical physics in the early modern pe-
riod would never have accepted such a cheery presumption; they man-
tained that it is only when the processes of nature enjoy a special simplic-
ity that mathematics can track its workings adequately. (p. 297)
This is what he calls “mathematical opportunism”: «it is the job of the applied
mathematics to look out for the special circumstances that allow mathematics to
say something useful about physical behavior» (p. 297). In other words, math-
ematical opportunists are motivated by the belief that the success of applied
mathematics is based on a certain number of constraints that physical worlds
must obey in order to be described by mathematical structures. It is not sim-
ply a matter of unmanageable complexity: «the success of applied mathematics
require some alien element that cannot be regarded as invariably present in the
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physical world» (p. 299).22
It is not easy to decide in favour of one of these two doctrines. If it is true,
as Wilson remarks, that many of the originators of mathematical physics in
the early modern period would have described themselves as mathematical op-
portunist, it is also true that sometimes physicists themselves seems to endorse
an extreme mathematical optimism. For example, the swedish-american cos-
mologist Max Tegmark, in his (2007), endorse what he calls the Mathematical
Universe Hypothesis (MUH): «Our external physical reality is a mathematical
structure» (p. 102).23 In other words, Tegmark argues that, if we assume that
there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans
(this is what he calls the External Reality Hypothesis, ERH), then the external
reality described by a hypothetical Theory of Everything (TOE) would be a
mathematical structure, since such a TOE would only consist of abstract terms
and their relations. Such a claim can be surely considered as a very extreme
form of mathematical optimism.
I do not think that many would follow Tegmark along this line of thought.
Note that Tegmark’s MUH does not talk about “representation”, it talks about
“reality”: he is not saying that there is a mathematical structure that isomor-
phically represents everything in the TOE; he is saying that all what there is
in the TOE is just a mathematical structure. In the end, Tegmark’s MUH is
just an empirical hypothesis which is far from being porvable — in any sense.
In fact, in his (2007) article, Tegmark shows a diagram in which he represents
how different scientific theories can be organized in a family tree. Within this
family tree, every scientific discipline can be derived from General Relativity
and/or Quantum Field Theory, and these two last theories are derived in turn
22According to Wilson (2000), «many of the skeptical remarks one finds in the anti-
realist literature are better recast as considerations in favor of mathematical opportunism,
although most of these arguments underestimates the resources available to an honest opti-
mist» (p. 299).
23See also Tegmark (2014).
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from an hypothetical TOE. A justification for MUH is given by the (empirical)
observation that
the ratio of equations to baggage decreases as we move down the tree,
dropping near zero for highly applied fields as medicine and sociology. In
contrast, theories near the top are highly mathematical, and physicists
are struggling to articulate the concepts, if any, in terms of which we can
understand them. (p. 103)
According to Tegmark, a description can be considered “complete” only if it
is well-defined also according to non-human sentient entities (aliens, for exam-
ple) that lack the common understanding of concepts that we humans have
evolved (e.g., “particle”, “observation”, “force”, and any other words appearing
in a theory). These concepts are the “baggage” of which he talks in the previous
quotation.24
Now, leaving aside the fact that such a complete derivation of scientific
theories from an hypothetical TOE is highly problematic (and actually still far
from being realized), many doubts can be cast on Tegmark’s claim according to
which the TOE should be a completely “baggage-free” theory.
However, coming back to our original question (is there, for any physical
phenomenon, a suitable, isomorphic, mathematical representation of it?), it is
clear that a solution to this problem is far from being achieved — and achiev-
able. It is a matter of fact that applied mathematics, today, largely relies on
non-isomorphic representations, but it is hard to take this as an evidence for
mathematical opportunism, since such representations could be due simply to
the fact that an eventual isomorphic representation would be humanly unman-
ageable because of its overwhelming complexity.
Probably, the most prudent attitude in this regard consists in adopting a
‘modest’ and ‘moderate’ optimism, with a touch of opportunist skepticism. It
must be noted, however, that if one found an argument in favor of mathemat-
ical opportunism (and, consequently, against mathematical optimism), then a
24See (Tegmark 2007, pp. 102-104).
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problem for structural realism would arise, particularly for its ontic version (à
la Ladyman & Ross (2007)).25 Indeed, if some physical phenomenon cannot be
isomorphically grasped by a mathematical structure, then we should conclude
that mathematics can have here only an instrumental value. But if it is so, then
it seems to be hard to argue in favor of an ontic meaning for these mathematical
structures.
Structural surplus, heuristics and theory development
I have already stressed, when I presented my account in chapter 5, the impor-
tance of the surplus structure. Actually, such a surplus is what often permits
to generate new heuristic opportunities for increasing the knowledge and mak-
ing new discoveries: the fact that a theory may have a mathematical surplus
in its representation means that such a mathematical surplus — which at the
moment rests uninterpreted within the representation itself — may be at any
time ‘activated’ by means of a new interpretation. Such a notion of structural
“surplus”, therefore, can play a significant role not only in analyzing single dis-
coveries or single progresses in science (as I did in chapter 6 by discussing the
discovery of the omega minus particle and of the positron), but also in analyzing
the evolution of physical theories themselves.
The importance of the structural surplus of mathematical representations
has been examined by Michael Redhead in various works. For example, in
(Redhead 1975) he is concerned with an anlysis of the role played by symmetries
in inter-theory relations. However, in order to offer a suitable framework for his
discussion, he outlines a brief sketch of the role of mathematics in theoretical
physics. The account he offers presents some analogy with the account here
presented in chapter 5, but some differences should be noted. He considers a
25Epistemic versions of structural realism (à la Worrall (1989)), on the contrary, would
remain untouched.
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theory T as embedded in a mathematical structure M ′, by this meaning that
there exists an isomorphism between T and a substructure M of M ′, so that
M ′ is a non-simple conservative extension of M (see fig. 6.3). «If we like —
Figure 6.3: Redhead (1975, p. 87).
Redhead goes on — we can introduce an uninterpreted calculus C of which T
and M are regarded as isomorphic models, or we can introduce a calculus C ′
for M ′ and introduce a new theory T ′ which is partially interpreted via the
structure T» (p. 87; see fig. 6.4).
Figure 6.4: Redhead (1975, p. 88).
As Redhead comments,
The relative complement of T in T ′ we refer to as the surplus structure in
the mathematical representation of the theory T . Now we can reverse our
line of argument and starting with a given T ′ ask what is the corresponding
T? To a positivist T would involve only observational terms but to a realist
theoretical terms may also appear in T . Even to a realist it is not clear in
some cases whether the surplus structure should or should not be accorded
ontological reference [. . .]. In other cases terms in T ′ which starts their
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life effectively as uninterpreted symbols may acquire a reference in reality
as that particular branch of science develops. (p. 88)
It is clear that Redhead’s concern in introducing such a calculus aims at
the same target we aimed in chapter 5 and 6, when I discussed how and why
a mathematical representation can have surprising heuristic implications. How-
ever, there are some differences between Redhead’s analysis and mine. The first,
immediate, difference is that Redhead compares mathematical structures with
theories, while I compared mathematical structures with data models which, in
the end, reflect physical reality. But this is not a big difference, since, presum-
ably, these theories are in some sense compared to physical reality. Secondarily,
Redhead claims that the theory T must be isomorphic to a substructure M of
M ′. Now, this can be seen just as a boundary case of my monomorphic relation.
Indeed, if T is isomorphic to M , why do we deal with M ′? And how can we fix
an M ′ of which M is a substructure? After all, there can be an infinite number
of structures of which M is a substructure. In my account, on the contrary,
we just know that M ′ (which is fixed from the start) embeds T (that is, T is
monomorphic to M ′). Now, we can hope for reducing M ′ to a substructure M
of it, which is isomorphic to T , but this is not always feasible. For example, if
no tenth baryon had ever been discovered, how could Gell-Mann and Ne’eman
reduce their mathematical structure M ′ to an M isomorphic to T (where T
does not have a tenth baryon Ω− among the objects of its domain)? It is not
clear, not only “how”, but even “that” this task could have been completed. In a
certain sense, by thinking that a theory T is always isomorphic to a mathemat-




The last section of Bangu’s (2008) article is dedicated to some general consid-
erations concerning the role and the importance of mathematics in physics and
science in general. In these conclusions, he underlines that
The problem presented here is [. . .] not a direct challenge for the working
physicists, but for the physicist-qua-methodologist; that is, a challenge for
her ability to propose a systematic philosophical/methodological frame-
work able to accommodate this episode. Consequently, our problem is an
instance of a broader kind of concern: what is the most appropriate way
to construe the relation between philosophical/methodological standards
and scientific practice. (Bangu 2008, p. 255)
According to Bangu, the best account for this relation between methodological
standards and scientific practice is what he calls ‘methodological opportunism’,
whose spirit is well captured by the following Einstein’s (1949) words:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy
kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact
with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is
– insofar as it is thinkable at all – primitive and muddled. However, no
sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his
way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-
content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does
not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his
striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the
epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which
are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let him-
self be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by
the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to
the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist : he
appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of
the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts
and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logically deriv-
able from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers
his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they fur-
nish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He
may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the
viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his
research. (pp. 683-684; italics mine)
By embracing this kind of opportunism, the scientists can reject the DN model,
the RP principle, and the various reconstructions that epistemologists may pro-
pose in order to methodologically account for some particular scientific discov-
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eries. They are free to ignore these epistemological difficulties and to adopt any
stratagem they want in order to endorse scientific progress.
This kind of puzzle, the scientist-qua-methodological opportunist stresses,
should not be allowed to interfere with the practice of science, as no at-
tempt to offer a principled, systematic account (either standard or non-
standard) of those episodes should be followed too far or taken too seri-
ously. As the Einstein advice goes, scientists should patiently listen to
the epistemologists’ arguments; in the same time, they should also learn
to live without longing for the benefits of the coherence offered by the
commitment to a particular ‘epistemological system’ of either empiricist
(the DN scheme) or Pythagorean sort. (Bangu 2008, p. 256)
We must be carefull not to confuse this opportunism with the mathemat-
ical opportunism which I have previously discussed. There, the opportunism
concerned the possibility of finding an isomorphic mathematical structure for
any phenomenon in nature; here, instead, the opportunism concerns the episte-
mological rigor which scientists should comply with in their work. In different
words, epistemologists try to understand the puzzles that scientific research sub-
mits to their attention, but scientists as such are not in duty bound to respect
their prescriptions.
I perfectly agree with Bangu on his final considerations. The problems I
dealt with in the two final chapters of this work are philosophical problems and
there is no particular reason for working scientists to take them too seriously,
or to worry for these puzzles too much. However, the account presented in
these pages permits to shed light on some of these puzzles. Especially, we are
now in a better position to understand the methodological steps that led to
the discovery of the omega minus particle and of the positron, and to all the
similar scientific discoveries. This reconstruction avoids controversial principles
like RP and, at the same time, succeeds in recognizing the non-standard pecu-
liarity of these important discoveries. Moreover, we have now a reliable account
for the representative effectiveness of mathematics in science that also permits
to account for some — at least up to now — puzzling cases of mathematical
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heuristic effectiveness. It seems to me that, even if the scientist-qua- scientist
can certainly ignore our considerations, from the philosophical point of view we
obtained an unquestionable remarkable profit.
Bibliography
Atiyah, M. (2007), ‘Review of "Bourbaki, A Secret Society of Mathematicians"
and "The Artist and the Mathematician"’, Notices of the American Math-
ematical Society 54(9), 1150–1152.
Aubert, B. et al. (2006), ‘Measurement of the spin of the Ω− hyperion’, Physical
Review Letters 97, 112001. BABAR collaboration.
Ayer, A. J. (1956 [1936]), Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz Ltd.,
London. Now in (Benacerraf & Putnam 1983).
Azzouni, J. (2000), ‘Applying mathematics: An attempt to design a philosoph-
ical problem’, Monist 83(2), 209–227.
Baker, A. (2003), ‘The indispensability argument and multiple foundations for
mathematics’, Philosophical Quarterly 53, 49–67.
Baker, A. (2005), ‘Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical
phenomena?’, Mind (114), 223–238.
Baker, A. (2009), ‘Mathematical explanation in science’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science (60), 611–633.
Balaguer, M. (1998), Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford
University Press, New York.
215
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bangu, S. (2006), ‘Steiner on the applicability of mathematics and naturalism’,
Philosophia Mathematica 14(1), 26–43.
Bangu, S. (2008), ‘Reifying mathematics? Prediction and symmetry classifica-
tion’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39, 239–258.
Bangu, S. (2012), The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability
and Ontology, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK).
Barnes, V. E. et al. (1964), ‘Observation of a hyperon with strangeness minus
three’, Physical Review Letters 12(8), 204.
Barrow, J. D. (1988), The World within the World, Oxford University Press,
London. Trad. it. Il mondo dentro il mondo, Adelphi, Milano 1991.
Batterman, R. W. (2002), The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning
in Explanation, Reduction and Emergence, Oxford University Press, New
York.
Batterman, R. W. (2010), ‘On the explanatory role of mathematics in empirical
science’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61(1), 1–25.
Benacerraf, P. (1973), ‘Mathematical truth’, Journal of Philosophy 70, 661–80.
Now in (Benacerraf & Putnam 1983).
Benacerraf, P. & Putnam, H., eds (1983), Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd edn,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Bigelow, J. (1988), The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Math-
ematics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Bonolis, L. (2004), ‘From the rise of the group concept to the stormy onset
of group theory in the new quantum mechanics. A saga of the invariant
characterization of physical objects, events and theories’, Rivista del Nuovo
Cimento 27(4-5).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
Boolos, G. (1987), The Consistency of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, in J. J.
Thomson, ed., ‘On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright’, MIT
Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 3–20.
Bourbaki, N. (1950), ‘The architecture of mathematics’, American Mathematical
Monthly 57, 221–232.
Bueno, O. (1997), ‘Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach’, Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science 28, 585–610.
Bueno, O. (2003), ‘Is it possible to nominalize quantum mechanics?’, Philosophy
of Science 70, 1424–1436.
Bueno, O. & Colyvan, M. (2011), ‘An inferential conception of the application
of mathematics’, Noûs 45(2), 345–374.
Burgess, J. (1983), ‘Why i am not a nominalist’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 24(1), 93–105.
Carnap, R. (1950), ‘Empiricism, semantics, and ontology’, Revue Internationale
de Philosophie 4, 20–40. Reprinted in the Supplement to (Carnap 1956).
Carnap, R. (1956), Meaning and Necessity, enlarged edn, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago & London.
Carnap, R. (2001 [1934]), The Logical Syntax of Language, Routledge, London.
Eng. transl. Amethe Smeaton.
Carnap, R. (2003 [1928]), The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoprob-
lems in Philosophy, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois. Eng. trans-
lation by Rolf A. George.
Cheyne, C. & Pigden, C. R. (1996), ‘Pythagorean powers or a challenge to
platonism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), 639–645.
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chihara, C. (1973), Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, Ithaca.
Colyvan, M. (1999), ‘Confirmation theory and indispensability’, Philosophical
Studies 96, 1–19.
Colyvan, M. (2001a), The Indispensability of Mathematics, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Colyvan, M. (2001b), ‘The miracle of applied mathematics’, Synthese 127, 265–
277.
Colyvan, M. (2002), ‘Mathematics and aesthetic considerations in science’, Mind
(111), 69–74.
Colyvan, M. (2010), ‘There is no easy road to nominalism’, Mind (119), 285–306.
Daly, C. & Langford, S. (2009), ‘Mathematical explanation and indispensability
arguments’, Philosophical Quarterly (59), 641–658.
Davies, P. C. W. (1992), The Mind of God, Penguin Book, London.
Dirac, P. A. M. (1931), ‘Quantised singularities in the electromagnetic field’,
Proceedings of the Royal Society (London), Ser. A 133(60).
Dummett, M. (1991), Frege: Philosophy of Mathmatics, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Dyson, F. J. (1964), ‘Mathematics in the physical sciences’, Scientific American
211(3), 128–146.
Einstein, A. (1949), Reply to criticisms, in P. A. Schilpp, ed., ‘Albert Einstein:
Philosopher-scientist’, Open Court, La Salle, IL.
Feynman, R. (1967), Tha Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 219
Field, H. (1980), Science Without Numbers, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton.
Frege, G. (1980 [1884]), The Foundations of Arithmetic, Blackwell. Eng. transl.
by Austin, J. L.
French, S. (2000), ‘The reasonable effectiveness of mathematics: partial struc-
tures and the application of group theory to physics’, Synthese 125, 103–
120.
Gavroglu, K. (1995), Fritz London. A Scientific Biography, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Germain, P. (1953), Applied mathematics in France, in ‘Proceedings of a Con-
ference on Training in Applied Mathematics. Columbia University, New
York City. 22, 23, 24 October 1953’, pp. 48–53.
Goodman, N. (1968), Languages of Art, Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis.
Goodman, N. (1983), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (Mass.). 4th edn.
Hahn, H. (1988 [1933]), Logik, Mathematik und Naturerkennen, in B. McGuin-
ness, ed., ‘Hans Hahn: Empirismus, Logik, Mathematik’, Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt a.M., pp. 141–172.
Hardy, G. H. ([1940] 1992), A Mathematician’s Apology, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Hellman, G. (1989), Mathematics Without Numbers, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Hempel, C. G. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, New York.
220 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hersh, R. (1990), Inner vision outer truth., in R. E. Mickens, ed., ‘Mathematics
and Science’, World Scientific Press, Singapore.
Hertz, H. ([1894] 1956), The Principles of Mechanics, Dover Publications, Inc.,
New York. English transation of the original edition.
Hughes, R. I. G. (1997), ‘Models and representation’, Philosophy of Science
64, 325–335.
Kitcher, P. (1984), The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, Oxford University
Press, New York.
Körner, S. (2009 [1960]), Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introductory Essay,
Dover Pubblications, INC., New York. 1st edition: 1960.
Ladyman, J. (1998), ‘What is structural realism?’, Studies in History and Phi-
losophy of Science 29(3), 409–424.
Ladyman, J. & Ross, D. (2007), Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized,
Clarendon Press, Oxford. with Spurrett David and Collier John.
Liggins, D. (2008), ‘Quine, Putnman and the ‘Quine-Putnam’ indispensability
argument’, Erkenntnis (68), 113–127.
Lyon, A. & Colyvan, M. (2008), ‘The explanatory power of phase spaces’,
Philosophia Mathematica (16), 227–243.
Maddy, P. (1990), Realism in Mathematics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Maddy, P. (1992), ‘Indispensability and practice’, Journal of Philosophy
89(6), 275–89.
Maddy, P. (1995), ‘Naturalism and ontology’, Philosophia Mathematica
3(3), 248–70.
Maddy, P. (1997), Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 221
Malament, D. (1982), ‘Review of Field’s Science Without Numbers’, Journal of
Philosophy 79, 523–534.
Mancosu, P., ed. (2008), The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford.
Melia, J. (2000), ‘Weaseling away the indispensability argument’, Mind
(109), 455–479.
Melia, J. (2002), ‘Response to Colyvan’, Mind (111), 75–79.
Morrison, M. (2007), ‘All is not what it seems’, Studies in History and Philos-
ophy of Modern Physics 38, 529–557.
Ne’eman, Y. & Kirsh, Y. (1996), The Particle Hunters, 2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Panza, M. & Sereni, A. (forthcoming), ‘On the indispensable premises of the
indispensability argument’.
Papineau, D., ed. (1996), Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.
Parsons, C. (1964), Frege’s theory of number., in M. Black, ed., ‘Philosophy in
America’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Penrose, R. (1990), The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds
and the Laws of Physics, Vintage, London.
Pincock, C. (2004), ‘A revealing flaw in Colyvan’s indispensability argument’,
Philosophy of Science 71, 61–79.
Pincock, C. (2009), Towards a philosophy of applied mathematics, in O. Bueno
& Ø. Linnebo, eds, ‘New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics’, Palgrave
Macmillan.
222 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pincock, C. (2011), ‘On Batterman’s “On the explanatory role of mathematics in
empirical science” ’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62, 211–
217.
Pincock, C. (2012), Mathematics and Scientific Representation, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
Putnam, H. (1965), ‘Craig’s theorem’, Journal of Philosophy 62(10), 251–260.
Reprinted in (Putnam 1975), pp.228-236.
Putnam, H. (1975), Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putnam, H. (1979a), Philosophy of logic, in ‘Mathematics Matter and Method:
Philosophical Papers Vol. 1’, 2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Putnam, H. (1983), Two dogmas revisited, in ‘Realism and Reason: Philosoph-
ical Papers Vol. 3’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 87–97.
First published in 1976.
Putnam, H., ed. (1979b), Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Pa-
pers, Vol. 1, 2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Quine, W. V. O. (1951), ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, The Philosophical Review
60, 20–43. Now in (Quine 1961).
Quine, W. V. O. (1957), ‘The scope and language of science’, British Journal
for the History of Philosophy VIII(29), 1–17.
Quine, W. V. O. (1961), From a Logical Poin of View, 2nd (revised) edn, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge.
Quine, W. V. O. (1981a), Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
Quine, W. V. O. (1981b), Things and their place in theories, in ‘Theories and
Things’, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
and London.
Quine, W. V. O. (1995), ‘Naturalism; or, living within one’s means’, Dialectica
49(2-4), 251–263. Reprinted in (Quine 2008).
Quine, W. V. O. (2008), Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other
Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Redhead, M. (1975), ‘Symmetry in intertheory relations’, Synthese 32, 77–112.
Reichenbach, H. (1920), Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori, Springer,
Berlin.
Reichenbach, H. (1965), The Theory of Relativity and a-priori Knowledge,
University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles. Eng. transl. of
(Reichenbach 1920).
Resnik, M. D. (1981), ‘Mathematics as a science of patterns: Ontology and
reference’, Nous 15, 529–550.
Resnik, M. D. (1982), ‘Mathematics as a science of patterns: Epistemology’,
Nous 16, 95–105.
Resnik, M. D. (1985), ‘How nominalist is Hartry Field’s nominalism?’, Philo-
sophical Studies 47, 163–181.
Resnik, M. D. (1997), Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Rota, G. C. (1977), ‘The phenomenology of mathematical beauty’, Synthese
111(2), 171–182.
224 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Russell, B. (1993), Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, reprint edn, Rout-
ledge, London and New York. Firs edition: 1919.
Shapiro, S. (1983), ‘Mathematics and reality’, Philosophy of Science 50, 523–
548.
Shapiro, S. (1997), Philosophy of Mathematics. Structure and Ontology, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Simons, P. (2001), ‘Review of Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics
as a Philosophical Problem’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
52(1), 181–184.
Smart, J. J. C. (1963), Philosophy and Scientific Realism, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, New York.
Sober, E. (1993), ‘Mathematics and indispensability’, Philosophical Review
102(1), 35–57.
Steiner, M. (1975), Mathematical Knowledge, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Steiner, M. (1998), The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Steiner, M. (2005), Mathematics — application and applicability, in S. Shapiro,
ed., ‘The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic’, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, pp. 625–650.
Suppes, P. (1967a), ‘Set-theoretical structures in science’. Mimeograph.
Suppes, P. (1967b), What is a scientific theory?, in S. Morgenbesser, ed., ‘Phi-
losophy of Science Today’, Basic Books, New York, pp. 55–67.
Tegmark, M. (2007), ‘The mathematical universe’, Foundations of Physics
38, 101–150.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
Tegmark, M. (2014), Our Mathematical Universe. My Quest for the Ultimate
Nature of Reality, Knopf.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.
van Fraassen, B. C. (2006), ‘Representation: The problem for structuralism’,
Philosophy of Science 73(5), 536–547.
van Fraassen, B. C. (2008), Scientific Representation: Paradoxes and Perspec-
tives, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
von Meyenn, K. (1983), Pauli’s belief in exact symmetries, in M. Doncel et al.,
eds, ‘Symmetries in Physics (1600-1980). Proceedings of the 1st Interna-
tional Meeting on the History of Scientific Ideas’, Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona, Barcelona.
von Neumann, J. (1956), The mathematician, in J. R. Newman, ed., ‘The World
of Mathematics’, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Weinberg, S. (1986), ‘Lecture on the applicability of mathematics’, Notices of
the American Mathematical Society 33.5.
Weinberg, S. (1993), Dreams of a Final Theory, Vintage, London.
Weyl, H. (1931), Gruppentheorie und Quantenmechanik, 2nd edn, Hirzel,
Leipzig.
Wigner, E. (1926), ‘Ueber nicht kombinierende Terme in der neueren Quanten-
theorie’, Zeirschrift fur Physic 43, 492–500.
Wigner, E. (1927), ‘Einige Folgerungen aus der Schroedingerschen Theories fur
die Termstrukturen’, Zeirschrift fur Physic 43, 624–657.
226 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wigner, E. (1939), ‘On unitary representations of the inhomogenous Lorentz
group’, Annals of Mathematics 40, 149–204.
Wigner, E. (1959), Group Theory and its Application to the Quantum Mechan-
ics of Atomic Spectra, Academic Press, London. Translation of the 1931
german edition.
Wigner, E. (1960), ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natu-
ral sciences’, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13(1), 1–
14. Reprinted in Symmetries and Reflections, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington 1967.
Wilholt, T. (2004), Zahl und Wirklichkeit: Eine philosophische Untersuchung
über die Anwendbarkeit der Mathematik, Mentis-Verlag, Padeborn.
Wilholt, T. (2006), ‘Lost in the way from Frege to Carnap: How the philosophy
of science forgot the applicability problem’, Grazer Philosophischen Studien
73, 69–82.
Wilson, M. (2000), ‘The unreasonable uncooperativeness of mathematics’, The
Monist 83(2).
Worrall, J. (1989), ‘Structural realism: The best of both worlds?’, Dialectica
43, 99–124. Reprinted in (Papineau 1996), pp. 139-165.
